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 attainment of  the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Zambia, as in many 
developing countries, requires a radical departure from business as usual. The 
country needs faster economic growth coupled with redistribution as recent trends 
in poverty, social indicators, and employment imply that the MDGs cannot be achieved by 
growth alone even if  the rate were much higher than in the recent past.
The MDGs call for a broader role for the public sector, with emphasis upon public 
investment. This is in line with the central objective of  the Fifth National Development Plan, 
which is a sustainable and rapid growth rate that maximizes poverty reduction. It is our hope 
at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that the Zambian government 
could use this independent report to facilitate the implementation of  the plan. 
So far, progress towards the attainment of  the MDGs in Zambia has been mixed and 
prospects for their attainment in 2015 are slim with present levels of  public expenditure. 
However, the prospects are relatively brighter now, with the fiscal space created by the debt 
relief  from Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief  Initiative, 
and with the bold aspirations in the Fifth National Development Plan.
With the fiscal gains from debt relief  achieved, additional poverty reducing 
expenditure must come from increases in official development aid grants and a sustainable rise 
in the fiscal deficit to accommodate the properly-structured public investments needed in 
education, health and infrastructure.
This report suggests that, additionally, an internationally competitive manufacturing 
sector should be a central element in Zambia's growth and poverty reduction strategy. 
Agricultural development must be promoted as part of  the poverty reduction strategy of  the 
country, but an internationally competitive manufacturing sector should be an equally 
important element in the strategy.
Zambia has potential for a strong, competitive manufacturing sector as the country 
has an excellent natural resource base and skilled work force. Further, because urban poverty 
has increased dramatically over the last twenty years, growth of  manufacturing would be 
poverty reducing by generating employment at decent wages. 
A coherent and integrated industrial policy is necessary to achieve this. The policy 
should combine a macroeconomic framework favorable to manufacturing, a sectoral policy 
that fosters competitiveness (consistent with World Trade Organization obligations), and 
micro policies to raise the efficiency of  enterprises.  Cutting across all three levels would be 
public investment in infrastructure.
UNDP hopes that the report will be useful for the Government of  the Republic of  
Zambia, as well as for all stakeholders in policy development in Zambia and other countries as 
they work towards achieving the noble objectives of  the Millennium Declaration.
Aeneas C. Chuma
UNDP Resident Representative
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This case study of  Zambia is the first in a 
regional project on Economic Policies for 
Poverty Reduction by the Bureau for 
Development Policy and the Regional 
Bureau for Africa of  the UNDP that aims 
to reinforce, at the country level, 
programmes to strengthen the capacity for 
formulating and implementing macroeco-
nomic, sectoral and structural policies that 
are more supportive of  poverty reduction.  
The project has the following major 
focus areas: 1) integrating poverty reduction 
objectives into policymaking and socio-
economic development  strategies; and 2) 
facilitating practical policy options and 
institutional mechanisms to foster more 
pro-poor macroeconomic stabilisation 
strategies, economic restructuring and 
sustainable growth. 
 The project complements other related 
regional and country programmes support-
ing preparation and implementation of  
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
progress reports including  ongoing work 
on governance.
During the 1990s the need for poverty 
reduction in most parts of  the world 
progressively emerged as a major develop-
ment challenge for the international com
1 ~ Introduction
1.1 The UNDP Regional Programme munity.  At the 2000 Millennium 
Summit, poverty was designated as one of  
the main development challenges of  the 
new century, which required a robust 
response both at the national and interna-
tional levels. The heightened concern about 
poverty was prompted by the increasingly 
evident contrast between the rising inci-
dence of  poverty and growing inequality 
both within nations and among them; and, 
achievements in economic growth and 
significant advances on the technological 
front in many parts of  the world.  
It has also been prompted by the failure 
of  macroeconomic stabilisation and struc-
tural adjustment programmes, which 
dominated economic policy during much of  
the last two decades, to produce poverty-
reducing growth.  This failure was contrary 
to expectations of  both the adjusting 
countries and international financial institu-
tions.  With their foundations in neo-
classical theory, the stabilisation and adjust-
ment programmes assumed that poverty 
reduction would flow automatically from 
resumption of  growth and higher levels of  
employment. The record on both counts 
has not matched expectations.
Analysis of  the performance over the 
past decade of  sub-Saharan countries as a 
group suggests that significant progress has 
1
1 been made by most of  them in stabiliz-ing their macroeconomic environments.     
However, growth performance contin-
ued to be well below levels required to 
impact substantially on poverty. Although 
there has been a reversal of  the downward 
trend over the five-year period through to 
1999, annual average growth rates since the 
turn of  the century have been three percent.
This is well below the minimum rates of  
seven to eight percent required to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals target 
(MDGs) for poverty reduction. UNDP esti-
mates that as of  2001, up to  fifty percent 
of  the region's population lived in absolute 
poverty, a level that projected to worsen 
over the following five years if  these trends 
continued. Performance with  respect to 
other areas of  human poverty was as well 
not satisfactory. 
Meeting the poverty reduction objectives 
established in the MDGs, halving the pro-
portion of  people living in extreme poverty, 
is a daunting challenge, but attainable in the 
sub-Saharan region if  growth is combined 
with policies of  redistribution of  the 
growth increment. The initial poverty reduc-
tion strategies in the 1980s, to the extent 
they existed, and in the 1990s focused on 
'social safety nets', programmes directed at 
what was considered to be transitory 
adverse effects of  the adjustment progr- 
ammes on the  poor and other disadvan-
taged groups. These ad hoc  measures 
accounted for what was called the 'social 
dimensions of  adjustment' approach. 
Partly as a result of  UNDP's advocacy 
for a broader approach to the challenge of  
poverty, as set out in the global Human 
Development Reports and reinforced by the 
1995 World Summit on Social Develop- 
pment, a new generation of  poverty reduc-
tion programmes emerged by the mid-
1990s.  These took a more comprehensive 
and active approach to poverty, attempting 
to identify its root causes and integrating 
poverty reduction measures in national 
development programmes.  The changes in 
approach stressed the importance of  faith
designing macroeconomic policies to be 
pro-poor, an explicit rejection of  the faith 
that growth would 'trickle down' to the poor 
sufficiently to have a major poverty reduc-
ing effect.  The evolution of  comprehensive 
Poverty Eradication Action Plans and later 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
were outcomes of  this process. The objec-
tive is to put in place a set of  macroeco-
nomic, structural and sector policies that 
make an impact on poverty reduction by 
combining sustainable growth and equity. 
The introduction of  PRSPs also constitutes 
a response to the need for broadening par-
ticipation in economic policy formulation 
and implementation processes.
The regional programme to which this 
case study contributes aims to promote 
greater consistency between participating 
countries' economic policies and poverty 
reduction strategies. It will foster under-
standing of  potential trade-offs among stra-
tegic economic and sectoral policy objec-
tives as a prelude to formulation of  macro-
economic and sectoral policy options that 
facilitate generating growth along a sustain-
able and equitable path towards poverty 
reduction. This requires deeper and sus-
tained analytical work on stabilisation poli-
cies, that they can be more flexible on infla-
tion and fiscal deficits in relation to promot-
ing output expansion and poverty-reducing 
growth through higher levels of  investment.  
An important policy option in this connec-
tion is giving more scope under appropriate 
circumstances to fiscal expansion to allow 
for increased public investment that can 
stimulate growth.  
It is also notable that the strategic prin-
ciples that will underpin the proposed 
regional project are in line with those of  
UNDP Africa's Second Regional 
Cooperation Framework for the period 
2002-2006. The key elements of  that strat-
egy include: advocacy, policy advice and sup-
port for mainstreaming human development 
initiatives in overall development 
programmes; reinforcement of  knowledge 
networking for building on shared experi
2
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ences, knowledge and best practices in 
UNDP's focus areas; adding value to coun-
try programmes; and promotion of  regional 
cooperation  and integration.
 Given that the overall objective of  the 
regional project is to contribute to policy 
making, applied research and policy analysis, 
the mission drew on considerable Zambian 
expertise.  The core mission included 
Zambians, and the Ministry of  Finance and 
Economic Planning provided information 
and background papers essential to the 
report, as did the Bank of  Zambia.
It would be pretentious and conde-
scending to suggest that the role of  the 
external consultants was 'capacity building', 
because the capacity of  Zambian econo-
mists, both in the government and outside 
of  it, to carry out all the tasks of  policy 
design is considerable.  The contribution of  
the external collaborators was to bring to 
the study experience from other countries, 
and recent analytical developments in the 
policy field.
 
The regional programme for Africa draws 
on previous work of  a similar type in the 
UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Programme 
on the Macroeconomics of  Poverty 
Reduction. As for this programme, it 
focussed on macro policies to generate pro-
poor growth. The Asian studies, comple-
mented by several on transition countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, together 
comprise the Global Programme on the 
Macroeconomics of  Poverty Reduction. 
In its first stage, the programme pro-
duced policy-oriented research on the 
impact on poverty of  macroeconomic poli-
cies (fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate poli-
cies) and adjustment policies (financial 
liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and 
privatisation/de-regulation). The conclu-
sions from the nine case studies provide les-
sons for the African studies, which are dis-
tinctly different from the neo-liberal policy 
1.2  Lessons from the Asia-
Pacific Programme                                          
matrix that has dominated economic pre-
scriptions for the last two decades.
The conclusions include the necessity 
for an active fiscal stance, focused on public 
investment as the basis not only to foster 
more rapid growth but also as a mechanism 
to focus resources on poverty.  Monetary 
policies should play a complementary 
accommodating role to expansionary fiscal 
policies and avoid restrictive inflation target-
ing, as is done in Zambia and will be dis-
cussed in detail. 
In order to finance additional public 
investment, a more concerted effort is requ- 
ired to mobilise domestic public resources, 
which are too low in many countries to sup-
port a pro-poor growth strategy in many 
African countries, and especially in Zambia.
 The Asian studies also included in the 
macroeconomic framework recommenda-
tions for stronger regulation of  financial 
institutions and external short-term capital 
flows, and the use of  state financial institu-
tions to direct credit for both growth-
promoting and poverty-reducing purposes.  
The study is sceptical about the ability 
of  trade liberalisation to foster exports.  
Alternatively, the study points towards back-
ing a trade regime with active industrial poli-
cies, allowing medium-term protection of  
vital domestic sectors and focusing develop-
ment on sectors, such as agriculture, where 
poor workers are concentrated and are likely 
to suffer from unbridled liberalisation.   As 
presented later, there is wide agreement that 
trade liberalisation in Zambia had a negative 
impact on both manufacturing and agricul-
ture, and was anti-poor.
In order to heighten the pro-poor 
impact of  growth, the alternative policy 
framework arising from a synthesis of  the 
Asian studies placed priority on sectoral 
measures, such as employment generation 
and agricultural and rural development, as 
critical complements to macroeconomic and 
adjustment policies.  For job creation, the 
emphasis was on not only fostering a more 
employment-intensive pattern of  growth, 
but also taking explicit public policy 
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1 measures to boost the productivity of  poor workers. For agricultural and rural 
development, the emphasis is on deploying 
public investment for critical public goods 
(such as rural roads and irrigation), improv-
ing      agricultural terms of  trade and pro-
viding equitable and sustainable access to 
productive resources, such as through 
secure use-rights to land. 
In evaluating this impact, the research 
also identifies complementary policies that 
can enhance the impact on poverty of  mac-
roeconomic and adjustment policies. This 
paper reviews two complementary sectoral 
policies, namely, agricultural development 
and employment generation, which figured 
prominently in many of  the studies. The 
research also investigates whether a country 
is able to mobilise the domestic resources 
(for example, through savings, taxation or 
borrowing) to finance a high rate of  public 
and private investment for accelerated     
economic growth.
The Asian case studies addressed seven 
issues relevant to the sub-Saharan countries, 
and Zambia specifically: 1) investment-led 
fiscal policy 2) inflation targeting, 3) the rev-
enue/GDP ratios, 4) agricultural and rural 
development, 5) financial liberalisation, 6) 
employment, and 7) pro-poor trade policies.  
As for this report, the objective of  the 
Asia-Pacific regional programme was to 
broaden the policy dialogue on the prerequi-
sites for pro-poor growth and promote 
greater consistency between countries' 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and their 
macroeconomic and adjustment policies.  
Whereas, for the rest of  this section will 
focus on fiscal policy and employment, the 
major issues in Zambia.
UNDP's basic approach to pro-poor 
growth Strategies stemmed from its 2002 
report (UNDP 2002), which concentrated 
on generating growth how to make it equi-
table. Its focus was on the economic oppor-
tunities of  the poor, namely, their access to 
assets, resources and employment that 
enable them to secure a decent material stan-
dard of  living and thereby significantly last 
widen their options for human develop-
ment. The policy note took the position that 
if  countries were to reach the target of  halv-
ing extreme income poverty by 2015, rapid 
growth would be essential, more rapid than 
the average of  the last three decades.  
However, if  growth is more equitable, the 
incomes of  the poor grow faster than the 
average, and countries have a much greater 
chance of  reaching   the MDG target.
Hence, a strategy of  such 'equity-based' 
growth would need to be rapid enough to 
improve the absolute incomes of  the poor, 
and equitable enough to improve their rela-
tive position, preferably by enhancing equity 
at the start of  the growth process as 
through land reform or universalising basic 
education, or by decreasing high inequality 
over time through increasing wages by gen-
erating widespread employment among low-
skilled workers. Equity-based growth can be 
achieved through a variety of  strategies, 
which depend in part on each country's   
initial conditions. 
In general, if  growth is to immediately 
reduce poverty, it should have a pattern that 
directs resources disproportionately to sec-
tors in which the poor work, such as small-
scale agriculture, the areas in which they 
live, underdeveloped regions, and to the fac-
tors of  production that the poor possess, 
such as unskilled labour or land.
The long term objective of  all develop-
ment is to move the workforce, and poor 
workers in particular, out of  low prodctiv-
ity sectors, poorly resourced regions and 
low-skilled employment.  In most cases, this 
would imply poor workers shifting from  
agriculture and into industry and a modern 
service sector. 
In the past, import-substitution strate-
gies have succeeded in achieving this effect 
in some countries. Strategies based on 
emphasizing the exports of  manufactures 
have been successful.  In the short run, 
inequality is not likely to be reduced, and 
may even rise. 
If  inequality is reduced, it is more likely 
to be due to initial prosperity in agriculture 
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or an initially equitable distribution of  
endowments, such as land or human capital. 
In examining the impact of  macroeco-
nomic and adjustment policies, the UNDP-
supported case studies were directly con-
cerned with these vital issues of  growth and 
inequality, and their interaction. The policy 
recommendations favoured more expan-
sionary, investment-focused fiscal policies 
and more accommodating monetary policies 
than 'neo-liberal' orthodoxy allows. 
The pro-poor growth strategies in the 
Asia-Pacific reports put a premium on 
boosting domestic savings and investment, 
instead of  the orthodox focus on  alloca-
tive efficiency and price stabilisation, and 
using public investment as a stimulus to  
private investment.
This implies a more activist policy role 
for the state and a larger revenue base, with 
which it can finance capital expenditures 
and direct them to poverty-reduction pur-
poses. The case studies tended to be critical 
of  the impact of  conservative policies of  
financial liberalisation, both domestic and 
external, and favour  capital controls, stron-
ger regulation of  the financial sector, and 
some scope for directed credit, especially 
for poverty-reduction purposes.
The case studies gave trade liberalisation 
mixed reviews. Compared to financial 
liberalisation, greater trade openness had, in 
some countries, a more positive impact on 
growth and poverty reduction. However, 
this has often been combined with import 
substitution policies.  If  trade liberalisation 
is not complemented with other active mea-
sures, especially poverty-focused interven-
tions such as the building of  rural infra-
structure, financing of  agricultural develop-
ment and the provision of  adequate credit 
to small and medium enterprises, then trade 
liberalisation can exacerbate inequality and 
bypass the poor, especially the rural poor.  
As we see in subsequent chapters, this 
tended to be the case in Zambia.  To be 
most effective, liberalisation of  trade should 
be designed carefully and go hand-in-hand 
with a pro-active industrial strategy. Despite 
the widespread rhetorical commitment 
to pro-poor growth, employment is often a 
'missing link' in the chain that connects 
growth to poverty reduction.  This is prima 
facie evidence of  a deep-seated inconsistency 
between the orthodox stabilisation-fixated 
growth strategies, on the one hand, and 
national poverty reduction strategies, on the 
other hand.  In trying to link growth to pov-
erty reduction, the UNDP-supported Asia-
Pacific case studies had to address the 
importance of  generating widespread 
employment; and, such employment has to 
be at decent wages to be poverty reducing. 
This implies that self-employment, micro-
enterprises and the micro-finance services 
supporting them cannot serve as the foun-
dation for a pro-poor employment strategy. 
Although such micro programmes can help 
raise incomes, secure and remunerative 
employment cannot be sustained by these 
alone. The emphasis needs to shift to small 
and medium enterprises, and large enter-
prises that are employment-intensive and 
skill-enhancing. 
A major initial finding of  the regional 
programme is the need to use fiscal policy 
more proactively to expand pro-growth and 
pro-poor public investment.  The case 
found that public investment could, if  
growth-oriented, have a 'crowding-in' effect 
on private investment (Roy & Weeks 2004), 
as this study finds for Zambia. Boosting 
aggregate demand through public invest-
ment can have the advantage not only of  
sparking recovery in a stagnant economy, 
but also of  loosening the supply constraints 
on long-term growth. However, 'crowding-
in' cannot be automatically assumed. Public 
capital expenditures have to be carefully 
designed as part of  a well conceived pro-
growth as well as pro-poor strategy.
The multipliers for expenditures on pub-
lic investment can be substantial if  such 
investment helps boost the productivity of  
labour and capital. The higher marginal pro-
pensity to consume in developing countries, 
compared to industrial countries, is an addi-
tional factor that can increase these multipli
5
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1 ers (Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz 2002, 12). Also, the multiplier impact of  public 
investment can be powerful if  there is 
excess capacity in an economy and house-
holds are liquidity constrained, as is the case 
in many developing countries,  including 
Zambia. 
The common concern among Wash- 
ington-Consensus economists has been that 
increasing public investment will enlarge 
public deficits and these, in turn, will lead to 
higher inflation, depreciation of  the excha- 
nge rate and higher real interest rates.  There 
is little evidence in the literature that public 
investment crowds out private investment 
through changes in the interest rate or  
excha nge rate (Hemming, Kell and 
Mahfouz 2002, 36). 
Moreover, multipliers remain large, and 
crowding out is minimised, when a moder-
ate monetary expansion accompanies an 
increase in public investment. As long as 
deficits are used to finance public invest-
ment that expands aggregate supply, then 
the aggregate demand effects should not be 
unduly inflationary. Public investment can 
be a powerful instrument for the realloca-
tion of  public resources to poverty reduction.
The case studies concluded that fiscal 
policy should not be held captive to infla-
tion targeting.  The Neo-liberal recommen-
dation to national policymakers is that they 
should insist on maintaining inflation rates 
of  zero to five percent, even though there is 
little empirical evidence to suggest that 
inflation rates above that level, or even 
above ten percent, have an adverse effect on 
growth.  The case studies suggest that some 
inflation must be expected in a rapidly grow-
ing economy, due to temporary sectoral bot-
tlenecks. In an economy with strong 
growth, inflation may reflect the adjustment 
of  relative prices to reallocate resources 
from less to more profitable sectors.  If  
monetary policies are excessively restrictive 
and some prices are downwardly 'sticky'; 
then inflation targeting can nullify the 
required reallocation of  resources, and can-
cel the growth stimulus of  expansionary 
fiscal policies. Low inflation is more appro
priate after a sustainable rate of  eco-
nomic growth has been achieved; trying to 
maintain low inflation before growth has a 
chance to take off  is likely to throttle any 
economic expansion.
The Asia-Pacific studies indicate that a 
policy framework with an active fiscal policy 
at its core can generate pro-poor growth in 
which the income of  the poor rises faster 
than average income. However, active fiscal 
policy must be accompanied by an accom-
modating monetary policy, and strong redi- 
stributive measures, some through   fiscal 
instruments themselves. 
This case study of  Zambia finds the les-
sons from the Asia-Pacific region relevant, 
though they must be adapted to the regional 
and  national context. The lessons from the 
Asia-Pacific Programme must be placed in 
the context of  Zambia's structural charac-
teristics, which differ notably from those of  
most of  the Asian countries covered in the 
programme's case studies.  The most impor-
tant of  these structural characteristics are: 
1)  A long-term decline in per capita 
income, dropping the country from 
middle-income status in the early 
1970s, to low-income status in 1990s   
2) Until the 2000s, almost total depe-
ndence on a single primary commo-
dity export, copper; 
3)   An agricultural sector whose output 
is extremely weather-sensitive; 
4) Inefficient domestic commodity 
markets, in part due to poor and 
deteriorating infrastructure;  
5)   Underdeveloped financial sectors;  
6)   Heavy dependence on concessional 
development assistance (especially 
from the World Bank), that  is 
strongly conditional; 
7)   A large debt burden; and 
8)   A near-catastrophic incidence of  
HIV/AIDS.  
Taken together, these characteristics pro-
duce in Zambia what is of  central impor-
tance to the design of  a pro-poor macro 
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policy, a high level of  growth instability.  
From the 1960s through the end of  the 
1990s, the annual variation in the growth 
rate, of  GDP and GDP per capita, was 
extremely high, with the absolute value of  
the year-to-year change almost four times 
the average annual growth.   This instability 
resulted primarily from the dependence of  
the economy on a single export whose price 
was volatile, copper,  and from the inability 
of  underdeveloped and ineffective internal 
markets to    generate supply adjustments to 
accommodate that volatility.                          
Three problems lie at the heart of  the high 
levels of  poverty in Zambia, and the stunted 
recovery after 2000: a heavy debt burden, 
lack of  diversification of  the economy, and 
the HIV/AIDs pandemic.  The first derives 
directly from explicit decisions by outside 
agencies, and was characterised by the 
Operations Evaluations Department of  the 
1World Bank as 'not realistic'.  The second 
was exacerbated by stabilisation and struc-
tural adjustment programmes whose design 
2was flawed.  To some degree these 
programmes, stressing balance of  payments 
support, reflected the priorities of  funders 
rather than the needs of  the Zambian econ-
3omy. And, the lack of  attention by the major 
funders to the HIV/AIDS pandemic under-
mined the effectiveness of  the large scale 
4lending that occurred.   Discussions with 
government officials and representatives of  
international agencies, and a review of  docu-
ments including evaluations from those 
agencies, indicate that at least over  two 
decades, programme assistance to Zambia 
was inappropriately designed and character-
5ised by excessive conditionality.
These deficiencies in programme lend-
ing resulted in what most external funders 
described as a 'lack of  commitment to 
reform' by the various Zambian govern-
ments over more than two decades.  Given 
the poor design and inappropriate priorities 
1.3 Country-driven & Nationally 
Owned Development
in the programmes, a lack of  govern-
ment commitment should not come as a 
surprise.  Overall, the relationship between 
the Zambian governments and external 
agencies from the 1980s into the new cen-
tury was one of  'donorship'.  The relation-
ship was one in which donors and lenders 
collectively acted as setters of  policy priori-
ties, designers of  economic programmes, 
active participants in the implementation of  
policy, and assessors of  the outcome of  pol-
icy; in other words, a case of  profound aid 
dependency that went beyond dependency 
6on funding.  
It would appear that in Zambia, donors 
and lenders have not distinguished between 
actions required by the government in order 
that the funds be used effectively, and those 
policies that the donors and lenders have 
the bargaining power to impose, be they cru-
cial to success or not.  Further, donors and 
lenders have tended to exercise an external 
judgementalism, assuming the authority to 
pass judgement on the appropriateness of  
conditionalities, and whether the govern-
ment has shown sufficient commitment to 
those conditionalities.  There is an obvious 
inconsistency in this approach; donors and 
lenders played a primary role in setting 
conditionalities, and the government was 
expected to show full commitment to these 
externally defined conditionalities (take own-
ership of  them).  By contrast, in a national 
ownership regime, the recipient government 
assesses policies in   consultation with the 
donor.  National ownership does not 
require external development agencies to 
suspend all judgements; rather, implies that 
those judgements arise out of  an interactive 
process with national stakeholders.
It is the view of  this mission that while 
relations between the government and some 
donors and lenders have at times been 
strained, greater national ownership is 
essential for more effective economic policy.  
Putting the principle of  national ownership 
into practice, an essential feature of  the PRS 
process, involves the realisation that eco-
nomic policies and reforms are not purely 
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1 technical matters, but involve trade-offs and political choices.  If  donors and lenders 
take national ownership seriously, it implies 
that in some cases they must adjust their 
views to those of  recipient government.  
This adjustment by donors and lenders 
would be facilitated if  they point out what 
they see as failings of  the government, and 
recognise their own mistakes in their deal-
ings with the government over the last 
twenty years, some of  which they have docu-
mented in their in-house evaluations (WB 
1996 & 2002).
There is truth to the allegation of  
observers that the governments of  Zambia 
have made major policy mistakes regarding 
the economy at critical times.  Similarly, the 
record of  outside agencies suggests that a 
degree of  modesty and self-doubt on their 
part would be appropriate when proposing 
policies to the government.  Since 1990, the 
expectations of  these agencies for positive 
outcomes from the major policy changes 
required by loan conditionality have consis-
tently been unrealised.  To take but one 
piece of  evidence, growth forecasts by the 
World Bank for the 1990s proved exces-
sively optimistic.  As Table 1.1 shows, the 
growth forecast of  almost four and one half  
percent for the first half  of  the decade was 
far above performance, and the forecast for 
the second half  of  the decade, while closer 
to the actual outcome, was still well off  the 
mark.  In part, the projection error arose 
from over optimistic assumptions about the 
response of  private investment to the policy 
changes (see 1991-1995 in the table 1.1).  
The purpose of  pointing out the unreli-
ability of  projections is not to allege that 
they could have been better; but rather, to 
emphasise the impression of  economic anal-
ysis, both in terms of  its specification of  
appropriate policies and its ability to relate 
those policies to outcomes.  The lesson to 
take is that external agencies and the gov-
ernment should treat the policy dialogue as 
one of  cooperative interaction in which the 
parties learn from each other.  The fact that 
external agencies have  funding which the 
government    desperately requires places a 
particular responsibility on the former to 
be modest their assessment of  their capabil-
ity of  designing appropriate policies. 
                                                   
Over the thirty years, 1975-2005, Zambia 
underwent a profound economic transfor-
mation. The adaptations required by the 
transformation were made difficult due to a 
misunderstanding of  the nature of  the econ-
omy and society by Zambia's most impor-
tant donors and lenders. The mainstream 
view appears to be that under the Kaunda 
regime (i.e., into the late 1980s) Zambia was 
a 'socialist' country, and the essential charac-
ter of  the transformation would be from a 
7planned to a market economy.   This pre-
sumption requires close inspection.
Until the early 1990s in the economics 
literature the term 'socialist economy' was 
synonymous with 'centrally planned econ-
omy', or, more simply, a 'planned economy'.  
The term has fallen from use since the end 
of  the Soviet Union, to the extent that it no 
longer appears in many dictionaries of  eco-
nomic terms.  However, the Penguin Dictio- 
nary of  Economics of  1987 provides the fol-
lowing definition of  a planned economy
An economy where state authorities rather than 
market forces directly determine prices, output  
and production. The most important features 
usually include: (a) production targets for differ
ent sectors that determine the supply of  differ
ent commodities; (b) rationing of  certain com
modities, to determine demand for them; (c) 
price- and wage-fixing by state bodies; and (d) 
(sometimes), a conscripted labour market in  
which workers take the jobs assigned to them. 
(Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1987, p. 317)
From independence to the end of  the 
1980s, the state authorities did not set pro-
duction targets across sectors; rationing was 
not important; state bodies did not set the 
prices of  most commodities; and, labour 
was not allocated administratively.  In the 
most important sector of  the economy, min-
ing, output and prices were determined in 
1.4  Zambia's Transition:  Adjusting 
from What
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9international markets, not withstanding that 
the sector was state owned.  There were con-
sumer subsidies, most notably for maize 
meal, but not rationing.  And, workers 
found their jobs at the enterprise level 
through labour markets.  
Zambia had a market economy with 
extensive and intensive state intervention, 
both in ownership of  enterprises and regu-
8lation of  markets.   Defining the economy 
as 'socialist' reflects the tendency by some 
neoclassical economists after the fall of  the 
Soviet Union to view centrally planned sys-
tems as essentially the extreme version of  
economies pursuing industrial policies (so-
called import-substituting industrialisation).  
In part this was an extension of  the ideolog-
ical position of  the Hayek-von-Mises school 
that judged all government interventions as 
socialist, and partly because the Western 
economists who played a prominent role in 
'reform' programmes in the former Soviet 
Union had not worked on those countries 
during their central planning period.
The issue of  definition has great practi-
cal importance.  Having defined Zambia as 
socialist, the international financial organisa-
tions concluded that the central problem of  
the economy was state control, implying the 
need for rapid deregulation and privati- 
sation.  To this end, conditionalities placed 
great importance on trade liberalisation, 
divestiture of  state assets and reduction of  
the role of  government, including the elimi-
nation of  economic planning institutions of  
the public sector.  While similar condition-
alities were applied to many African coun-
tries, in Zambia they were more intense.
1.5 The Political Context of 
Economic Decline
External agencies have tended to assign all 
economic ills of  the economy to the gov-
ernment intervention they defined as social-
ist, and as a result placed little importance 
on the regional political factors that pro-
foundly affected Zambia's economy.  On 
the last day of  1963, the Central African 
Federation collapsed when North Rhodesia 
gained independence as Zambia, and 
9Nyasaland as Malawi.   In response to the 
refusal of  the government of  the United 
Kingdom to grant independence to the 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, the 
white settler government declared inde-
pendence unilaterally in 1965 (Unilateral 
Declaration of  Independence, UDI).  
Though 'Rhodesia' was not officially 
recognised by any government, it was main-
tained as a white minority dictatorship for 
fifteen years with de facto support from the 
apartheid regime in South Africa and 
Portugal, which maintained neighbouring 
Mozambique as a colony. The declaration 
of  independence by the 'Rhodesian' regime 
caused Zambia to lose its two transport 
links for exporting its copper, through the 
white settler state and South Africa.  This 
resulted in a dramatic increase in transport 
costs, such that despite productivity raising 
innovations in copper mining and concen-
trating, Zambia was rendered a high-cost 
producer on the world market.  In 1976, 
construction was completed of  a rail link to 
Dar es Salaam, but for ten years the Zambia 
economy suffered from the politically-
motivated disruption of  its export products.  
The slow growth of  the economy dur-
ing 1965-1976 can to a great extent be 
explained by this disruption, which resulted 
in low investment in mining, a growing 
trade deficit and heavy indebtedness.  While 
the principled political stance that Zambia 
took with regard to the white settler regime 
in so-called Rhodesia, and the anti-colonial 
struggle in Mozambique, was not the source 
of  all of  its ills, it should not be ignored 
when assessing economic performance.   
The implications of  this history are devel-
oped in more detail in subsequent chapters.
Since the mid 1980s the economic and 
social problems of  Zambia have been com-
1.6. The Key Constraints:  Debt
and HIV/AIDS
Impact of HIV/AIDS
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1 pounded by one of  the world's most devas-tating HIV/AIDS epidemics. Evidence sug-
gests that by the mid-2000s one in every six 
adults was HIV positive, and eighty-nine 
thousand people died of  AIDS in 2003 
(UNAIDS & WHO 2004).  As a result, the 
most pessimistic estimate was that life 
expectancy at birth fell below forty, and 
over six hundred thousand children were 
AIDS orphans (UNAIDS, UNICEF & 
USAID 2004).  Unlike in North America or 
Western Europe, HIV in Zambia was not 
primarily a disease of  the underprivileged.  
Infection rates were estimated to be higher 
among the non-poor and better educated. 
However,  the poorest households were 
least able to protect themselves from HIV 
or to cope with its impact.
Whatever the severity of  the pandemic, 
sickness and death and the consequent 
effect on families and communities has 
social and economic repercussions that 
could result in long term changes in social 
structures.  The impact on households 
included permanent loss of  income in the 
case of  death, less labour available for fam-
ily farms, funeral and mourning costs, and 
the removal of  children from school in 
order to save on educational expenses and 
increase household labour. 
The longer term effect of  withdrawal 
from education would be loss of  future earn-
ing potential.  Further, a study found that 
HIV/AIDS results in malnourishment in 
children of  effected households, and that 
this worsened when the child was orphaned 
and sent to a guardian (Baggaley & 
Needham 1997).  
In the case of  most maladies, house-
holds in distress would be supported by 
extended families; however, the toll of  the 
epidemic reached such severity that family 
structures could not cope.  Social stigma 
compounded the problem, as many of  
those affected by HIV/AIDS could suffer 
exclusion from communities.  To make mat-
ters worse, when the male head of  a house-
hold dies it is common for his entire prop-
erty to be appropriated by relatives rather 
than the immediate family, leaving  the 
widow and children with little or nothing 
(AVERT 2005). 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has and will 
have a major impact on the age and sex com-
position and the rates of  growth of  the  
population and labour force of  Sub-Saharan 
countries. The scale, scope and timing of  
the impact on the quantity and quality of  
labour supplied are extremely difficult to 
estimate, and varies across countries.  The 
starting point for any analysis of  the impact 
of  HIV/AIDS should be recent data on 
prevalence and mortality rates and any 
cross-country comparison of  the impact of  
HIV/AIDS must be based on a discussion of  
the manner in which incidence is estimated. 
At a macro level HIV/AIDS has a direct 
impact on rates of  economic growth.  Using 
a Cobb-Douglas production function incor-
porating labour quantity, Haacker concludes,
While the evolution of  HIV prevalence rates and 
hence HIV/AIDS- related mortality rates, differ 
across countries, this [model] suggests that the rate of  
per capita output growth will be between .3 and .7 
percentage points lower than otherwise through 2000-
2010. (Haacker 2002, 35-36).
However, few studies have been able to inco 
-rporate the impacts at the household and 
firm level in  macroeconomic projections. 
There are several mechanisms by which 
AIDS affects macroeconomic performance.
AIDS deaths lead directly to a reduction 
in the number of  workers available.
A shortage of  workers could lead to 
higher wages, which leads to higher 
domestic production costs. Higher 
production costs lead to a loss of  
international competitiveness.
Lower government revenues and 
reduced private savings (due to     
greater health care expenditures and  
loss of  worker income) can cause a 
significant drop in savings and       
capital accumulation. 
According to the forthcoming National 
Human Development Report 2005 the 
l
l
l
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infant mortality rate in Zambia will be sixty 
percent higher by 2010 due to the impact of  
AIDS, the child mortality rate will double, 
the crude death rate will triple, and life 
expectancy will decrease from 60.1 to 30.3 
years. Overall, population growth would be 
reduced from 3.1 percent to 1.2, because of  
the effect of  AIDS (Cohen 1997). 
Additionally, according to the Zambia 
Business Coalition, eighty-two percent of  
known causes of  employee deaths are HIV-
related and seventeen percent of  staff  is 
recruited to replace people who have died 
or left because of  HIV-related infections 
(Times of  Zambia 2004). 
Even more significant, AIDS kills peo-
ple in the prime of  life, so the workforce is 
stripped of  valuable skills and experience. 
The situation becomes yet worse as there 
are fewer people to teach the next genera-
tion. All of  this means that production costs 
rise, while at the same time consumer 
spending falls because people affected by 
HIV/AIDS have less disposable income. 
The HIV/AIDS disproportionately 
affects women. It is estimated that 1.2 times 
as many women are afflicted with AIDS as 
are men. Women are thought to be 2 to 4 
times as susceptible to infection  during 
unprotected intercourse, and more vulnera-
ble to other STDs. Furthermore, women are 
culturally relatively weaker to protect them-
selves (GRZ, 2002b, 109). Women are vul-
nerable to infection due to their lack of  deci-
sion making power and autonomy within 
personal relationships and their lesser access 
to healthcare, social services and education. 
(Mwale and Burnard, 1992:10) 
The disease has a well-recognised gender 
dimension.  Women are affected by 
HIV/AIDS not only as sufferers, but also in 
their multiple roles in society and the family, 
as health care providers, educators, wives, 
mothers and income providers. Nursing the 
sick is generally seen as a feminine activity, 
particularly when unremunerated, as occurs 
for family members. The development of  
home based care programmes for chroni-
cally ill patients such as those with AIDS, 
whilst saving hospital beds, will have an 
impact on women by increasing their 
domestic duties (Byrne, 1994, 35-36).
Zambia has been one of  the world's 
poorest countries since the late 1970s, and 
HIV/AIDS has made a bad situation even 
worse. Negative trends in the economy and 
food production fuel the epidemic that 
helped to create them. As Zambia's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper acknowledges, 'the 
epidemic is as much likely to affect eco-
nomic growth as it is to be affected by it' 
(Government of  Zambia 2002b).
Poverty in Zambia is exacerbated and mag-
nified by HIV/AIDS, and the government's 
capacity to deal with the problem is under-
mined by the country's debt burden.  
Fundamentally a legacy of  the 1970s and 
1980s, the debt burden arises directly from 
the decline in revenue from copper that 
resulted from the combined effects of  sup-
porting liberation struggles in the region 
and the decline in the copper price.  While 
the first cause arose from a Government 
decision, it is one that the international com-
munity should applaud.  The second was 
beyond the control of  any government.  
The obvious solution to price instability is 
the diversification of  the economy.  But, 
despite its efforts, the government was no 
more able to achieve this in the 1970s and 
1980s than have subsequent governments 
that have enjoyed massive external support.  
Apparent export diversification in the 1990s 
and 2000s were the result of  a catastrophic 
collapse in the mining sector rather than 
purposeful policy.
Zambia's crushing debt burden arose 
through a combination of  unsound lending 
policies on the part of  multilateral agencies, 
which had the active support of  bilateral 
donors (this is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter), and declines in the terms of  trade.  
Figure 1.1 shows the share of  debt service 
in exports during 1975-2001 using a three-
year moving average to reduce the effects of  
The External Debt Burden
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1 year-to-year fluctuations.  The series ends in 2001, before other countries, and eventually 
Zambia, began to benefit from debt relief, 
which is considered in a subsequent chapter.  
The chart also reports the number of  coun-
tries that had a debt service ratio greater 
than Zambia's.  The overall impression one 
might take from the chart is that while 
Zambia's debt service ratio has been consis-
tently high (higher than the average for 
these countries except in the second half  of  
the 1980s) it continuously declined after the 
early 1990s.  This impression might be rein-
forced by Figure 1.2, which shows the debt 
stock per capita in current US dollars, which 
declined steadily after 1990, approaching the 
average for the other countries.
However, an external debt must be re-
paid, as opposed to merely refinanced, 
through foreign exchange earnings.  There-
fore, the capacity to pay will be affected by 
the price of  exports, which determine the 
purchasing power of  those exports, and 
import prices, which affect the cost of  pro-
ducing those exports.  When per capita debt 
is adjusted by the net barter terms of  trade, 
shown in Figure 1.3, the result is quite dif-
ferent from the previous charts.  In 2000-
2001, the terms of  trade adjusted per capita 
debt stood fifty percent higher than it had 
been at the beginning of  the 1980s, and well 
above the average for the other countries, 
with no tendency for the gap to narrow.
In anticipation of  the chapters that fol-
low, it can be concluded that in the mid-
2000s Zambia remained on of  the most 
heavily indebted countries in the Sub-
Saharan region.  This indebtedness com-
bined with conditionality-related deficit lim-
its has resulted in a severe fiscal constraint.  
The two predominant problems facing 
Zambia, HIV/AIDS and debt, are insepara-
ble.  Rarely has a trade off  been so clear and 
so cruel; pay the debt or treat HIV/AIDS 
victims.  This trade-off  lies at the heart of  
the report that follows.
debt service], rather than debt forgiveness, was not realistic, as was 
eventually recognized by launching HIPC.  This decision left the 
Bank with few and unattractive options, which led to large IDA 
transfers to off-set Zambia's repayments to IBRD and other 
creditors', and 'The result [of  the debt strategy] was an unenvisioned 
“muddle through” scenario in which exceptional allocations of  IDA 
helped to service the debt while net transfers for development were 
small' (WB 2002, p. 9).
 2 'Outcomes of  many Bank operations, and of  the overall Bank 
programme, were unsatisfactory' (WB 2002, p. ii).
3 'Creditor pressure for balance of  payments support weakened the 
design and supervision of  successive adjustment operations' (WB 
2002, p. ii).
4 'The emphasis on exceptional levels of  adjustment lending to 
finance an unsustainable debt overhang along with the delayed 
response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic were significant weaknesses 
[in WB programmes]…' (WB 2002, p. ii)
 5 This conclusion is epitomised in even stronger language in a WB 
evaluation of  operations in Zambia:
The general conclusion of  this evaluation is that, given the nature 
of  Zambia's problems and the government's wavering commitment to 
the reform in the 1980s, there was too much emphasis on policy -
based operations, and too much emphasis within policy-based 
operations on stabilisation rather than on long term structural 
adjustment.  A more balanced approach, with a higher share…going 
to physical and  social infrastructure would have been desirable.  
(WB 1996, p. 7)
6  For a detailed analysis of  the relationship between the government 
and donors and lenders, and aid dependency in Zambia, see 
Chisala (2005).
7  For example, 'A change of  regime in Zambia in 1991 initiated a 
transition from a socialist to a market-oriented economy' (
WB 2002, p. I).
8  Zambia had a mixed economy: 'A market economy in which both 
private and public enterprise participate in economic activity, though 
not necessarily in all sectors, some of  which may be reserved for public 
monopoly' (Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1987, p. 273).
9 The official name was the Federation of  Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
and was established as a semi-autonomous dominion of  the United 
Kingdom in 1953.
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Table 1.1: Actual and World Bank forecasted growth rates, 1981-2000
Annual average 1981-1990 1991-2000 1991-1995 1995-2000
Actual Actual Actual ActualProjected Projected Projected
Real GDP growth
Actual- projected
Non-mining GDP growth
GDI/ GDP
1 0.6 4.9 -1.6 4.4 1.4 5.4
-4-6-4.3
1.4 2.2 -1.9 3.2
15 16 21 171319 17
Figure 1.1: Zambia's debt service as a percentage of
exports and number of sub-saharan countries with
higher ratios, 1975-2001(3 year moving average)
Figure 1.2:  Debt Per capita, Current US dollars, 1980-
2001 (3 year moving average)
Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: Total number of countries other than Zambia is thirty-one (Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe).
Source: See figure 1.3
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Figure1.3: Debt per capita, current US dollars adjusted for
the terms of trade, 1980-2001 (3 year moving average)
Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: 'average' is for the thirty-one countries listed in notes to the previous chart.
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Source: Forecasts from WB (2002, 21)
This chapter reviews the performance of  
the Zambian economy over forty years, 
1965-2005, as the basis for the subsequent 
analysis of  poverty and the policies that 
would enable the country to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal target of  
reducing poverty by half  in 2015 from its 
level in 1990.  To understand the story 
behind the statistic of  growth and structural 
change one must consider a much longer 
period, in order to place Zambia's decline in 
historical context. 
From the initial occupation of  the coun-
try by the British to independence, 
Northern Rhodesia was part of  a regional 
division of  labour.  While this division 
derived from Zambia's mineral endow-
ments, it was not the result of  disemb- 
odied market forces, but rather an adminis-
trative process consciously designed by the 
colonial authorities.
The regional conflict manifested most 
violently in an insurrection in Southern 
Rhodesia, which undermined Zambia's 
post-independence development, as 
explained below.  This conflict was also the 
outcome of  the consciously designed divi-
sion of  labour, which created a powerful 
settler population in the state that became 
'Rhodesia'. Had British colonial policy in 
Central Africa been different, for example, 
restricting the economic and political role 
of  expatriates as in West Africa, there would 
have been no war in 'Rhodesia', no apart-
heid-type labour regime in the mines of  
Northern Rhodesia, and no breakdown in 
Zambia's international transport and com-
munication links.
While exacerbated by external and inter-
nal management and economic factors, the 
decline and eventual collapse of  Zambia's 
mining sector can be traced to the conse-
quences of  colonial rule.  The privatisation 
of  mining is a major part of  the story, con-
sidered here rather than in the chapter on 
privatisation due to the dominant role of  
copper in the performance and structural 
change of  the economy.  Having reviewed 
the colonial period and the decline of  cop-
per, the chapter can consider economic per-
formance during 1965-2005.  This relatively 
brief  discussion is elaborated rigorously in 
Chapters 4 and 5.
The British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
acquired Northern Rhodesia in the 1890s 
2.2  Colonial Division of Labour in 
British Central Africa
2.1Introduction 
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mainly for the purposes of  mineral pros-
pecting.  The company had obtained land 
rights over the territory by a series of  trea-
ties with local chiefs.  In order to finance 
the territorial administration and to create a 
supply of  wage labour, the BSAC intro-
duced a tax on adult males, which could 
only be paid in cash.  Failure to pay this 
'head tax' resulted in forced labour to clear 
the debt to the BSAC.  The establishment 
of  Northern Rhodesia as a settler colony 
created the demand for cheap African 
labour for European farming and other 
enterprises.  Although many Africans went 
voluntarily, working conditions, particularly 
in the mines, were quite bad, resulting in a 
10high turnover of  labour.   
In 1924, after almost three decades of  
company rule, the British Colonial Office 
assumed the administration of  Northern 
Rhodesia, and allowed the BSAC to retain 
its mineral rights, which would prove 
extremely lucrative when large reserves of  
copper were found.  World demand for cop-
per increased dramatically with the growth 
of  electrical and automobile industries in 
the United States and Europe, and by 1930 
four large mines had been developed on the 
Copperbelt of  Zambia: Nchanga and Nkana 
owned by the Anglo American Corporation, 
and Roan Antelope and Mufulira by the 
Rhodesian Selection Trust.  Despite the 
Great Depression of  the 1930s, copper min-
ing industry grew rapidly (see Figure 2.1), 
with the value of  exports increasing five-
fold from 1930 to 1933.
Thus began the dominance of  copper in 
the economy and society. A range of  colo-
nial government policies including taxation 
of  Africans, forced labour, land and agricul-
tural policy contributed to the deterioration 
of  quality of  life in the rural agricultural 
communities and reinforced  this situation. 
For example, African farmers were rest-
ricted in the crops they could  grow in order 
to limit the income earning alternatives to 
working in the copper mines.  The mining 
companies invested in a railway across the 
country and other infrastructure to support 
their activities, but this infrastructure left 
rural areas virtually untouched.
In 1953, the Colonial Office joined 
Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland into the Federation of  Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland.  The motivation for the 
Federation was economic.  According to the 
advocates of  federation, a larger market 
would be created, basic infrastructure could 
be more effectively planned, and the econo-
mies of  the three territories were designed 
by colonial policy to be complementary: 
Northern Rhodesia would specialise in min-
ing; Southern Rhodesia, another settler col-
ony, would focus on agriculture and manu-
facturing; and, Nyasaland, the most densely 
populated of  the three, would be a source 
of  labour.  The effect of  the Federation was 
11 to create an artificial specialisation. Nort-
hern Rhodesia financed the development of  
the Federation, with almost £100 million 
extracted from the territory between 1953 
and 1963, most of  which was used for 
industrial development in Southern 
Rhodesia (Lanning and Mueller 1979).
Northern Rhodesia was developed as an 
integral part of  the larger southern African 
economy and transport system.  Imports of  
equipment, machinery and other supplies 
came through by the South African and 
Southern Rhodesian railway systems that 
linked to Cape Town, Durban and Beira.  
Copper exports used the same routes.  Coal 
for the mines was supplied by Wankie 
Colliery in Southern Rhodesia.  The Fede-
ration tightened this bond by building the 
Kariba Power Station in Southern Rhodesia 
near the border between the territories.  
These common services would prove a 
major obstacle to Zambia's development 
after unilateral declaration of  independence 
by 'Rhodesia'. 
The unbalanced development of  the 
Northern Rhodesian economy was aggra-
vated by colonial policy in the agricultural 
sector, which encouraged a small number of  
European settlers at the expense of  African 
farmers.  In order to foster European settle-
ment, land along the 'line of  rail' was rese-
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2rved for European farming.  So-called 
Native Reserves were established in 1928-
1929 for those forcibly expelled from this 
land.  Access to markets by African farmers 
in the Native Reserves was constrained by 
poor transport, though in Southern Prov-
ince African farmers increased the produc-
tion of  maize for the market.  This growth 
of  commercial farming by Africans created 
concern among European farmers, who 
feared that it would drive down prices.  In 
response, the colonial authorities created the 
Maize Control Board in 1936, which insti-
tuted producer price supports above the 
world level and reduced competition from 
African farmers though a system of  quotas.  
The Board paid African farmers a lower 
price for their maize than Europeans 
12received (Dodge, 1977).  
As early as 1946, there was call for diver-
sification of  the economy by encouraging, 
rather than discouraging, African farming.  
Although the colonial government stated its 
intention to increase expenditure on African 
agriculture and rural development, in prac-
tice expenditure remained low, particularly 
13after the establishment of  the Federation.  
As a consequence of  colonial policy, the 
incomes in the rural agricultural sector rem-
ained low and stagnant, prompting migra-
tion to the mines and other urban areas. 
Agricultural production was also nega-
tively affected by the absence of  ablebodied 
men in the villages because it was often 
stratified strictly along gender lines. This 
14was particularly the case in the Chitemene   
system where men were responsible for cut-
ting down trees for burning while the 
women did most of  the planting and har-
vesting.  Africans were considered tempo-
rary workers whose home, and therefore 
social support structure, remained in the 
village. The wages paid in the early colonial 
period were at 'single' rate and so what 
emerged was a situation in which wages 
were kept artificially low.
In keeping with the intention for 
Northern Rhodesia to be a settler colony, 
expenditure by the colonial administration 
tended to be concentrated along the 'line of  
rail', with public investment supporting the 
copper mining industry and commercial 
farming.  An analysis by Baldwin shows that 
forty-five percent of  government expendi-
ture in the 1950s was on power, water and 
communications along the 'line of  rail', less 
than three percent for rural development, 
and only slightly more for agriculture, for-
estry and veterinary services combined 
(Baldwin 1966). 
Consistent with the plan for Northern 
Rhodesia to be a settler colony, skilled work 
was reserved for Europeans, and Africans 
were restricted to unskilled labour forma-
lised by different wage scales based on race.  
Although the mining companies paid better 
wages and provided better facilities than in 
other sectors, social policies governing Afr-
ican workers were based on the presump-
tion that they were 'migrant labour' (Roberts 
1976) with their primary residence in vil-
lages.  This approach continued even after 
both employers and government accepted 
permanent African labour settlement in the 
mining areas.  By 1964, the average 
European miner earned seven times what 
the average African miner earned (Lanning 
and Mueller 1979); not withstanding that 
many Africans had the skills to replace 
European workers. With apprenticeships 
restricted to Europeans and colonial policy 
toward African education extremely basic 
(only four years provided), formal skill dev-
elopment by Africans was extremely limited.
  
 
The collapse of  copper mining in the 1990s 
represented the culmination of  a trend that 
had begun long before.  In the years imme-
diately prior to independence the mining 
companies reduced their levels of  invest-
ment in the mining industry in Zambia, per-
haps because they feared the consequences 
of  independence and majority rule; this con-
tinued after independence.  The de facto 
disinvestment by the companies was indi-
2.3. Copper in Zambia
The Decline of Copper
16
Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Case Study of Zambia
cated by   dividend payments from 1964 to 
1969 consuming eighty percent of  profits.  
This mismanagement of  the copper sec-
tor by the companies reinforced the post-
colonial government's political commit-
ment to assume the 'commanding heights' 
of  the economy, though a series of  
partial nationalisations.  
The intention to take ownership of  fifty-
one percent of  the mines was announced by 
President Kaunda in his Matero Speech in 
August 1969.  To this end, the government 
established the Zambia Industrial and 
Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) as a holding 
company with two subsidiaries.  Mindeco 
Limited would hold the government's inter-
est in the mining companies, Nchanga Con-
solidated Copper Mines (NCCM) jointly 
owned with the Anglo-American Corpor-
ation and Roan Consolidated Copper Mines 
(RCCM) with the Roan Selection Trust. Ind- 
eco Limited would hold investments in the 
other mining-related enterprises. NCCM 
and RCM were merged in April 1982, to 
form the  Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM).
With controlling shares in the hands of  
mining companies, the government, in prac-
tice, assumed responsibility for the  risks 
involved in this industry at the global and 
15operational levels.   When majority owner-
ship passed to the public sector in 1969, the 
intention was to   increase investment, 
16which had been in decline previously.   
This intention would not be realised due 
to unforeseen events.  As noted in Chapter 
1, the Unilateral Declaration of  Indepe-
ndence by Southern Rhodesia in 1965 dra-
matically increased transport and intermedi-
ate goods costs.  Initially, Zambia used the 
railway which was jointly owned with the 
white regime.  However, hostility between 
the two countries escalated, leading to the 
closure of  the border in 1972.  This made it 
necessary to find alternative transport 
routes and sources of  inputs as quickly as 
possible.  A road link through Tanzania 
partly resolved this problem, but  was not 
efficient.  Problems in transport resulted in 
shortages of  materials and improvisation in 
the production process, with the result that 
production costs increased substantially. 
The high cost and turnover of  skilled 
expatriate staff  in the mines exacerbated the 
problems associated with 'Rhodesian' inde-
pendence. Accustomed to an apartheid lab-
our regime in the mines, many expatriates 
left the country, with a substantial number 
going to Rhodesia and South Africa.  By 
necessity this replacement occurred rapidly 
(so-called Zambianisation), before sufficient 
skills had been developed. 
As a result of  low investment during the 
pre-independence years, the disruption of  
transport due to UDI, and the need to rap-
idly replace expatriate labour, Zambia was 
unable to take advantage of  the years during 
which the price of  copper increased.  In 
1969, Zambia was the largest producer of  
copper among developing countries, and the 
third largest producer after the United 
States and the former U.S.S.R., with produc-
tion twelve percent of  world production 
(Bostock and Harvey 1972).  By 1990, 
Zambia produced only five percent  of  
world production, compared to Chile and 
the United States each with eighteen per-
cent; Canada eight percent, and the then-
U.S.S.R. seven (USG 1998).  Over the     
long term, exports declined from 622,900 
metric tonnes in 1972 to 228,000 on the eve 
of  privatisation in 1999 (See Figure 2.2).
The financial and operational problems 
affecting ZCCM had a detrimental effect on 
the production quality and costs, as well as 
level.  As equipment and inputs became dif-
ficult to obtain the operations of  the mines 
deteriorated, and Zambia passed from being 
a low cost to a high cost producer.  Acco-
rding to Kangwa (2001), ZCCM produced 
at 83.1 cents per pound in March 1993, 
while Codelco of  Chile was at 73.3 cents 
per pound.  
In this context it must be stressed that 
ZCCM was a major provider of  social ser-
vices in the mining areas through provision 
of  schools, hospitals and health centres, 
housing, water and sanitation facilities, elec-
17
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2tricity, recreation clubs, even churches. The 
social services were provided at subsidised 
rates to employees and their families, and 
were superior to those of  the local councils. 
The management of  these services required 
an extensive administrative system.  As dis-
cussed below, privatisation would have a dev-
astating effect on social provision in the 
mining areas.
As well as its direct operations, ZCCM 
generated much of  the public revenue.  
Following independence, the new govern-
ment put in place an ambitious development 
programme, which would be funded by reve-
nue from copper mining.  Thus, the decline 
of  copper had a direct and dramatic impact 
on the ability of  the government to carry 
out public investment.  A major goal of  this 
investment was the diversification of  the 
economy, to be realised through public sec-
tor participation and ownership in manufac-
turing and services.  Therefore, the decline 
of  copper not only implied a short term fis-
cal crisis, but a fundamental deterioration in 
the country's long term development.
The new government elected in 1991 
embarked on a radical shift in economic pol-
icy within the framework of  multilateral sta-
bilisation and adjustment programmes, a key 
element of  which was the proposed priva-
tisation of  the copper sector.  The govern-
ment came under heavy influence from 
donors and lenders who were convinced 
that ZCCM represented a drain on public 
resources, and which could not be reformed 
within the public sector.  The sell-off  of  
ZCCM became a condition for develop-
ment assistance, and the more important 
international agencies viewed privatisation 
as a pre-condition to economic develop-
ment itself.  This view was    justified by the 
expectation that  privatisation would mobi-
lise new capital  that would revitalise the 
industry.  This would stimulate growth after 
two decades of  decline, rejuvenate exports, 
and generate revenue for development exp-
enditure.  Privatisation would also stimulate 
Privatisation of Copper
the growth of  other industries  and services, 
and create opportunities for local suppliers 
and contractors.  In the event, these expec-
tations would go spectacularly unfulfilled.
The government initiated the divestiture 
process with the Privatisation Act of  1992. 
The act established the Zambia Privatisation 
Agency (ZPA) as an autonomous agency of  
the government to plan, implement and 
monitor the privatisation of  state enter-
prises. The privatisation of  state owned 
enterprises progressed quickly with the 
salient exception of  the programme's key-
stone, the mining sector.  In a decision that 
would subsequently provoke considerable 
criticism and cynicism, the government 
abruptly removed the entire mining sector 
from the ZPA's terms of  reference.  In a 
rather surprising development, the interna-
tional agency most directly involved, the 
World Bank, endorsed an ad hoc process for 
17mining privatisation.   
In 1993, as part of  this process, and 
unlike the privatisation of  other public sec-
tor companies, the government established 
a negotiating team for the mining industry 
18separate from the ZCCM.  After consider-
ation of  a number of  options it was decided 
that ZCCM would be sold in parts. The sale 
began in 1997 with the Konkola and Kan-
sanshi Mines, but negotiations over the Nch
anga and Nkana parts of  the sector, as well 
as the Chambeshi Acid and Cobalt plants, 
was much more protracted.  These negotia-
tions, with a group called the Kafue Cons-
ortium collapsed in 1998, leading to an offer 
by the Anglo-American Corpora-tion that 
the government accepted in March 2000.
There is little controversy that priva-
tisation of  ZCCM took place under great 
pressure from international agencies whose 
leverage over the government was consider-
19able due to its dependence on aid.  The par-
ties completed the privatisation with rema-
rkable speed, which may explain the rather 
startling omission from the contract of  any 
penalty clause should the buyer not fulfil its 
obligations.  This omission would prove 
extremely costly, because the Anglo-
18
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2.4 Economic Performance, 1965-2005
Introduction
Upon independence in October 1964, the 
new government of  Zambia faced a daunt-
ing task. Popular expectations were high, 
fuelled by nationalist enthusiasm and the 
pledge by the Kaunda government to cor-
rect the glaring imbalances and inequities 
created by colonial rule.  While a social dem-
ocrat more than a socialist, Kaunda was 
strongly influenced by the ideology of  state 
socialism.  In great part this resulted from 
the support for independence provided by 
the Soviet Bloc countries. As a consequence, 
a semblance of  central planning was intro-
duced, more virtual than real.  The official 
ideology of  humanist socialism, aimed at 
attaining political and economic independ-
ence from western industrial countries, con-
trasted sharply with the reality of  heavy 
dependence on expatriate technical skills 
and external financial assistance.  
Zambia had one of  the highest per cap-
ita incomes in Africa in 1964.  However, the 
per capita income statistic hid dismally low 
human development. Colonial education 
policy in North Rhodesia had more in com-
mon with the Portuguese in Mozambique 
than the British approach in West Africa 
and Uganda, indicated by there being fewer 
than a hundred university graduates at inde-
pendence. Due to this legacy of  the colonial 
period and the under developed structure 
of  the non-mining economy, implementing 
the new government's state-led develop-
ment policy was a practical impossibility.
Copper dominated the economy at inde-
pendence, and would do so for thirty years 
despite attempts through government plan-
ning and later 'market forces' to diversify.  
This dominance would come to an end 
through disaster not design, the unintended 
collapse of  the copper sector.  In the years 
immediately after independence, copper 
appeared as the vehicle to development and 
modernisation, and to these ends the gov-
ernment took fifty-one percent ownership 
of  the sector and wholly nationalised a sub-
stantial part of  the manufacturing sector, all 
American Corporation (AAC) withdrew 
from the Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) in 
2002, less than two years after purchasing 
majority ownership.  The International 
Financial Corporation of  the World Bank, 
which purchased a minority share as part of  
20the agreement , also withdrew, threatening 
the loss of  two-thirds of  Zambia's copper 
production. Equally, if  not more, controver-
sial had been the award of  the Luanshya 
mine to the Benani Group in June 1997.  
Only later did it emerge that the com-
pany had little experience in mining and was 
unable to provide the capital necessary to 
finance the operations and development of  
the mine. After three years the company was 
 in receivership. More generally, the terms of  
mining privatisation had an extremely high 
opportunity cost in terms of  public revenue.  
Associated with the agreement were: a redu-
ction in the corporate tax rate from thirty-
five to twenty-five percent; exemption from 
customs duty on inputs up to US$ 15 
million; reduction of  the mineral royalty 
from two percent to six-tenths of  a percent; 
exoneration from excise duty on electricity; 
an increase in the period for which losses 
could be carried, from ten to twenty years; 
and, exemption from the withholding tax 
On interest, dividends, royalties and man-
agement fees.  
The effect of  these so-called incentives 
was that it would be decades before the gov-
ernment received substantial revenue from 
the new mining companies. Instead of  pro-
viding a strong basis for future growth, the 
seriously flawed privatisation process repre-
sented yet another structural obstacle to 
overcome.  The first half  of  the 2000s saw a 
recovery of  the sector from a very low base.  
Should the recovery of  copper be sustai-
ned, it will make the diversification of  the 
economy all the more necessary. The domi-
nance of  copper over the economy in the 
past was part of  the process that resulted in 
long term decline and massive indebtedness, 
both internal and external. Economic diver-
sification would be the key to avoiding a 
return to decline and debt.
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2before the long decline of  the economy 
would be reversed.
The structural adjustment programme 
brought profound changes to a country ill 
structured to accommodate them.  Trade 
liberalisation introduced competition, which 
the state enterprises were unprepared to 
meet.  The liberalised economic environ-
ment, when combined with extremely high 
borrowing rates, proved in practice to be 
biased against Zambian producers.  
The harsh environment was com-
pounded by uncertainties in the business 
environment arising from unstable macro-
economic conditions and unpredictable 
changes in implementation of  the economic 
policy instruments.  High prices for utilities 
such as electricity, water, telephones and fuel 
further worsened the difficulties faced by 
domestic industries. 
This dismal forty years of  decline and 
instability is presented in statistics in the fol-
lowing pages.  Before entering into detail, 
the central message from those forty years 
should be stressed:  neither strong public 
intervention and ownership, nor radically 
neo-liberal policy frameworks have achieved 
the economic diversification and equity req-
uired for sustainable growth in Zambia. The 
challenge for this report is to find an alter-
native to those policy extremes that would 
enable Zambia to prosper in the long term 
and achieve the MDGs in the medium term.
By any conceivable measure, the growth per-
formance of  Zambia has been dismal, a chr-
onicle of  decades of  relentless economic 
decline.  Table 2.1, per capita GDP growth 
divided by five year periods, and 2.2, growth 
of  GDP for the full forty years, period a 
range of  measures of  the depth of  this dec-
line from 1961 to 2000 where the 2000s 
will  be considered after reviewing these 
four decades.
Over the eight five year periods, Zambia 
ranked in the bottom half  of  the per capita 
growth 'league' in every case, ranging from a 
Economic performance & 
Structural Change
public utilities, and key elements of  trans-
port and communications.  Financial institu-
tions were underdeveloped, catering to min-
ing and the rest of  the formal sector.  Given 
the lack of  skills and, essentially, translanted 
planning institutions, it was not surprising 
that political interference, managerial ineffi-
ciency, and lack of  accountability under-
mined the potential for diversification. 
These systemic problems reinforced an eco-
nomic decline fundamentally caused by inst-
ability in the world copper market and the 
regional political tension described above. 
During 1985-1991 the government, now 
holding power into its third decade, intro-
duced market based policies in the frame-
work of  multilateral loan conditionality. 
Continued decline resulted in severe under-
utilisation of  capacity in the formal sector, 
which remained largely in public ownership. 
While the altered policy regime incl-uded 
incentives designed to attract investment, 
the decline of  the economy and continued 
administrative ineffectiveness undermined 
whatever effect they might have had. Lack 
of  growth and the obviously negative wel-
fare and distribution effects of  the condi-
tionality-based policies led the government 
to abandon the policies. As a consequence, 
relationships with the multilaterals deterio-
rated to the point of  hostility, the effects of  
which would persist for twenty years.
In 1991 the Kaunda period came to an 
end through elections, and from a position 
of  extreme weakness the new government 
committed itself  to a radical adjustment 
programme inspired by the World Bank and 
supported by almost all donors and lenders.  
With the exception of  the countries in tran-
sition from central planning, it may be the 
case that no other country passed through 
economic liberalisation so radical and rapid 
as Zambia did during the first half  of  the 
1990s.  By definition, countries undergoing 
radical policy change, be it wise or reckless, 
lack a stable policy framework, and policy 
instability is rarely consistent with market-
based growth.  Zambia proved no exception 
to this rule; it would be almost ten years 
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'best' of  twelfth from the bottom (1965-69) 
to a worst of  third from the bottom (1975-
79).  In no five year period was the rate as 
high as one percent, and for the last five it 
was negative.  Perhaps even more striking 
are measures in Table 2.2, which refer to 
growth of  GDP.  The second column 
shows the percentage of  years in which 
each country's growth rate was above the 
regional average for years that the country 
had data.  By this measure, Zambia comes 
third from the bottom, above only Madag-
ascar and Sierra Leone.  The consistently 
low growth rate is indicated by the standard 
deviation of  the country's growth rate, 
which was also below the regional average.
The consequence of  the low growth rate 
over four decades is shown in Figure 2.3, 
which provides an index of  total GDP and 
per capita GDP at 1994 prices.  The index 
of  GDP per capita declined almost continu-
ally during 1965-1995, to fall from close to 
150 to below 80, then stagnating for the rest 
of  the 1990s before rising modestly in the 
2000s.  Figure 2.4 shows the growth rates 
graphically as a three year moving average, 
and between 1965 and 2000 for per capita 
income only seven data points are substan-
tially above zero.
During these decades of  economic 
decline, the production structure of  the 
economy underwent considerable change, 
primarily as a result of  the absolute and rela-
tive decline of  mining in the 1990s rather 
than the growth of  other sectors (see 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6).  Up to the early 1990s, 
despite low growth rates, there was a ten-
dency for the productive sectors to increase 
relatively, with a slight upward trend in min-
ing, manufacturing and agriculture, though 
the regional drought in the early 1990s 
resulted in a brief, severe drop in the latter.  
After the early 1990s, mining began a rapid 
decline, from above twenty percent of  
aggregate value added in 1991 to well below 
ten percent at the end of  the decade.  Over 
the same years, the manufacturing share stag-
nated and agriculture declined, implying by 
definition an increase in the residual cate-
gory 'services'.  Since the share of  value 
added in the public sector declined or did 
not increase over these years, it follows that 
redundant workers fell into low-remune-
ration 'informal' activities.  Thus, the struc-
tural change one observes is that of  an econ-
omy in decline, with households increasingly 
struggling to subsist in activities of  low 
productivity.  This shift from gainful 
employment to poverty is discussed in the 
next chapter.
As the Zambian economy descended 
and foreign exchange from copper declined, 
pressure increased on the balance of  pay-
ments.  Figure 2.7 shows imports and 
exports as a share of  GDP from the early 
1990s to 2004.  After an approximate bal-
ance between the two in the early 1990s, the 
trade gap widened sharply to reach ten per-
cent of  GDP in 2000, and remain at an 
unsustainable level.  The trade gap was cov-
ered by growing indebtedness, primarily to 
multilateral lenders (see Figure 2.8).  The 
unsustainable trade and current account defi-
cit resulted in a loss of  control of  the nomi-
nal exchange rate.  After relative exchange 
rate stability from independence to the mid-
1980s, the exchange rate collapsed in the 
late 1980s, and collapsed even more in the 
early to mid 1990s (see Figure 2.9).  This 
collapse generated rampant inflation, which 
approached hyper-inflation levels during 
1990-1995.  As the note to Figure 2.9 
reports, the exchange rate explains almost 
three-quarters of  the inflation rate from 
1997 to 2004, when a fixed regime could no 
longer be sustained.  
Thus, the instability of  the Zambian 
economy followed a straightforward 
sequence of  causality, the decline of  foreign 
exchange earnings from copper, severe bal-
ance of  payments pressure, and collapse of  
the exchange rate, resulting in uncontrolla-
ble inflation.  Perhaps the most surprising 
aspect of  this process was that the appar-
ently large inflows of  multilateral loans in 
the first half  of  the 1990s did not dampen 
the inflation, but were coincident with it 
approaching hyper level.  This unexpected 
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2result can be explained by Figure 2.10, 
which shows total ODA grants and loans, 
and grants and loans net of  external interest 
payments.  During the high inflation of  the 
1990s, net grants and loans were a negative 
four to six percent of  GDP.  To put the mat-
ter simply, ODA funds entered the Central 
Bank, immediately to flow out to pay exter-
nal debt to the lending agencies making 
those loans.
The instability provoked by the interna-
tional copper market lends urgency to the 
diversification of  Zambia's exports.  
Therefore, exchange rate movements in the 
mid-2000s must be viewed by the objective 
observer with considerable alarm.  From the 
beginning of  1997 to the middle of  2003, 
the nominal exchange rate depreciated by 
half, approximately in line with inflation, 
such that the real exchange moved within a 
relatively narrow range (see Figure 2.11).  
However, in the second half  of  2003 the 
real exchange rate began to rise, slowly for 
two years, then almost exponentially at the 
end of  2005 and into 2006.  In seven 
months, from July 2005 through February 
2006, it rose by almost fifty percent.  Such a 
real appreciation of  a currency is typically 
associated with catastrophic economic 
events, such as hyper-inflation aggravated by 
exchange controls, while in Zambia it has 
been associated moderate growth and an 
open capital account.
Whatever the cause of  the appreciation, 
it is a disaster for export diversification.  
The Zambia National Farmers' Union has 
shown this in a study of  the impact of  the 
exchange rate on agricultural exports 
(ZNFU 2006).   Far from a sign of  eco-
nomic strength, the appreciation of  the 
exchange rate is a symptom of  the limita-
tions of  a regime of  tight monetary and 
restrictive fiscal policy, in the context of  a 
boom in the exports of  a volatile commod-
ity.  On a few issues there is little contro-
versy among economists.  One of  the areas 
of  agreement is that an appreciating real 
exchange rate discourages the production of  
traded commodities.  It is unlikely that any-
one familiar with the Zambian economy 
would consider this a desirable or rational 
policy outcome. A real exchange rate at its 
early 2006 level is a ticket for the return jour-
ney to  copper dependency.
The policy to check the nominal appre-
ciation and reverse it is clear and simple to 
 understand faster growth.  Faster growth 
would draw in imports, which could be 
financed in excess of  exports by the reduc-
tion in debt service (see Chapter 5) and offi-
cial development assistance.  The faster 
growth would be achieved through a more 
rational fiscal policy whose expenditure 
would be sufficient to achieve the MDGs 
(again, see Chapter 5).  Direct expenditure 
of  ODA funds by the government, without 
those funds passing through the Bank of  
Zambia, would be an important measure to 
check the rise of  the nominal exchange rate, 
as the IMF has argued in a recent paper on 
21'scaling up' aid.  Thus, 'sound macro policy' 
in Zambia would be expansionary, and 'un-
sound policy' would be a restrictive policy 
which accommodates a debilitating rise in 
the real exchange rate.
From soon after independence, Zambia 
entered into a long term economic decline, 
resulting from a combination of  falling cop-
per prices and regional conflicts afflicting its 
neighbours.  This decline was exacerbated 
by a legacy that left the country ill-prepared 
for independence due to its de facto status 
as a settler state in the colonial period, with 
institutionalised racial divides.  One conse-
quence of  the colonial legacy and fall of  
copper prices was a lack of  diversification 
of  the economy, which would prove disas-
trous in the 1990s.
The decline and then collapse of  the 
copper sector left the country deeply in 
debt, with a severely constrained fiscal situa-
tion (pursued in detail in Chapter 6).  The 
fiscal constraints would limit the extent that 
the government could respond to the most 
dangerous threat to development in the 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
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country's history, the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
In the chapters which follow, this report 
analyses the country's severe poverty, its link 
to HIV/AIDS, and proposes measures to 
create the fiscal space to both deal with that 
malady and generate the public investment 
necessary to foster poverty reducing, sus-
tainable growth.
11  There has been some suggestion that the Northern Rhodesian 
economy had a better chance of  diversification had the Federation not 
been created (Franklin, 1963).
12  This served to discourage Africans from increasing their acreage 
and was justified by the idea that the cost of  production was lower for 
African farmers.
13 '…since Northern Rhodesia was considered [by the colonial 
authorities] to have the least agricultural potential of  the three 
territories, it is fair to assume that a relatively small expenditure was 
planned for the development of  agriculture-both European and 
African' (Dodge 1977, 21).
14 Chitemene System involves the cutting of  tree branches in a field 
to be used for crop production. The cut branches are collected and 
heaped around the same field. Once dry, the branches are burnt; the 
remaining ash providing fertility for the field. This system is common 
in the Northern and Luapula Provinces from where most of  the mine 
labour was drawn.
15The mission team was told by a high official in the Ministry of  
Mines that:
 After independence, the government took over a mining sector that 
was technologically Backward, with equipment installed in the 
early part of  the twentieth century.  Under  nationalisation, 
capital investment was low and modernisation was slow.  However, 
important innovations occurred during nationalisation, when 
Zambia became the first country to introduce acid-soluble copper 
technology. (Interview at the Ministry of  Mines, 1 
November 2004)
16 To quote:
Investment and modernisation were constrained by the regional 
political circumstances after independence. With UDI in 
Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], copper could no longer be exported by the 
existent routes through South Africa and South Rhodesia.   So 
severe was the problem that copper ore was taken by plane to 
Tanzania. (Interview at the Ministry of  Mines, 1 
November 2004)
17 'After ZPA had written the TOR for mining privatisation, the 
WB urged by the government to take mining out of  ZPA hands, and 
implement it through an ad hoc process, which it agreed to.  The 
negotiating team for mining privatisation included staff  of  the 
national mining corporation, which violated the Privatisation Act, 
which called for independent negotiators' (Interview at the Zambian 
Privatisation Agency, 1 November 2004).
18 This became controversial as the process was not considered 
transparent and problems that arose later were blamed on this 
decision by government.  There are at least two views on the role of  
the ZCCM negotiating team.  One holds that the ZCCM 
representatives pursued their narrow self-interests in the negotiations, 
while the other view holds that the advice of  ZCCM experts was 
largely ignored by both the government and external agencies.  A 
Ministry of  Mines official stated, 'We [experts in ZCCM] knew 
what worked and what did not work, but the WB did not listen to 
us' (Interview at the Ministry of  Mines, 1 November 2004).
19 'Public pressure from the donors to sell off  ZCCM at a time of  
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falling world demand for copper made it a buyers' market' (Kangwa, 
2001, 23).   At the May 1998 Paris club meeting, the Zambian 
government promised to complete the privatisation of  ZCCM by July 
of  that year.  The lengthy negotiations between the government and 
the Kafue consortium resulted in some donors delaying release of  their 
contributions to the   US$530 million balance of  payments they had 
pledged at the Paris meeting.  The British government, in announcing 
their discontinuation of  aid to Zambia, cited the failure by 
Government to complete the privatisation of  ZCCM assets as the 
reason that prompted their action.
20 It is a common view among Zambian officials involved in the 
negotiations that the role of  the IFC as a minority purchaser 
represented a conflict of  interest: 'The WB was advising the 
government on privatisation, indeed, urging great speed, while the 
IFC was negotiating as one of  the buyers' (interview with an official 
of  the Task  Force on Corruption, 2 November 2004)
21 The IMF 'manual' on scaling up aid flows states:
Absorption and spending are policy choices.  If  the government 
spends aid resources directly on imports…spending and absorption 
are equivalent, and there is no directly impact on…the exchange 
rate, the price level, or the interest rate.  But if  a country 
receives the foreign exchange resources and the government 
immediately sells them to the central bank…spending is likely to 
differ form absorption. (Gupta, Powell & Yang 2006, 11)
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Table 2.2: Indicators of growth & instability, the sub-sSahara,
1961-2000
Notes:
Countries ordered by percentage of years with a growth rate above the regional mean. 
Number of years refers to those with the GDP growth statistic.  Grw rate is the average 
growth rate for the years covered. %>average is the number of years the country's 
growth rate was greater than the regional average for the years covered by its data (to 
one percentage point). Stdev is the standard deviation of the growth rate for the years 
covered. Relative growth rate is the country average divided by the cross-country mean 
for the years covered for that country. 
Figure 2.1: World copper price & output in Zambia,
1939-1960
Source: Coleman 1971, 145.
Note: price in £UK per ton  & output in thousands of tons
Source: WB, Africa Database, CD-ROM, 2003
Figure 2.3: GDP and GDP per capita, factor cost, 1965-2004
Source:  The source for this and subsequent tables unless otherwise noted is Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning, Macroeconomic Indicators, issues for 1997-2005.
Note: 1984 = 100. 
Figure 2.2: Copper production in thousands of metric tons,
1972-1998
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Figure 2.4: GDP and GDP per capita, growth rates, 1964-2004  
(3 year moving average)
Figure 2.5: Sectoral shares in aggregate value added,
1965-2004
Figure 2.6: Growth rates by sector, 1965-2004, 3 year
moving average
Figure 2.7: Exports and imports as percent of GDP, 1992-2004
Figure 2.8: External balances as percent of GDP, 1992-2004
Note:  The exchange rate was fixed at .71 Kwachas to the US dollar during 1960-
1972, and for 1973-75 at .64.  From 1977 through 2004, the simple regression of 
the annual inflation rate and exchange rate was the following, where Xt and Pt are 
the logarithmic rates of change of the exchange rate and the GDP price deflator, 
respectively:
Pt =   .108  +  .696[Xt]    Adj R-square = .711,  F = 74.22
         (2.97)    (8.61)       Degrees of freedom = 25
Figure 2.9: Zambia:  Changes in the nominal US Dollar
exchange rate & inflation, 1960-2004
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Figure 2.10: ODA grants and loans, total and net of interest payments, shares of
GDP, 1992-2004
Figure 2.11: Nominal and inflation adjusted(’real’) exchange
rate, January 1997-February 2006 (Jan 2000=100)
NER  nominal exchange rate (Kwacha to the US$)
RER  real exchange rate (nominal exchange rate divided by the US GDP deflator, and multiplied by the Zambian 
GDP deflator.
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Reducing poverty, preventing excessive 
inequality, and generating adequate employ-
ment are the three most important goals of  
a macroeconomic strategy that seeks to 
improve the living standards of  the popula-
tion. Poverty, inequality and employment are 
each a complex phenomenon and difficult 
to capture with a single measure, particularly 
in a low-income economy undergoing 
change.  In order to avoid misleading simpl-
ifications, this chapter considers different 
indicators for poverty, inequality and empl-
oyment, which capture different aspects. 
This chapter addresses the following 
issues on the characteristics of  poverty in 
Zambia:  its level and incidence, geographic 
distribution, its determinants, and trends.  
Zambia has a database on poverty from 
various household surveys organised since 
1991.  The quality of  the data varies, though 
there has been a consistent improvement in 
survey design and coverage over time.  The 
quality improvement invites caution when 
interpreting trends based on comparisons 
between different surveys.   Discussion of  
the methodology of  poverty measurement 
and data issues in Zambia can be found in 
an annex to this chapter.  In what follows, 
the chapter reviews the poverty situation 
based on the 2003 household survey; iden-
tifies the trends in poverty and inequality, 
focusing on the 1990s for which there is a 
systematic survey evidence; analyses the 
nature and features of  inequality in Zambia; 
inspects the structure of  labour markets and 
changes in main labour market indicators 
over the last two decades; and presents imp-
lications for poverty, inequality and employ-
ment for a poverty reduction strategy.
The latest poverty profile of  Zambia was 
published by the CSO in November 2004, 
based on the data collected in the LCMS III 
2002/03 (GRZ 2004).  The survey mea-
sured that sixty-seven percent of  the popu-
lation fell below an adult equivalent poverty 
line of  K 92,185 per month.  With respect 
to this consumption line, poverty in rural 
areas affected seventy-four percent of  the 
population and fifty-two percent were below 
the extreme poverty line.  Thus, in 2003, 
more than half  the rural population of  
Zambia was living at levels below the food 
3.2 Characteristics of Poverty
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subsistence norm. Moreover, fifty-two 
percent of  the urban population fell below 
the poverty line, compared to forty-five to 
forty-six percent during 1993-96 (see Tables 
3.1 and 3.2).
According to the 2004 poverty assess-
ment, ‘poverty was attributed to the inability 
to acquire enough food' (GRZ 2004, 159), 
which is consistent with the finding that the 
majority of  poor still live in rural areas, and 
that their consumption basket includes own-
consumption of  food.  In rural areas, food 
share in the consumption basket was 
seventy-five percent in 2002/03, and the 
percentage of  household-produced food 
was fifty-five.  In towns and cities the prop-
ortions were fifty-two and four, respectively 
(GRZ 2004, 151-55).  It is not surprising to 
find a correlation between consumption of  
household production and poverty levels.  
This suggests that poverty in Zambia is 
'absolute' in the sense that a large propor-
tion of  people falling below the poverty line 
find themselves at a point of  destitution, so 
food intake is inadequate. 
Poverty incidence varied across prov-
inces from fifty-seven percent in Lusaka to 
eighty-one percent in Northern Province. 
The former, the lowest for any province, 
was even high for any sub-Saharan region 
(Table 3.3).  The other poverty measures, 
namely the poverty gap and severity, which 
indicate with more precision how poor the 
poor are, also show important territorial 
disparities. In Northern, Northwestern and 
Western province there are more house-
holds below the poverty line, but also, the 
poor living there are more destitute in 
relative terms, i.e. their average consump-
tion is more distant form the poverty line 
than in other provinces (Table 3.3). Overall, 
the poverty gap ratio in 2003 was high (27.9 
percent), but lower than in 1990s, which 
means that PAE consumption levels of  the 
'poor' were on average seventy-three percent 
of  the poverty line. Poverty severity, which 
is more sensitive to the expenditure distribu-
tion among the poor, is also highest in 
Northern (0.21) and Northwestern and 
Central provinces (0.16) suggesting that the 
very poorest households of  Zambia can be 
found there.
As to be expected, poverty varies across 
social categories. The categories normally 
used in poverty analysis in Zambia for rural 
areas are small, middle, large scale farmers 
22and non-agricultural households.   In urban 
areas the categories derive from the average 
cost of  living: low, medium and high cost 
areas.  This classification is imperfect, espe-
 cially for rural areas, wheredisaggre-gation 
among small-scale farmers would provide 
important information on the characteristics 
23of  poverty.   Data on cultivated land per 
household and net crop value per capita 
indicate substantial differentiation among 
both smallholders and middle scale farmers
(Zulu et al. 2000, 27-30).  
Poverty was exceptionally high among 
the rural small scale households and house-
holds residing in urban 'low cost' areas 
(Table 3.4).  Almost five million people 
classified as small scale farmers were poor, 
and over 3.5 million 'extremely poor'.  Table 
3.4 also shows the poorest and most 
vulnerable classes, for a wide range of  indi-
cators, were, in order of  importance, small-
scale farmers, middle scale farmers and 
urban residents in 'low cost' areas (GRZ 
2004).  Extreme poverty was concentrated 
among small-scale farmers in rural areas. 
This group included farming households 
displaying a variety of  coping strategies, and 
off-farm income, particularly casual wage 
labour, was probably the only source of  
cash and food during the four or five 
months before harvests.  According to the 
GRZ (2004), ninety-three percent of  small 
scale farm households received an income 
24of  K 600,000 or less.   Seventy-five percent 
of  the poorest households in urban areas 
received less than K 600,000.  A third of  
what were defined as large-scale farmers 
(more than twenty hectares) still fell below 
the poverty line, implying that size of  
holding may not be the central differentiat-
ing factor or simply that farm size is not 
accurately measured for larger scales.  Other 
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possible determinants would be availability 
of  working and physical capital, the quality 
of  land, crop choice and other non-
agricultural activities.
Typically female-headed households are 
often mentioned as being particularly 
vulnerable to poverty traps. To an extent, 
this may be a feature in Zambia, especially 
in urban areas but some studies show that it 
is not female-headed households per se who 
are particularly disadvantaged, but more 
specifically female-headed households 
lacking male adult support or households 
where there is 'female dominance' and lack 
of  available labour power, since these 
households are severely affected by labour 
shortages (Byrne 1994, 17).
According to the 1998 poverty data, 
people classified as self-employed, unpaid 
family workers and unemployed had higher 
poverty incidence (eighty, eighty-five and 
seventy-five percent, respectively). In the 
same year forty-six percent of  employees in 
state enterprises fell below the poverty line, 
and fifty-eight percent of  private sector, 
formal and informal, wageworkers.  Local 
government employees had a notably high 
poverty rate, seventy-three percent showing 
the extent to which lower rank civil servants 
have suffered from poverty.  Thus there are 
significant differences between employment 
categories in terms of  poverty levels. It is 
interesting to note that parastatal employees 
were relatively better off  in 2003 than in 
previous years.  This is not because their 
living conditions improved; but, partly 
reflects the effect of  privatisation, which 
rendered redundant a substantial proportion 
of  the lowest paid employees, dropping 
them into the informal sector and maintain-
ing their poverty status in a different 
occupation category. Female workers were 
particularly affected since they occupied 
disproportionately the lower ranks of  the 
public sector (Byrne 1994).
Poverty levels differ according to 
whether heads of  households work in the 
formal or informal sector, as shown by 
Kapungwe (2004). Eighty-five percent of  
informal agricultural workers fell below the 
poverty line, with formal non-agricultural 
employees at fifty-two percent. The poverty 
incidence among formal agricultural work-
ers, i.e. those working with contracts for 
more than six months, was also high, and 
not significantly different from other 
agricultural workers and self-employed 
farmers (eighty-two percent).  This finding 
indicates that formal sector farm workers 
were not 'privileged' in terms of  the risk to 
fall into poverty. One can reasonably assu-
me that farm workers who are not regis-
tered as formal, and therefore, who might 
not have contracts, may not receive the 
minimum wage, or enjoy fringe benefits, 
would be among the most poverty prone in 
absolute and relative terms.
Cross-tabulations between poverty 
incidence and education confirmed in 1998 
that poverty levels were extremely high 
among the least educated, eighty-eight 
percent for those without schooling and 
eighty-five for those with less than Grade 4 
(Kapungwe 2004).  Education was one of  
several elements of  poverty status that 
might differ from area to area.  The profile 
of  the poorest households in Zambia 
indicates that poverty in much of  the 
country was related to remoteness from 
communications networks, and lack of  
income-generating opportunities.  This 
combination has led many households to 
request to be eligible for resettlement 
schemes, since migration to better served 
areas seems to be the only escape from 
poverty (Leavy et al. 2003).  Transitory 
activities generating occasional jobs for cash 
or food were also typical of  the poorest 
rural and urban households (Milimo et al., 
2002; Kapungwe 2004; Kamya 1994). 
Food is the dominant element in the 
consumption of  the poorest fifty percent of  
the population, and poverty is consequently 
affected by the level and variability of  food 
prices.  This might explain why in some of  
the poorest rural areas destitute workers 
often might be paid in maize (Leavy 2003), 
though this is a common practice across the 
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developing world, and might reflect the 
dominance of  non-market employment 
relations associated with forms of  employer 
coercion.  Because of  the unequal distribu-
tion of  land and earnings from crops 
among small scale farmers, it is unlikely that 
the poorest households benefited from 
expansion of  cash crop production in the 
1990s.  This is consistent with the percep-
tion among the poor and the evidence from 
agricultural surveys that these farmers were 
'too poor to farm';  that is, they lacked the 
basic farm assets necessary to take advan-
tage of  new crops, technologies and mar-
kets, domestic or foreign (GRZ 2004, 174, 
Deininger and Olinto 1999). This may 
particularly affect groups of  women (espe-
cially widows, separated or abandoned) 
living in households with little or no male 
presence and scarce active labour for 
income generating activities.  The number 
of  days of  casual employment that the 
poorest farmers obtain and the remunera-
tion they receive were probably the key 
determinants of  their household welfare. 
In urban areas, the massive decline of  
formal sector jobs and incomes drove urban 
poverty trends in the 1980s and the 1990s.  
Lowly paid and retrenched workers of  state 
enterprises, as well as youth in urban areas, 
appear to have been the first victims of  the 
adjustment era in recession-laden towns, 
particularly in the Copperbelt, and became 
new entrants in a saturated informal econ-
omy (Kamya 1994).  Changes in food prices, 
in part driven by liberalisation of  markets 
and removal of  consumer subsidies on 
maize meal, as well as falls in employment 
and real wages, were all central to the rise in 
poverty.  Also important were events 
beyond the control of  policy makers, with 
drought and weather effects perhaps the 
most important.   
In the 1990s in response to falling 
incomes, the most common household 
coping strategies were: reducing food 
consumption or altering diets (more tubers 
and less cereals); keeping children out of  
school to work; income support from family 
and friendship networks; selling at harvest 
and receiving food aid in the 'hungry 
season'; sale of  household assets, particu-
larly agricultural assets; and most important, 
engaging in casual wage labour (for exam-
ple, agricultural piecework and food for 
work programmes).  Survey respondents 
also mentioned crop diversification as a 
strategy, although this was limited to those 
rural areas where more cash crops became 
available after liberalisation (e.g. cotton and 
tobacco).  In urban areas, apart from the 
strategies mentioned above, people engaged 
in backyard farming (particularly women), 
micro enterprises financed by redundancy 
payments, and activities manifesting the 
unravelling of  social cohesion, robbery, 
extortion and prostitution.  Very few 
societies undergo decline without the 
manifestation of  socially dysfunctional 
behaviour, and Zambia was no exception.  
Work instead of  education for children, 
prostitution as the labour force entry point 
for girls and women, robbery instead of  
decent work for men are the unavoidable 
fellow passengers in a process in which 
average incomes fall by over half.
Central to the analysis that follows is the 
previous discussion of  methodological 
issues (see also Annex 3.1). In order to 
assess poverty, one needs data over a sample 
of  the same households through time 
('panel data').  There are no nationally repre-
sentative panel data for Zambia.  As a result, 
a rigorous and definitive quantitative ana-
lysis of  poverty dynamics is not possible 
(Litchfield et al. 2003).  
However, less exacting standards can 
produce useful insights on the basis of  
surveys with   similar properties, especially 
coverage, representativeness, and if  data are   
collected in the same way, i.e. with very 
similar questionnaires.  Estimates from 
cross sections of  the data suggest that 
3.3 Trends in Poverty and 
Social Indicators
Poverty Incidence, Trends and HIV/AIDS
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fifth percentile upwards, with the original 
29sample.   This can be interpreted as a 
reduction in living standards of  the 'middle' 
class, which is consistent with the overall 
finding that urban poverty increased sign-
ificantly over the 1990s. However, the not-
ion of  'middle' class may be inappropriate 
except in the quantitative sense because inc-
ome and consumption levels of  these hous-
eholds were initially close to the 'absolutely 
poor', and barely sufficient to afford a basic 
food basket plus a few non-food items.  The 
recession of  1991-98 can be considered 
pro-poor if  one accepts that the bottom 
percentiles of  the distribution saw their real 
expenditure increase in comparison with the 
rest of  the population.  In other words, 
relatively poorer households gained with 
respect to the 'poor middle class' and less 
poor households over 1991-98.
These trends should be viewed with 
much caution.  As argued, the 1991 survey 
reports extremely low levels of  consump-
tion for the bottom three and four deciles 
of  the population.  It is not surprising, if  
these estimates were correct, that over the 
eight-year period poorest households 
managed to improve their situation some-
how.  Dropping implausible values at the 
low end of  the distribution makes a very 
30substantial difference in the trends.   The 
analysis of  growth incidence curves sug-
gests that a sub-group of  households within 
the bottom twenty percent had consump-
tion growth rates well above the average.  
This is more evident if  one compares the 
growth incidence curve in rural areas with 
31that of  urban areas.   In rural areas the 
growth pattern was relatively more pro-poor 
than in urban areas, because the bulk of  low 
consumption outliers concentrate in the 
rural domain. 
In summary, the evidence from density 
functions and growth incidence curves 
confirms that urban poverty and the 
consumption of  households in the middle-
to-top sixty percent of  the distribution 
worsened significantly.  It also shows that 
consumption growth rates were negative for 
poverty incidence fluctuated in the seventy 
to eighty percent range during 1991-1998, 
then fell to just below seventy percent in 
2003.  Therefore, whether it increased or 
decreased depends on the base year.  
Perhaps the most accurate statement is 
that in the mid-2000s poverty incidence was 
below its highest level during the 1990s, but 
not significantly below its average value in 
the decade.   Thurlow and Wobst (2004) 
argue that a relatively constant poverty 
incidence was associated with a declining 
poverty gap, reflecting an improvement in 
income distribution, especially after 1996.  
This argument would be consistent with the 
finding that urban poverty incidence 
increased, while rural poverty slightly fell, 
from a much higher level.  To put it simply, 
many non-poor urban households fell below 
the poverty line, while many poor rural 
households rose towards it.  If  one could 
eliminate measurement errors and properly 
account for seasonal effects, one would 
probably find that during 1991 to 2003, 
poverty remained unchanged around the 
extremely high level of  sixty-five to seventy-
25five percent.   Poverty in urban areas 
increased, most dramatically during 1996-
1998, when the measured increase was ten 
percentage points.  The processes of  
privatisation and formal sector retrench-
ment largely explain this increase.
A calculation of  cumulative density 
functions (CDF) for expenditure during 
1991-1998 suggest the following if  one 
26takes the entire database;  i.e., including 
households with extraordinarily low expen-
27diture in 1991 distribution.  First, the 
distribution (density) functions of  con-
sumption of  1991 and 1998 cross at a point 
near the extreme poverty line, implying that 
trends of  poverty were different for two 
sets of  households whose consumption 
28levels are below or above that point.   
Poverty incidence in 1998 was slightly 
higher than in 1991, but the poverty gap 
and severity diminished significantly 
(McCulloch et al. 2001).  The situation 
worsened for the households from the fifty-
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a majority of  households, and did not lift 
32the poorest out of  poverty.    In other 
words, while the period 1991-1998 was, 
strictly speaking pro-poor, it was fundamen-
33tally a period in which poverty worsened.
Social indicators confirm the negative 
poverty trends during the 1990s. Zambia 
was one of  the few countries in the world 
whose ranking on the Human Development 
Index declined in every year of  the decade. 
Almost across the board, health, after 
improvements in the 1970s, nutrition and 
34education worsened.   Under-five mortality 
increased in the twenty-year period, striking 
evidence of  social regression.  By contrast, 
neighbouring countries like Mozambique 
and Malawi showed significant annual 
35reductions in child mortality rates.   Child 
malnutrition levels deteriorated substantially 
36from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s.  
According to a government report, 'almost 
half  (forty-nine percent) of  children aged 
three to fifty-nine months were stunted (too 
short for their height), twenty-three percent 
were underweight (low weight for their age) 
and five percent were wasted (low weight 
for their height)' (GRZ 2004, 219). 
The worsening of  health conditions was 
associated with the spread of  HIV/AIDS in 
the country, especially during the 1990s.  
Reported prevalence rates from antenatal 
sentinel posts reached twenty percent of  
37adults.   Child and adult mortality, malnutri-
38tion, morbidity,  and HIV/AIDS preva-
lence are interdependent and mutually 
39reinforcing.   As a result, Zambia has, today, 
one of  the highest incidences of  orphans in 
the sub-Saharan region, over twenty percent 
of  the population under fifteen (Hunter and 
Williamson 2002; Bennell 2003). 
The deterioration of  the health of  the 
Zambian population was also due to a crisis 
in public health services.  A dramatic decline 
in per capita health expenditure occurred 
between 1970 and 1992, which negatively 
affected existing infrastructure, quality of  
personnel and availability of  basic drugs and 
40equipment.   The motivation of  health 
workers declined as their real incomes fell 
due to the reduction of  funding and the 
consequent decline in real wages and work 
material (equipment, drugs, consumables, 
etc.).  The fall in funding was exacerbated by 
the introduction of  user fees in 1993, which 
substantially reduced the effective demand 
41for health care (Milimo et al. 2002, 34-38).   
The decline in the quality and amount of  
health services also explain the drop in life 
expectancy, to a level among the lowest in 
the sub Saharan region.  
In education, literacy rates increased, but 
gross and net school enrolment rates for 
both sexes fell during the 1990s partly as a 
result of  the introduction of  user fees (see 
Table 3.5).  This was a clear symptom of  
household hardship in light of  the impor-
42tance Zambians place on formal schooling.   
As Table 3.5 suggests, in 1980, Zambia had 
education levels among the highest in the 
sub Saharan region; and, while in the early 
   2000s literacy and enrolment rates were 
and remained higher than many African 
countries, the trend after 1980 was unam-
biguously negative. 
The impact of  HIV/AIDS on the 
education sector was particularly severe. 
According to Kelly (2000), teacher mortality 
had increased over the 1990s, and was 
estimated at seventy percent higher than the 
population as a whole.  In 1998 UNAIDS 
estimated that Zambia lost about 1300 
teachers to HIV/AIDS, 'the equivalent of  
two-thirds of  its training college output' 
(UNAIDS 2002).  Subsequently, teacher 
mortality rates fell, due to teachers' aware-
ness of  the disease, rather than improved 
43treatment.   After 1998 the shortage of  
teachers decreased, because of  lower 
mortality and an increase in the number of  
-new teachers trained, from below two thou
-sand in the late 1990s, to close to six thou
sand five years later. On a less positive note, 
the supply shortage was also relieved by the 
decline in enrolments, discussed above. 
The main factor limiting the supply of  
teachers in the 2000s was the central 
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fared less badly than the average.  However, 
this last finding could be due to an underes-
timation of  the weight of  household produ-
ction in the consumption basket. Whichever 
the reason, this more positive trend fell 
short of  bringing the poorest rural house-
holds sufficiently close to the poverty line.
The deterioration of  most social 
indicators, at least until 2000 calls for 
substantially increasing the public invest-
ment that will be necessary to reverse the 
situation and now also avoid health and 
education workers' brain drain, which has 
been exacerbated by a combination of  
'push' (low incentives, salaries, deterioration 
of  work conditions, general reduction in 
living standards among civil servants, etc.) 
and 'pull' factors (increasing demand for 
health professionals in countries like the UK 
and the USA).
Zambia is one of  the most unequal societies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa as measured by 
income variation.  The Gini coefficient falls 
into the .50 to .60 range, which places 
Zambia with South Africa, Namibia, and 
Botswana as the most unequal in the sub 
Saharan region, and also close to Brazil and 
46Colombia.   The maximum-recorded 
measure for the Gini coefficient is derived 
from the 1991 expenditure survey, with a 
value of  .57 if  the very low observations are 
omitted (see discussion and chart in    
Annex 3A.2), and .61 in 1991 if  they are 
included.  Inequality estimates based on 
income data are even higher, but less reliable 
than consumption measures.  Estimates 
prior to 1990 are based on income data,   
and not strictly comparable with consump-
tion-based estimates.  
From the few statistics there are avail-
able, and secondary evidence, several points 
can be inferred. First, conventional wisdom 
holds that at independence in 1964, Zambia 
was more unequal than two decades after.  
However, the data show increases in income 
inequality between 1959 and 1976, mainly 
due to a fall in the share of  the bottom 
Inequality
government's expenditure ceilings set by 
loan conditionalities. This constraint on 
expenditure prevented the government 
from recruiting the teachers required to 
meet the goals of  the Free Basic Education 
programme established in 2002.  Almost 
nine thousand teachers, most specifically 
trained for rural schools, were unemployed 
in 2003 because the government could not 
use available funds to hire them.  Indeed, 
the number of  teachers employed fell from 
442002 to 2003.    If  expenditure limits 
continue, Zambia will not meet the MDGs 
for education. Moreover, the trends above 
are largely consistent with qualitative 
evidence collected in participatory poverty 
assessments and trends in the ownership of  
basic household assets, often used as a 
proxy of  long-term wealth (see Annex 3.1).
This section can be concluded with a 
brief  re-statement of  the major points for 
which the evidence is sufficient.  Poverty in 
Zambia fluctuated around very high levels, 
within a sixty-five to seventy-five percent 
range, for the headcount measure, increas-
ing from 1991 to 1998 and decreasing 
afterwards.  The small overall reduction 
recorded between 1991 and 2003 may not 
45be statistically significant.   It is likely that it 
reflects differences in survey design and is 
within the margin of  statistical error. It also 
masks differences between income groups 
and geographical areas.  
Urban poverty incidence increased 
significantly during 1991-98, then slightly 
fell between 1998 and 2003.  The substantial 
increase was probably the result of  a 
relatively large portion of  households being 
clustered just above the poverty line in 1991, 
which would be consistent with poverty 
incidence rising while poverty gaps and 
severity decreased. Rural poverty seems to 
have slightly increased between 1991 and 
1996, and decreased thereafter, especially 
between 1998 and 2003.  Nevertheless, rural 
poverty levels remain extremely high, and a 
substantial proportion of  people live below 
the food poverty line.  Since 1991, house-
holds in the bottom quintile appear to have 
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47quintile (see Table 3.6).   A number of  
hypotheses have been offered to explain the 
increase in inequality after independence: 
the rise of  a public sector bourgeoisie 
within a state capitalist economy (Turok 
1989, 219), and a widening rural-urban gap 
48to name two.   The simple truth is that 
there are no reliable statistics to provide the 
basis upon which a trend could be asserted, 
so explanatory hypotheses are speculation 
about the unknowable.
According to Thurlow and Wobst (2004) 
evidence from the poverty profiles would 
indicate that income distribution has 
improved during the 1990s, specifically if  
49we compare 1991 and 1998 survey data.   
This finding is at odds with the published 
results of  the other surveys after 1991; i.e. 
1993-1998, where it seems that both the 
Gini coefficient and the Kuznets ratio of  
inequality increased (the latter being the 
ratio of  income shares between the first and 
the fifth quintiles (GRZ 1997 and Table 
3.6).  Thurlow and Wobst (2004) conclude 
that despite overall increases in poverty 
incidence, the poorest fared better than the 
middle income groups, and, in this sense, 
growth during 1991-98 was relatively pro-
poor.  As argued in the previous section 
these results depend heavily on the possibly 
problematic lower consumption levels of  
the poorest in 1991.  Thurlow and Wobst 
(2004), following McCulloch et al. (2001) 
drop some extremely low values, but not all.  
Income-based inequality estimates suggest 
an overall drop in inequality, from extremely 
high levels in 1991, to slightly lower in 1998 
(see Figure 3A.4) and then lower still in 
2002/03, mainly due to declines in the 
income held by the top twenty percent.  
For reasons discussed above, reliance on 
consumption expenditure and income 
estimates does not yield reliable results in 
Zambia, because of  inconsistencies across 
surveys.  However, there exist complemen-
tary indicators of  inequality. Surveys 
provide information for a range of  educa-
tion and health indicators cross-tabulated 
with wealth quintiles based on asset indices. 
The evidence shows considerable inequality 
in education and health outcomes in rural 
and urban areas.  While differences between 
urban and rural areas are substantial, even 
more striking are the differences within 
rural areas (Sahn and Stifel 2004). Tables 3.7 
through 3.10 show the evidence of  social 
inequality for both education and health 
indicators. It is worth noting that these 
differences on the basis of  socio-economic 
status are far more important than gender 
disparities for the main education and health 
indicators. Households in the upper quin-
tiles, as measured by assets, have higher 
immunisation rates and delivery attendance 
rates in public or private health centres, 
lower fertility rates, lower child mortality 
rates, and lower levels of  malnutrition 
among children and pregnant women, than 
households in poorer quintiles.  The 
negative trends for social indicators pre-
sented previously affected the lower quin-
tiles more than the higher ones, and subse-
quent improvements were unevenly distrib-
uted in favour of  the latter.  This is shown 
when one compares malnutrition rates 
across wealth quintiles and infant mortality 
rates with education in 1992 and 2001 (see 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11, which shows that the 
rates dropped for both, though at a much 
faster pace for the higher wealth quintiles 
and better educated). 
High inequality in the levels prevailing in 
Zambia means that pro-poor growth rates 
must be very high. This poses a significant 
challenge. It also means that there is signifi-
cant scope for income redistribution 
through fiscal policies, social insurance, free 
health and education for the poor and direct 
employment creation.
There is limited information on labour 
markets in Zambia, and what is available is 
not strictly comparable over time.  Most of  
the information is derived from the LCMS 
surveys, which were designed for poverty 
3.4 Labour Markets
Demographics of Labour Markets
Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Case Study of Zambia
336
recorded unemployment rates in general, 
but particularly in rural areas. 
Given the levels of  poverty in rural 
areas and the kind of  predominant activities 
(small-scale farming, casual wage labour, 
etc.) being unemployed is not an option. In 
1991 the evidence of  youth unemployment 
was alarming and became one of  the hot 
topics of  debate on employment issues 
(GRZ 1991). 
Since then, several surveys have shown 
compelling evidence of  increasing youth 
unemployment rates, particularly for those 
between twenty and twenty-nine. Youth 
urban unemployment was already signifi-
cantly high by 1986, namely 47, 33 and 16 
percent respectively for the 15-19, 20-24 
and 25-29 age cohorts. In the latest survey 
(2002/03) the figures were up to 49, 47 and 
30 percent for 15-19 (GRZ 2004, 94). 
Growing youth unemployment is partly 
a result of  dwindling job opportunities and 
the socio-economic crisis of  the past two 
decades; but, also a consequence of  contin-
uous increases in the youth labour force 
(due to population growth and higher 
labour force participation), in spite of  the 
expected effects of  HIV/AIDS spread 
51among the youth.   A report on youth 
unemployment (Mayaka and Moyo 1999) 
confirms these findings and suggests that 
the unemployed youth cannot be treated as 
a homogeneous category. The unskilled 
youth appear more affected by the lack of  
job opportunities in towns. But, more 
importantly, the lack of  specific training and 
demand for previous work experience have 
barred a large proportion of  youth from job 
opportunities, mostly in the regulated 
'formal' sector but also in the informal 
economy (Mayaka and Moyo 1999, 129). 
Those who manage to find employment, 
especially in unregulated activities, often 
concentrate in petty services for irregular 
durations and pay (repairs, trading, hair-
dressing, wielding, etc.). Others who have 
alternative aspirations (mechanics, drivers, 
nursing, teaching, typing), and can afford to 
wait, prefer to remain unemployed and look 
analysis. The employment sections in 
household questionnaires did not intend to 
address labour market issues specifically.  At 
the time of  this mission, the last labour 
50force survey was for 1986.   The lack of  
such surveys for twenty years makes it 
impossible, for example, to judge the empl-
oyment effects of  the structural adjustment 
programmes since 1990 with any degree of  
precision and disaggregation.  Existing evid-
ence, however, indicates a growing 'infor-
malisation' of  the economy, resulting in part 
from the privatisations and liberalisation 
measures that were part of  the structural 
adjustment process. 
With its mid-2000s population of  about 
eleven million, Zambia was one of  the most 
urbanised countries in the sub-Saharan 
region.  Urbanisation approached its peak in 
the decade after independence, when 
mining and manufacturing sectors prom-
pted rural-urban migration.  From the early 
1990s this tendency reversed itself  as 
mining declined and the rest of  the urban 
economy followed it down.  As a result, 
urban population has decreased from forty 
percent in 1980 to thirty-five in 2000.  This 
decline in urbanisation was virtually unprec-
edented since the middle of  the twentieth 
century in the developed or underdeveloped 
world.  Perhaps more than any other simple 
measure, it indicates the extent to which 
Zambian society and economy underwent a 
traumatic collapse. 
Quantitative evidence shows that formal 
sector employment fell during the 1990s, 
when reform packages, especially priva-
tisation and trade liberalisation were acceler-
ated (see Figure 3.2). Unemployment rates, 
as measured in household surveys, have 
gone up since 1986 (from thirteen to sixteen 
percent), mainly because      recorded urban 
unemployment has almost doubled (Table 
3.12). Census data show that between 1990 
and 2000 overall unemployment decreased, 
however, this is only because a large drop in 
rural unemployment more than compen-
sated for the significant rise   in urban 
unemployment. One must be cautious about 
Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Case Study of Zambia
37
growth.  This creates the potential for a 
vicious circle as labour quality declines at 
the same time as skill-shortages create 
labour demand constraints, resulting in 
fewer and lower-quality employment oppo-
rtunities. HIV/AIDS severely exacerbates 
this vicious circle.  Losses in productivity of  
workers through sickness-related absentee-
ism and death of  relatives may explain some 
of  the decline in productivity.  According to 
UNAIDS (2002), in Malawi and Zambia 
there has been a massive increase in illness 
and death rates among health workers in 
particular, though there is no reliable 
information on this (Bennell 2003). 
Official statistics indicate that formal sector 
employment declined slightly after 1986, 
when it reached its peak of  556,000, to 
546,000 in 1992.  Subsequently the decline 
was considerably more rapid, to 416,000 in 
2002 (see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.17). The 
dramatic drop in formal sector employment 
cannot simply be attributed to redundancies 
directly related to the privatisation process 
alone. According to data from the ZPA, 
privatisation-related redundancies between 
1992 and 2003 for 253 listed companies 
affected just over seven thousand employ-
ees, which is 5.4 percent of  the total formal 
job losses recorded in the same period by 
53  the CSO.
Much of  the decline in formal employ-
ment followed from the demand-constraints 
on, and trade liberalisation of, the economy 
in the 1990s, especially in manufacturing 
and mining sectors.  The only exceptions to 
employment decline were in tourism-related 
activities, and large-scale farming in horti-
culture and tobacco, particularly after the 
arrival of  a few hundred Zimbabwean 
commercial farmers.  These sectors gener-
ated far too little employment to offset the 
fall of  employment in manufacturing, in 
which employment had increased threefold 
from independence to the mid 1970s, then 
fluctuated with no trend in the 1980s 
(Figure 3.2). From the late 1980s on manu-
Formal Sector Employment Trends
for formal sector, or better, remunerated 
opportunities (Kamya 1994, 30). Moreover 
Kamya (1994, 33) shows  that many infor-
mal activities present significant barriers to 
entry, given the high average age of  manu-
facturing operators (thirty-seven years)
In any case, we should not forget that 
data on unemployment should be taken 
with caution. Frequently those who declare 
themselves unemployed belong to less poor 
households. They either tend to live in 
middle- and high-cost urban areas or be 
concentrated among the most educated 
urban labour market entrants. Thus it is not 
surprising that unemployment is heavily 
Concentrated among the more educated 
youth living in urban areas. 
Labour supply in Zambia has suffered 
during the 1990s and 2004 for several 
reasons. Health indicators are clearly worse 
and the HIV/AIDS pandemic took a great 
toll among people of  working age.  The rise 
in undernutrition and micro-nutrient defi-
ciency in children implies a less healthy 
labour force for the future, as suggested by 
empirical evidence in the rest of  Africa 
(Sender et al. 2005, 26).  Education attain-
ment, after impressive progress up to 1980, 
regressed, in literacy indicators, enrolment 
rates and participation in vocational training. 
These trends affected formal sector com-
petitiveness through growing high-skill 
shortages in various sectors (Chiwele and 
Chinganya 1997; Colclough 1989).  
There is evidence that the long term 
economic crisis had particularly negative 
effects on public sector workers.  
Recruitment fell, salaries declined and 
working conditions deteriorated, which 
prompted skilled workers, especially from 
health and education, to leave the country, 
with serious implications for an economy 
52already suffering from skill shortages.   
The deterioration in health and educa-
tion obviously affected the productivity of  
the labour force, and exacerbated the 
demand factors constraining employment 
Labour supply: Education and Health 
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55Informal Labour Market
The trends in formal wage employment are 
consistent with other evidence of  growing 
informalisation of  the labour market.  How-
ever, precise information on the 'casualis-
ation' of  labour does not exist to document 
this.  Sporadic official data, indirect evi-
dence from the LCMS, interviews with 
government experts and other informants 
in Lusaka, plus some qualitative evidence 
see Milimo et al. 2002) offer indications of  a 
55tendency towards informalisation.  
We noted above that women have been 
pushed from the formal to the informal 
sector, and concentrated in the service 
trades.  It also appears that their activities 
are ones in which the income elasticity of  
demand is low, serving poor populations in 
a saturated market.  These are trades 
characterised by ease of  entry and requiring 
little initial capital outlay.  As a result, 
incomes are under continuous threat from 
competition as new entrants, frequently 
redundant form the formal sector, crowd 
into the easy-entry activities.  These activi-
ties, such as vending and brewing, are 
characterised by low productivity, such that 
the operators have little prospect for 
development and expansion (Touwen, 
1990:12).  The informal sector is also 
subject to official harassment as activities 
may be illegal, such as unlicensed home 
brewing and trading.  Women are subject to 
arrest, confiscation of  goods and fines, 
which further reduces their profit levels and 
increases the risks of  economic activity  
(Bardouille, 1991:131). 
Casualisation and informalisation were 
reflected in the increase of  reported self-
employment, unpaid family labour, and 
shifts in the sector composition of  employ-
ment towards services, particularly trans-
57port, trade, finance and construction.   The 
fall in the share of  the category 'employees' 
from twenty-five percent in 1986 to seven-
teen in 1998, sixty-one to fifty-two in urban 
areas, corresponds to the decrease in wage 
employment discussed above. This shift 
appears more dramatic if  one looks at 
facturing employment entered into a 
systematic decline. Agricultural formal wage 
employment followed a similar pattern, 
though apparently increasing more rapidly 
than manufacturing during the 1980s (see 
Figure 3.2).  However, the extraordinary 
increase in the second half  of  the 1980s 
may be merely the result of  different 
reporting systems and sources.  In other 
sectors formal employment in 2003 was ten 
percent below its 1990s level in construc-
tion, fifty percent lower in manufacturing, 
54and seventy-five percent in mining.   
Copper prices partly explains the 
employment performance throughout the 
economy during the 1970s and first half  of  
the 1990s, but less so during 1987-2000 
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In the latter period 
copper prices fluctuated, even rising briefly, 
but the stimulating effect on the economy 
did not match the previous negative effect.  
Another aspect of  the formal employ-
ment market has been discrimination 
against women.  Women were and are 
concentrated in the lower ranks of  the 
public sector, in both government agencies 
and parastatals. As a result, the effects of  
retrenchments and redundancies resulting 
from the Public Sector Reform Programme 
and privatisation of  publicly owned enter-
prises had a particularly negative impact on 
women, forcing many into the informal 
sector.  As a result of  the reduction of  
employment opportunities in the formal 
sector, women in increasing numbers have 
sought livelihoods in the informal sector 
(the informal sector is discussed in the 
following section).  
It would appear that about fifty-five 
percent of  women are working in the 
informal sector.  As in formal sector 
employment, women are concentrated in 
the service and lower income areas of  the 
informal sector, often adapting their dome-
stic activities, such as food production, to 
the cash economy.  Women also are in a 
large majority (70.6 percent) of  unpaid 
family workers.  (World Bank, 1993b: xi)
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Census data, whose comparisons are less 
vulnerable to the sampling peculiarities of  
surveys.  Between 1990 and 2000 the 
proportion of  'employees' in censuses fell 
from nearly thirty-one percent to eighteen, a 
decline occurring both in urban and rural 
areas (Table 3.14).  In Zambia, as in South 
Africa (Theron 2005), there was a shift away 
from the standard employment relationship 
typical of  the mining and manufacturing 
sectors. Part of  this change resulted from 
retrenchment, especially in public enter-
prises. An analysis of  poverty data from the 
various surveys during 1991-2003 indicates 
that the poverty headcount of  government 
and public enterprise employees signifi-
cantly decreased, especially for 1991-96.  
It would appear that in the privatisation 
process job losses were concentrated among 
unskilled, lowly paid workers.  Thus, the 
'losers' in the retrenchment process were the 
poorest workers, who fell into activities with 
even lower remuneration, such as subsis-
tence farming, petty trade, charcoal burning 
and casual piece work. Women were over-
represented in this category of  'losers' due 
to their concentration in the service and 
lower income areas of  the informal sector 
(Byrne 1994, 23). In other words, the 
retrenchment process was anti-poor and 
gender-biased, first because of  its demand 
effect through a lower wage bill, and second 
through retrenching lower paid workers 
from public enterprises.
In the household survey of  2003, the 
proportion of  the working age population 
employed in the 'informal sector' was 
eighty-three percent for the country as a 
whole, ninety-three percent in rural areas 
and fifty-six in urban areas.  These can be 
compared to the 1986 percentages, seventy-
seven, eighty-nine and forty-three, respec-
tively.  Even though these percentages must 
be viewed as approximations because of  
definitional ambiguity, the evidence is clear 
that in Zambia an extremely high and 
perhaps growing proportion of  employed 
people lack employment rights and receive 
very low (often below-poverty level) wages.  
Recent surveys show that a higher incidence 
of  informal employment is associated with 
higher poverty levels, for small and 
medium-scale farmers, households in low-
cost urban areas, and provinces other than 
Lusaka and Copperbelt (see Table 8.10 in 
GRZ 2004, 100; and Kamya 1994). 
The informalisation involved a retreat 
into low-return subsistence farming associ-
ated with an increase in the proportion of  
unpaid family workers. In urban areas, the 
dramatic fall in mining, manufacturing and 
construction in relative terms was matched 
by an increase in services (again, see Table 
3.17). If  similar to other countries of  the 
region, these categories include a wide range 
of  casual and low remunerated occupations 
such as street vending, hawking, bar ser-
vices, domestic service, repairs, and petty 
transport (Milimo et al. 2002). Women are 
particularly confined to very low-return 
activities, especially serving poor popula-
tions in saturated markets. Moreover, 
women involved in trading and brewing 
activities are also victims of  official harass-
ment to prevent these activities, i.e. arrests, 
confiscation of  goods, etc. (Byrne 1994, 25).
Some of  these trends indicate a failure 
of  labour markets to adjust to the new 
policy environment and structure of  
incentives fostered by structural adjustment 
policies. Despite the intention of  structural 
adjustment to favour tradable sectors, this 
did not happen (Chiwele and Chinganya 
1997). However, a dichotomy between 
tradables and non-tradables may be too 
crude, especially since all agricultural 
outputs are treated as tradable while in 
reality the sector is heterogeneous and much 
of  its production is non-tradable due, for 
example, to transport costs. Information 
used for employment patterns is not 
sufficiently disaggregated to provide an 
accurate picture of  tradable and non-
tradable trends and changes between more 
relevant sub-categories of  activity. The 
labour market rigidities alleged by the 
structural adjustment analysis were not 
necessarily dictated by interventionism or 
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anti-poor bias of  labour policies.   The 
absence of  a social security system, techni-
cal difficulties in switching skilled labour 
across different sectors, the time lags and 
scarcity of  skilled labour for different occ-
upations represented 'rigidities' more 
important than labour regulation, whose 
enforcement was sporadic.  In practice it is 
not clear how important organised labour 
was across sectors.  It may be that unions in 
Zambia had an impact on the slow employ-
ment adjustment to the stagnation and 
reforms, but there is no direct evidence of  
this.  The role of  unions has been exagger-
ated, and much of  the collective bargaining 
took place at the firm or industry level 
where adjustments were less easily blocked 
(Chiwele and Chinganya 1997).
In summary, evidence for state or trade 
union created 'rigidities' is far from conclu-
sive.  Certainly by the mid-2000s such 
rigidities were of  little importance.  A 2004 
World Bank assessment of  constraints on 
businesses in Zambia shows that labour 
regulations rank low in the order of  impor-
tance, sixteenth out of  seventeen contr-
58aints.   Only seventeen percent of  enter-
prises reported that labour regulations were 
a major constraint.  Retrenchment rules 
changed shortly after the Privatisation Act, 
prior to which the World Bank alleged, 
'retrenchment was never really an issue in 
Zambia' (WB 2003a, 28).  The changes 
increased retrenchment benefits significantly 
at the same time as privatisation-related 
layoffs became irreversible, although the 
retrenchment formulae only referred to 
basic pay, which was often below forty 
percent of  salary plus benefits (WB 2003a, 
28).  In many cases retrenchment packages 
were not paid, 'leaving employees in limbo' 
(WB 2003a, 28).  The retrenchment costs of  
privatisation were uneven, because schemes 
and implementation have varied among 
companies.  This variation makes general 
conclusions about the effects of  labour 
unions on the labour market rather uncon-
vincing and, in the absence of  concrete 
evidence, motivated in part by ideology.  
Overall, it is hard to interpret the trend 
towards informalisation and greater reliance 
on irregular and low remunerated self-
employment as other than a major symptom 
59of  Zambia's decline.  
Available information on rural labour 
markets is inadequate for a rigorous analysis.  
What evidence exists suggests that rural 
labour markets are quite fragmented.  It 
would appear that the incidence of  casual 
wage work is particularly high in rural areas, 
but largely unmeasured due to the difficul-
ties in collecting reliable data through large-
scale national household surveys.  There are 
different forms of  labour transactions and 
exchange, which vary between provinces 
and types of  farmers/employers.  The 
territorial distribution of  large and medium 
scale farmers, and their concentration along 
the 'line of  rail' biases the distribution of  
enumerated and unrecorded agricultural 
wage labour in Zambia.  Micro-level 
research shows that small scale farming 
generates casual wage employment under 
precarious conditions (Leavy 2003).  
Seasonal and casual wage work is 
available both in plantations (coffee, sugar) 
and in neighbours' farms.  Employment in 
larger-scale plantations tends to be better 
paid compared to when poor farmers work 
for their richer neighbours, though wage 
levels were in any case very low in the early 
2000s (Leavy 2003). Wages paid by neigh-
bours may be in cash or kind and deter-
mined with a high degree of  discretion 
depending on the personal arrangements 
and the bargaining power of  casual labour-
60ers.   This kind of  work usually involves the 
'most dirty and physically demanding tasks, 
such as clearing an area for cultivation, 
planting, weeding, harvesting or shelling and 
pounding grain' (Milimo et al., 2002, 28). 
For extremely poor households casual 
wage work is a coping strategy that derives 
from their inability to grow enough food on 
their holdings.  For the less poor it is an 
income source for accumulating cash for 
Rural labour markets
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marriage, migration, and working capital.   
The number of  days available for work and 
the levels of  remuneration may be impor-
tant determinants of  levels of  poverty in 
rural areas.  Therefore, systematic informa-
tion on rural labour markets is essential in 
order to create programmes for sustainable 
poverty reduction. 
In summary, little is known about the 
operation of  rural labour markets other 
than that remuneration is low and working 
conditions precarious.  This is a particularly 
serious information gap, because, as shown 
at the beginning of  this chapter, the major-
ity of  the poor live in rural areas.  As a con-
sequence, ignorance of  the conditions 
under which the poorest gain their liveli-
hoods makes designing effective poverty 
programmes difficult.  If  there is one thing 
that is known about rural poverty, it is that 
the simple 'trickle down' resulting form agr-
icultural growth is not an effective strategy 
for poverty reduction; indeed, it is not a 
poverty reduction strategy at all.
There is little disaggregated information   
on wage structure, let alone wage trends. 
Moreover, in Zambia, as in most  sub-
saharan countries, few resources have been 
allocated to collect time-series data on the 
wages of  workers outside the formal sector 
(see Annex 3A.1). The lack of  information 
is a major impediment for a serious analysis 
of  the impact of  policies on the poorest 
people in the country.  It also represents a 
constraint to investigating the interaction 
between poverty and employment, which 
would be the focus of  this report were the 
information available.  However, it is prob-
ably the case that the nature of  informal 
employment largely precludes the collection 
of  such information.
Soon after independence, the 1966 
Brown Commission formally ended racial 
discrimination in wages and salaries, which 
resulted in substantial wage increases for 
black workers up to 1973 (Mkandawire 
1993, 461).  The increase in mining and 
Wage Levels and Tendencies
urban wages for black workers in this period 
also resulted in a growing gap between rural 
and urban earnings in the 1970s, though the 
gap has been exaggerated (Jamal and Weeks 
1993).  Real average earnings started to fall 
in the early 1970s for recorded wage emplo-
yees during the first copper crisis.  
Reductions in real wages occurred in all 
sectors and more markedly in mining, where 
wage levels in 1983 were just fifty-four 
percent of  their 1970 level in real terms 
(Colclough 1989, 24).  Agricultural average 
earnings did not fall as steeply, but their 
levels in 1983 were a third of  those in 
mining, half  of  the manufacturing wage, 
and forty percent of  transport earnings.  
The fall in real earnings had its greatest 
impact on public sector workers, particularly 
those on the higher scales. In 1986 white-
collar workers received a salary sixteen 
percent below the 1967 level, while salaries 
for the lowest paid workers fell by roughly 
forty percent (Colclough 1989, 26-29).  This 
wage policy on the part of  the government 
would lay the groundwork for the abysmally 
low salaries in the upper levels of  the civil 
service that undermined morale and fos-
tered corruption during liberalisation in the 
1990s and into the 2000s (see Nielsen and 
Rosholm 2001). Also pro-poor were the 
government food subsidies, particularly on 
maize-meal (Bigsten and Ass. 2000; 
Colclough 1989), which would be an early 
casualty of  the IMF stabilisation package of  
1985 (Colclough 1989, 30). To a large 
extent, the episodes of  more drastic real 
wage cuts were associated with devaluations 
of  the Kwacha.  The wage and salary 
declines at the end of  the 1970s and into 
the 1980s would be but the beginning of  a 
long descent.   In 1996 real wages in the 
public sector had dropped to approximately 
forty-five percent of  their 1984 value 
61(Seshamani and Kaunga 1996).   
Use of  household survey data indicates 
the magnitude of  the fall in formal sector 
real wages. In 1991, nominal wages ranged 
from 5700 Kwachas per month for agricul-
tural workers to 16,145 for finance and 
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insurance workers. Two years later in 1993 
nominal wages for recorded employees 
ranged between 12,671 for agricultural 
workers, and 41,000 in mining and quarry-
ing.  Taking inflation into account between 
the two surveys, real wages for the lowest 
paid workers (agriculture) dropped by sixty 
percent, and by fifty-four percent for the 
highest salaries in finance and mining. (GRZ 
1999, 116).  In sum, the rather unsystematic 
evidence shows that, the decline in real 
wages for recorded formal sector workers 
was devastating during the 1980s and 1990s. 
A major element in the rise in poverty 
was the fall in recorded wage employment.   
As we have seen before, surveys at a sector 
level and censuses record a process of  
informalisation of  the labour market, 
compounded by a marked deterioration in 
working conditions in formal employment, 
both public and private.  With the sharp rise 
in the price of  copper after 2004, invest-
ment and employment increased in mining, 
and to some extent this spread to other 
sectors, most notably construction.  Evide-
nce is limited, but newspaper accounts, gov-
ernment investigations and discussions with 
employers and unions suggest that wages in 
some of  the new mines are below poverty 
level.  In addition, working conditions, 
especially safety conditions, in practice failed 
to meet government standards.  
The rejuvenation of  formal employment 
should not be on the basis of  poverty wages 
and the ill-health of  workers.  To prevent 
this, the relevant agencies should receive 
increased funding to monitor working cond-
itions, and the government should foster a 
simultaneous recuperation of  employment 
and trade union effectiveness. 
This chapter has presented and discussed 
evidence concerning poverty, social indica-
tors and employment in Zambia. 
Throughout the chapter and especially in 
the annexes it has been emphasised that, 
despite a significant number of  household 
3.5 Conclusion
surveys having been organised since 1991, 
available  statistical information presents a 
series of  problems that cannot be ignored, 
which have an effect on the interpretations 
about poverty and employment trends in 
the past decades. In spite of  these statistical 
gaps, it has been possible to draw a consis-
tent picture of  the situation, taking into 
account policy changes in the last fifteen 
years. Four main messages arise from the 
analysis in this chapter:
Poverty  incidence is still very high and 
probably stagnating but many urban 
people  have been falling into poverty 
over the last decade. However, the 
chapter has warned about serious 
problems with survey comparisons to 
analyse poverty trends.
Rural poverty  seemed to slightly 
improve from extremely high levels 
(destitution) in 1991. Given the 
importance of  agriculture (own account 
and through wage employment), which 
affects the lives of  millions of  rural 
poor, agricultural development is critical 
in the medium term but not only 
answer, as we shall see in chapter 4.
Inequality  is a very important issue 
even with high poverty incidence: there 
is urgent need for redressing various 
dimensions of  inequality particularly 
through employment creation and enha-
nced pro-poor redistributive fiscal exp-
enditures and reformed social services.
Employment there is no accurate data 
for any detailed assessment but growing 
informalisation and crisis in regulated 
wage employment are corroborated by a 
number of  available indicators. This 
calls for a  renewed focus on  employ
ment creation (directly and through 
better incentives to private sector) and a 
decent work agenda with pro-active 
state intervention.
As shown in this chapter, poverty incidence 
is very high according to the latest (2003) 
household survey, reaching sixty-seven 
l
l
l
l
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percent of  the population and three quar-
ters of  rural households. The analysis of  
poverty trends is problematic as a result of  
various methodological challenges. 
However, we have concluded that there is 
no clear statistical tendency between 1991 
and 2003 in terms of  overall poverty, rather 
a fluctuation around very high levels (sixty-
five to seventy-five percent), with a slight 
improvement after 1998 following a consid-
erable deterioration which particularly 
affected urban areas. A more disaggregated 
analysis has shown that while the bottom 
poorest people did relatively better, the top 
sixty percent of  the population, many living 
below the poverty line, suffered from an 
absolute decline in their real incomes parti-
cularly between 1991 and 1998. The relative 
improvement of  the poorest rural people 
arose from initial conditions of  pure dest-
itution and, probably, from previously wors-
ening living standards during the 1980s. The 
deterioration of  living standards in urban 
areas has been significant and its relation-
ship with processes of  economic reform, 
privatisation and the crisis of  the Organised 
(formal) non-agricultural sectors seems 
more than a coincidence.
Other social indicators corroborate the 
poverty trends. From 1980 a marked deter-
ioration of  health, nutrition and education 
standards has been noted, slightly attenuated 
only recently. The unfolding of  the HIV/-
AIDS crisis, which bears close association 
with generally worsening health conditions, 
has compounded these negative trends. 
Apart from the natural spread of  the pand-
emic, policy variables and their effects on 
health services have been emphasised. 
These processes must be coupled with many 
other symptoms of  social and economic 
crisis as stressed in this chapter. Overall, 
Zambia lost much of  the ground gained in 
the first two decades after independence in 
terms of  education and health standards in 
the context of  a relatively urbanised society.
High levels of  poverty, high average 
indices of  social deprivation (health and 
education) and low average incomes mask 
significant differences among social strata. 
In this chapter we have presented compel-
ling evidence about the high, and probably 
growing, degree of  inequality in terms of  
income and social indicators. Evidence on 
unequal prospects for different social 
groups, stratified by income sources, liveli-
hoods, geographical location and gender 
suggest that pro-poor policies should place 
inequality at the forefront of  the agenda. 
Evolution of  employment indicators is 
consistent with trends in poverty and social 
indicators. Most surveys, sector-level data 
and censuses suggest that there has been a 
process of  informalisation of  the labour 
market compounded by a marked deteriora-
tion in working conditions (wages, security, 
job opportunities) in the formal (organised) 
labour markets. Recorded unemployment 
62increased since the mid-1980s,  while 
formal sector (enumerated) employment has 
declined until recently to levels recorded in 
the mid 1970s despite a significant growth 
in the labour force over the last thirty years. 
The crisis in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors, protracted since the late 1970s, lies 
behind this poor labour market perfor-
mance. The 'informal' unorganised sector 
has become the pool where a growing mass 
of  youth in search of  first jobs and adults 
affected by retrenchment and deteriorating 
conditions flock in a typical 'survivalist 
strategy'. Micro-level evidence suggests that 
the growing informal sector is characterised 
-by lack of  dynamism, precarious work con
ditions, insecurity and saturation, particu-
larly in the most common occupations that 
present few barriers to entry. Demand res-
traint, associated with the crisis in the 
formal sector, and declining incomes in 
urban areas, partly explains the bleak 
prospects of  the informal unorganised 
labour market.
The deterioration of  labour markets and 
the falls in formal wage employment and 
wage levels call for a much more pro-active 
set of  employment policies. First, employ-
ment can be created and/or promoted in 
different sectors, especially:
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1. Agribusiness: substantial scope 
especially in labour-intensive crops like 
tobacco, horticulture and cotton
2. Vertical integration of  smallholders in 
non-traditional export value chains 
(vegetables, cut flowers, tobacco), 
which may induce increasing demand 
for casual and seasonal wage labour in 
the locations where outgrowing 
schemes flourish.
3. Manufacturing (initially sub-sectors 
linked to agriculture), which needs a 
substantial recovery and more imagin-
ative trade and industrial policies thro-       
ugh enhanced policy and autonomy;
4. Infrastructure construction, especially 
roads linking more remote areas and 
rural roads, and road maintenance. This 
can be implemented through judiciously 
planned public work schemes targeted at 
poorer areas and households thereby 
      creating employment and injecting cash 
in much needed local economies. 
5. Tourism is often mentioned as having a 
substantial employment potential, 
especially to absorb part of  the semi-
skilled labour force that is currently 
precariously employed in informal 
economic activities of  little dynamism 
     and  prospect. 
Employment creation will require substan-
tial public investments and different macro-
economic policies, especially to spread 
(cheaper) credit access to sectors with 
greatest employment potential. Secondly, 
these incentives for the private sector to 
promote employment creation should be 
accompanied with unambiguous measures 
for a 'decent work agenda' that focus on 
employment conditions of  the poorest, 
especially daily wages, other benefits (tran-
sport and meal allowances, nurseries, social 
responsibility programmes, etc.) and health 
and safety standards.
Enforcement of  decent work standards 
can be used as a central element of  a list of  
performance criteria to selectively promote 
industries and employers through a range of  
fiscal, financial and technological incentives.
In general, the links among poverty, 
social indicators, and employment and 
inequality suggests that any pro-poor eco-
nomic policy should be designed while 
taking into account the nexus between these 
various dimensions. These trends and pro-
files present clear symptoms of  a socioeco-
nomic crisis that calls for a more innovative 
and less restrictive approach to the linkage 
between macroeconomic policies and social 
outcomes through a more clearly defined 
employment nexus. This means that poverty 
reduction cannot be tackled in isolation 
from more pro-active and ambitious mea-
sures to address the high levels of  inequality 
and the deterioration of  employment pros-
pects in the last two decades. A 'decent 
work' agenda both in urban and rural areas 
with pro-active state intervention is essential 
at this stage. The challenges ahead imply 
that a significant boost in the productive 
economy, social infrastructures and the real 
incomes of  both rural and urban people is 
necessary if  these trends are to be reversed 
on a more sustainable basis.
 22 The definition of  rural strata can only be found in the 1993 
survey report. Farmers are stratified according to scale, defined in 
terms of  cultivated land, with cut-off  points at five and twenty 
hectares. If  households are mainly engaged in animal husbandry more 
criteria apply (numbers of  cows, beef  cattle, pigs, poultry, etc.). See 
GRZ (1993).
23 Note that 'small-scale rural households' account for 61 percent of  
the total population (over 6 million people) and 93 percent of  the 
rural population. Therefore, as a social category, it cannot be very 
homogenous.
24 Income data should be treated with even more caution than 
consumption expenditure data. 
25 According to the official indicators, overall incidence just went 
down from 69.7 percent to 66.5 of  the population (1991-2003), 
which is not a statistically significant change, whereas more successful 
countries like Mozambique have seen poverty levels drop from 69.4 to 
54 percent between 1997 and 2003. Extreme poverty incidence and 
rural poverty fell more significantly, especially between 1998 and 
2003. Urban poverty increases from 48.6 to 56 percent during 
1991-1998, and then dropped to 52.2 percent in 2003. Bear in 
mind that surveys differed in the periods covered and that a 
seasonality pattern of  consumption could be demonstrated in the 
2003 survey (see Annex 3.1 and Tables 3A.1 and 3A.2).
26 See Annex 3.2 on the technical aspects and illustration of  CDF 
applied to 1991 and 1998 survey data.
27 At the time of  this report the mission did not have access to the 
'cleaned' database for LCMS III 2003, so it was not possible to 
extend the density function analysis Into 2003.
28 In statistical terms, neither of  these distributions is stocha-
Stically dominant.
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29 If  one leaves out the implausible lower bound values (see below), 
the situation worsens in absolute terms from the twenty-eighth 
percentile approximately, i.e. the top seventy-two percent of  the 
population had negative rates of  real PAE expenditure growth. See 
Figures 3A.1 and 3A.2. 30 See Annex 3.2 and Figures 3A.1 and 
3A.2 on the consequences of  dropping very low consumption outliers 
or not.
31 See chart 2.1 in Thurlow and Wobst (200, 26). See Figure 
3A.3 in Annex 3.2.
32 When reaching this conclusion, it must be stressed that a panel 
series does not exist to assess poverty dynamics.  If  consumption of  
the poorest rural percentiles greatly depends on food the households 
produce, the differences between 1991 and 1998 in terms of  harvest 
and the seasonality of  the survey will have a major impact on the 
pattern of  growth incidence curves.  
33 One could label it a 'pro-poor recession'.
34 See GRZ (2002), GRZ-DHS (1997) for evidence of  health 
and nutrition worsening.  The latest DHS (2003) has finally shown 
some signs of  improvement for a range of  health indicators. See table 
3.5 for evidence on education.
35 Today Zambia is one of  the worst places in the sub Saharan 
region for a range of  health indicators. Apart from very high child 
mortality rates, Zambia is among the countries in Africa with the 
highest malaria-related maternal mortality and a very high incidence 
of  HIV/AIDS and AIDS related morbidity.
36 In a relatively short period of  time, like 1991-1996, stunting 
had increased from forty to forty-two percent (GRZ 1997, 3). See 
also Haddad and Garrett (1999).
37 The scale of  HIV/AIDS epidemic in Zambia may well be 
exaggerated, given the discrepancies existing between antenatal clinic 
estimates and population estimates. Bennell (2004, 2) quotes evidence 
from the latest DHS survey, in which HIV prevalence was 17.8 
percent for women and 12.9 for men (15.6 percent overall) in 2001, 
whereas the official UNAIDS estimates stayed at twenty-one percent 
(from ANC posts). Whether HIV prevalence in Zambia (like 
elsewhere in Africa) has been overestimated or not, the existing high 
levels leave absolutely no room for complacency. 
38 The PRSP (GRZ 2002b, 84) also reports increasing chronic 
illness incidence.
39 It is worth noting that U-5 mortality is severely affected by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. According to estimates by UNAIDS 
(2002) Zambia's U5 mortality rate would be thirty-eight percent 
lower in a 'without-AIDS' scenario during the 1995-2000 period.
40 Milimo et al. (2002, 34) quote negative trends of  forty-six 
percent in 1970-81 and a further decline of  forty-four percent from 
1980 to 1992. Simms et al. (1998) argue that the deterioration of  
basic health services was one of  the root causes of  increasing child 
mortality over the 1980s. The Zambian PRSP also points to the 
long distances from health centres and the lack of  transport as key 
determinants of  health seeking behaviour (GRZ 2002, 85).
41 The impact of  user fees is controversial but most evidence suggests 
a significant decrease in utilisation of  health services, even 
acknowledged by the Government in the 2002 PRSP: antenatal and 
family planning attendance dropped; STDs treatment dropped by 
seventy-six percent; 'although government policy calls for free referrals 
from the first level care, the resource gap resulted in hospitals charging 
even those who have been referred' (GRZ 2002, 85).
42 Only since primary school tuition fees were removed in 2002 the 
trend was reversed and demand for free education increased 
significantly.
43 'Life-prolonging anti-retroviral drugs have not been available at 
all' (Bennell 2003).
44 See IMF (2004b, 8) and WB (2004b, 23). The WB (2004b, 
23) confirms that 'teachers are underpaid, too few in number, and 
frequently absent' and 'teacher distribution has remained skewed in 
favour of  urban areas'. See also GCE (2004) report on the teachers' 
crisis in Zambia.
45 This is especially the case if  we take seasonal consumption 
patterns and survey design differences into account. See Annex 3.1.
46 See Figure 3A.4 in Annex 3.2 for a graphical illustration of  the 
high degree of  inequality.
47 Note that comparisons between pre- and post 1990 income-based 
inequality measures should be taken with a lot of  caution because 
there were significant differences in coverage.
48 For a critique of  the rural urban gap hypothesis, see Jamal and 
Weeks (1993).
49 See Lorenz curve in figure 3A.4, which shows less inequality for 
all strata between 1991 and 1998, even though levels remain very 
high by any standards. See also Table 3.6.
50 The 1986 survey was published with considerable delay, and 
provided relatively little disaggregated data.  Staff  at the CSO 
presented proposals to organise another labour force survey, drawing 
on lessons from South Africa.  The government did not take action, 
and there seemed little interest by donors and lenders in providing 
funds for such surveys.
51 See Sender et al. (2005) on similar trends in various SSA 
countries.
52 These trends are also consistent with evidence of  'ruralisation' 
and rural-rural migration commented above. See also Padarath et al. 
(2003) on health brain drain in the SADC region.
53 An official in the Ministry of  Labour confirmed that the 
privatisation process had only worsened already negative trends in 
formal sector employment. 
54 This is based on authors' calculations from CSO sources.
55 Defined as “employment where the employed persons were not 
entitled to paid leave, pension, gratuity and social security and worked 
in an establishment employing 5 persons or less”, which obviously 
includes small-scale farming (GRZ 2004, 98).
56 All our informants with knowledge of  Zambia's labour markets 
(including officials at the Ministry of  Labour) confirmed the tendency 
towards casualisation of  employment, particularly in urban areas. 
This is also facilitated by the law, which allows temporary contracts 
(without usual protection measures) for up to 6 months, and by weak 
enforceability, which, according to Labour officials allows many 
employers to find loopholes and maintain large proportions of  
workers in a precarious contractual situation. This is especially true 
in rural areas and out of  Lusaka. The Ministry of  Labour has 
twenty-one offices in the field but none of  them had a vehicle, 
according to a Labour Ministry official. 
57 See all Tables from 3.13 to 3.17. Note that there are some 
anomalies in comparisons between surveys especially in the distinction 
between self-employment (SE) and unpaid family labour (UFL), 
which does not seem consistent across surveys. Thus, for the purposes 
of  this argument, SE and UFL can be lumped together.
58 See WB (2004a, 21-22).
59 Qualitative assessments showed how urban focus groups made 
certain activities (growing in most urban areas of  Zambia in the 
1990s) like street vending, piece-working, charcoal burning, 
prostitution and others as equivalent to being 'unemployed' (Milimo et 
al. 2002, 22).
60 The daily wage paid in these large-scale farms was above the 
average daily per capita expenditure of  small-scale farmers (the 
poorest rural stratum) as estimated in the 2003 LCMS survey 
(2,800 Kwachas approximately). Wages paid by local small-scale 
farmers are well below these levels.
61 In 2000, the real wages of  various categories of  civil servants was 
less than twenty percent of  their 1975 level' (WB 2004b, 26).
62 Note, however, that the unemployment rate may be a misleading 
indicator of  labour market performance in a developing country 
context as argued in this chapter. See also Oya and Weeks (2004).
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Province Head count PO Poverty gap P1 Serverity P2 % of population
All Zambia
Rural
Urban
Lusaka
Copperbelt
Central
Eastern
North Western
Western
Southern
Luapula
Province
Northern
67
74
52
69
59
71
70
56
81
72
63
65
27
31
19
30
23
28
29
22
38
30
24
24
14
17
9
16
12
14
15
11
21
16
12
12
10,757,192
65.1
34.9
10.2
15.9
13.4
7.9
13.9
5.9
12.7
7.6
12.4
Table 3.3: Poverty Ratios: incidence, depth and severity by province, 2003
 (ratios in percentages)
Notes:
Head count  The percentage of people below the income line designation as poverty level.
Poverty gap  'The mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line where the mean is 
taken over the whole population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. That is the mean 
shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of 
the poverty line.' From the UN Statistics Division: 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=438).
Severity  Measure of inequality among the poor.  For explanation, see 
http://www.fao.org/Wairdocs/TAC/X5784E/x5784e0m.htm.
Source: GRZ, CSO (2004).
Survey year
Area Rural Urban
Extreme poverty incidence
Total poverty incidence (PO)
Poverty severity (P2)
Poverty gap (depth-P1)
1991 1993 1996 1998 a2003
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
80.6
88.0
69.7
54.6
32.3
48.6
46.4
29.9
83.5
92.2
65.3
47.6
24.4
44.9
35.4
17.4
68.4
82.8
55.6
36.5
27.3
46.0
37.9
19.4
70.9
83.1
49.3
34.2
36.2
56.0
23.7
13.2
52.0
74.3
31.3
16.5
32.0
52.2
19.2
9.3
Table 3.2: Rural and urban poverty: official statistics, 1991-2003
Notes:
a The 2002/03 LCMSIII results are not strictly comparable with previous surveys because the design 
was significantly different and measurement errors cannot be distributed.
Sources:
LSMS surveys and mission's calculations for poverty gap and severity in 1998.
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Notes and Sources:
a The 2002/03 LCMSIII results are not strictly comparable with previous surveys because the design was 
different. 
b Thurlow and Wobst (2004). 
c McCulloch et al. (2001).
Includes mission calculations from GRZ (CSO 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2004), Thurlow and Wobst 
(2004), and McCulloch et al. (2001).
Table 3.1: Poverty trends 1991-2003 from various sources
Poverty severity (P2)
Extreme poverty incidence
Poverty gap(depth-P1)
Poverty incidence (PO)
Poverty severity (P2)
1991 1993 1996 1998 a2003
58.2
69.2
62.2
46.6
56.5
68.5
41.7
30.6
57.0
69.5
42.1
30.9
60.6
73.8
58.3
40.5
53.2
69.2
51.3
32.3
65.8
79.4
45.4
30.7
68.6
81.3
47.4
32.3
57.9
72.9
40.1
26.7
59.8
75.4
40.0
25.6
55.8
71.9
36.9
23.1
46.0
66.5
27.1
13.9
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Extreme poverty incidence
Poverty gap(depth-P1)
Poverty incidence (PO)
Poverty severity (P2)
Extreme poverty incidence
Poverty gap(depth-P1)
Poverty incidence (PO)
Official
sources
Alternative
bcalculations
Alternative
ccalculations
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Population shares
Non- agricultural households
Moderately poorExtremely poor Total poor
All Zambia
Rural stratum
Medium scale farmers
Large scale farmers
Small scale farmers
Urban stratum
Low cost areas
Medium cost areas
High cost areas
46
52
54
35
-
35
32
39
13
4
21
22
22
29
33
20
20
23
17
4
67
74
76
64
33
55
52
62
30
8
65.1
60.7
1.1
.0
3.2
34.9
27.2
3.6
4.0
Table 3.4: Poverty Incidence by economic group, 2003 ( percent)
Source: GRZ [CSO] (2004).
Table 3.5:  Education Indicators, 1970-2002
Item 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002
School enrolment:
Total gross
Female, gross
Total (net)
Female youth
School enrolment:
-
49
32
64
50
59
47
73
65
94
89
79
78
68
59
81
76
79
76
66
65
78
72
88
86
82
79
68
68
80
74
89
87
Female
Literacy rate
Female
Youth*
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Note: *Defined as persons 15-24 years old.
Source: WDI 2005, WB and UNESCO.
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Table 3.6:  Coefficients and income shares, 1959-2003
Source: latest version of WIID database (WIDER 2005) and own calculations from CSO (various 
reports). All values, except for ratio in last column, are in percent terms.
1991
2002/03
1993
1996
1998
1959
1972
1976
1991
1993
1996
1998
Year Gini Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Ratio
Q5 to Q1
Basis of 
calculation
Consumption
Gross income
59.3
51.1
54.8
57.4
48.1
57.0
55.6
77.3
66.0
61.4
64.7
57.0
0.9
3.2
3.5
2.8
6.3
na
3.7
0.5
1.9
1.9
1.6
3.6
5.2
7.6
7.0
6.4
11.7
13.0
11.3
11.0
21.4
21.2
18.5
18.3
60.8
55.1
59.7
61.6
57.1
na
56.6
8.08
68.6
69.1
70.2
62.016.8
15.2
15.6
15.8
10.65.5
8.8
8.6
8.4
10.6
2.6
4.9
4.7
4.6
7.1 17.5
36.4
36.8
147.3
15.3
9.1
22.4
17.2
na
17.5
67.0
Quintiles
Wealth quintiles
Health indicators
IMR x1000
U5MR x 1000
Immunisations coverage
Age-specific fertility rate
(15-19 yrs) per 1000
Births:
Delivery in private
hospital/ clinic
Delivery in public
hospital/ clinic
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
124
212
71
210
14
6
132
226
77
172
16
8 8 4
28
179
80
191
105 104
191
80
161
64
70
136
86
86
63
28 10
36
158
78
192
108
Table 3.7: Health indicators by asset quintiles, 2003
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2000).
Never 
attended
Dropped out Primary Secondary or
higher
Wealth 
quintiles
Poorest
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
38
34
29
21
11 23
29
27
25
26 33
37
39
40
45 19
9
4
3
2
Illiterate Literate Cannot sum
numbersWealth quintiles
Poorest
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
97
96
91
78
54 46
22
9
4
3 74
68
56
36
15
Table 3.8: Literacy by Wealth Quintiles, 2003
Source: CSO and ORC Macro (2003).
Table 3.9: Schooling by wealth quintile, 2003
Source: CSO and ORC Macro (2003).
Q1/ Q5
Stunting Underweight
Fifth
Poorest
Second
Third
Fourth
Wealth quintiles 1996 2001 1996 2001
2.12
53
48
46
37
25
42
40
40
26
12
3.50
32
28
24
18
13
2.46
26
23
23
9
6
4.33
Table 3.10:  Malnutrition by wealth quintiles, 1996 and 2001
Source: CSO and ORC Macro (2003) )  and Gwatkin et al (2000).
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Infant and child
mortality
Under-five mortality
Urban
Rural
Education level
No education
More than primary
Primary
ZDHS Percent
change
ZDHS ZDHS ZDHS
1992 2001-02 1992 2001-02
78 77 150.8 140 -7.2
115.8 103.0 201.2 182 -9.5
115 108 204 198 -2.9
99
79
99
70
182
135
177
121
-2.7
-10.4
Table 3.11: Child mortality rates by strata, 1992 and
2001-2002
Source: CSO and ORC Macro (2003).
Year Zambia  Rural Urban
1986 13 11 19
1991 22 14 34
1993 20 14 33
1996 15   9 29
Table 3.12: Unemployment rates, 1986-2003 (percent  of
labour force)
Note: Relevant age starts at seven for 1991 and 1993 and twelve for 1986 and for 1996 onwards. 
Source: Mission calculations from GRZ [CSO] 1986, 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2004.
Zambia national
Self-employed
Employees
Unpaid family workers
1986 1996 1998 2003
Employers
1986 1996 1998 2003
Urban
Rural
Zambia national
Urban
Rural
69
81
33
51
55
40
55
59
42
60
67
40
5
5
4
27
36
4
27
35
4
20
26
3
25
13
61
21
9
54
17
5
52
20
7
56
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
Table 3.13: Changes in employment status, household
survey data: 1986-2003 (percent  of labour force)
Note: Figures for population twelve and older.
Sources: Mission calculations from GRZ [CSO] various years 1986, 1997, 1998
 and 2004.
Zambia national
Urban
Rural
1991 1993
Self-employed Employees Employer Unpaid family worker
1991 1993 1991 1993 1991 1993
0
1
0
1
0
0
41 43 25 18
49 48 6 4
23 29 63 62
30 37
41 48
3 6
Table 3.14: Changes in employment status from household survey data: 
1991-1993  (percent of labour force)
Note: The remnant to 100 is accounted for 'other' and 'not stated'; figures for population 
of seven and older. 
Source: Mission calculations from GRZ (CSO) 1991 and 1993.
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Table 3.17: Employment by sector of principal occupation, 1986 and
2003 (percentages)
Note: In order to keep consistency between both sources we have used the 1986 sector definitions and 
adjustments were made on the 2002/03 data. Thus, trade accounts for a single sector in the 2003 original 
source, but here it is added to Transport and Communications. Percentages less than 0.5 entered as zero.
Source: Own elaboration from GRZ (1986) and GRZ (2004).
Table 3.15: Changes in employment status from census data: 1990-2000 
(percent of labour force)
Source: Census 2000.
Table 3.16: Percentage distribution of employed persons 12 years and older 
by employment status, rural/urban and sex. Zambia, 2002-2003
Source: LCMS III 2002-2003 (GRZ CSO 2004).
3
Employment status Total
All MaleFemale
%Distribution
of employment
UrbanRural
All MaleFemale All MaleFemale
Employed by:
Public sector
Self-employed
All Zambia, % and 000’s 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
60 63 57 67 77 57 40 32 54
Household 2 2 2 1 1 0 5 4 6
NGOs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Embassies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Employer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unpaid family worker 20 8 32 26 12 39 3 1 5
Piece worker 2 3 1 1 2 0 4 5
Private sector 10 15 4 3 5 1 27 35 15
Central govt 5 6 4 2 3 1 14 14 14
Local govt 0 1 21 0 0 0 0 1
Parastatals 1 22 0 0 0 0 64
1
3,517
59.7
4.9
.5
1.3
9.8
.3
1.8
.0
19.6
1.7
.2
.1
Zambia national
Urban
Rural
1990 2000
Self-employed Employees Employer Unpaid family worker
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
0.2
0.9
0.4
1.0
1.8
3.2
27.3 39.7 30.6 18.3
31.2 42.1 11.3 6.3
20.2 32.5 66.2 54.5
37.4 41.6
54.3 51.4
6.4 12.0
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Mining and Quarrying
Electricity, Gas and Water
Construction
Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants
Transport and Communications
Finance and Insurance
Communications and Social services
Not stated
1986 2003
Total UrbanRural
1986 2003 1986 2003
66
5
3
2
0
10
2
1
9
3
Manufacturing
72
1
3
0
1
10
2
1
9
0
15
9
12
1
5
23
22
3
6
4
15
5
10
1
4
28
5
5
27
0
84
0
2
0
1
5
0
0
4
3
93
0
1
0
0
4
0
0
2
0
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Table 3.18: Distribution of the population 12 years and above by main economic activity, and various
categories, 2002-2003
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Copperbelt
Central
Province
Lusaka
Eastern
North Western
Western
Southern
Luapula
Northern
63
43
75
67
44
67
61
58
69
8
24
3
5
23
4
7
7
5
26
30
20
25
31
28
30
34
24
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
17
14
8
14
12
6
11
7
Categories
Total (000’s)
Sex
Male
Female
Demography
Rural
Urban
Categories
Farmers
Small
Medium
Large
Non-agric
urban cost
Low
Medium
High
Full time student Retired OtherUnemployedEmployed
Population 12
& older
Inactive populationLabour force
Economic status (in percent)
59
59
60
11
11
12 26
29
27
1
2
2
1
1
1
5,814
52
48
63
37
1
1
1
2
25
32
4
24
69
42
70
62
65
66
3
2
1
10
25
34
34
20
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
60
59
1
3
42
38
42
25
20
18
30
39
37
2
2
2
2
1
1
37
28
4
5
Areas
0
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Figure 3.1: GDP and the International Copper Price, 1955-2000
Figure 3.2: Formal sector employment in agriculture and manufacturing, 1960-2000
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The household surveys since 1991 resulted 
in a number of  reports and publications 
with quantitative and qualitative analysis 
(GRZ 1997; GRZ 1999, GRZ 2004, McCu-
lloch et al. 2001, Thurlow and Wobst 2004, 
Miti et al. 1997, Kapungwe 2004; Milimo et 
63 -al. 2002).   There are problems in using evi
dence from different surveys in order to 
assess differences in profiles and incidence 
trends, which raise the question whether the 
data and statistics based on them should be 
considered reliable information.  Strictly 
speaking only the surveys 1991-1996-1998 
are statistically comparable for trends. The 
1993 survey was carried out immediately 
after the major annual harvest, while the 
other three surveys were undertaken during 
the so-called 'hungry season', well before 
the major harvest.  Since expenditure estim-
ates derive from one-month and two-week 
recalls by informants, and expenditures are 
strongly seasonal, comparing the hungry 
season with the post-harvest is likely to gen-
erate systematic errors. The 2003 survey 
collected representative information for 
three of  the quarters, and the poverty head-
count ratios that result differ significantly 
among quarters, as Table 3A.1 shows (see 
also Table 3A.2). The implication is that 
surveys organized in different periods may 
well yield different poverty estimates that 
merely reflect seasonality of  consumption 
rather than real trends.
Most poverty indicators used by the 
government and by others are based on 
reported consumption expenditure and 
income. There is a vast literature on the 
relative merits of  these welfare indicators, 
which will not be discussed here.  It is 
sufficient to note that consumption expen-
diture, while it varies less over time than 
income, is affected by seasonal fluctuations 
that may not be randomly distributed across 
households.  Qualitative evidence shows 
that one of  the most important coping 
strategies of  poorer households is to reduce 
and change the pattern of  food consump-
tion. Thus, in some seasons, particular 
groups of  households will display signifi-
cantly lower consumption levels than the 
annual average.  One of  the most important 
problems with consumption estimates is 
that they normally rely on the memory of  
respondents for items that are very difficult 
to recall.  Extrapolations can yield signifi-
cant measurement errors, the magnitude 
and bias of  which are difficult if  not impo-
ssible to calculate. As a result, poverty 
analysis increasingly uses asset-based indices 
to rank wealth, which seem consistent and 
often more reliable than current consump-
tion information, because information on 
asset ownership (radio, TV, bicycle, farm 
implements, housing conditions) are easier 
to collect and verify. For example, demo-
graphic and health surveys (DHS) have used 
this method in recent years, permitting a 
disaggregated analysis of  health and other 
64social indicators by wealth quintiles.  
Data from DHS thus provided a consi-
stent and reliable disaggregation of  infor-
mation for Zambia in 1996 and 2002. Con-
versely, there have been some significant 
anomalies in consumption estimates in a 
number of  household surveys, particularly 
the base survey of  1991, in which estimates 
for the bottom of  the distribution seem 
biased and unreliable. 
Another problem in the calculation of  
poverty measures is the choice of  the time 
period and spatial price indices.  Despite 
household surveys collecting information 
on local prices through parallel surveys in 
local markets for average prices of  items, 
unit prices may vary considerably. Especially 
in a liberalised context in which local prices, 
particularly for food, fluctuate; assumptions 
about relevant prices for each household are 
frequently arbitrary.  The construction of  
price indices then becomes an imprecise and 
biased exercise.  In any case, the poverty 
survey and LCMS surveys in the 1990s did 
Annex
3A.1  Methodology and Data 
Consumption-based poverty estimates
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the 1996 and 1998 LCMS surveys. However, 
these surveys have had limitations in that the 
survey design does not capture changes in  
welfare due to seasonal variations. The LCMS 
surveys were conducted during the last 2 months 
of  the fourth quarter of  the year when the 
majority of  households become food insecure. 
Furthermore, the previous LCMS surveys 
captured household expenditure data using the 
recall method, which is prone to omissions 
resulting from memory lapses.
The shortcomings of  surveys of  the 1990s 
prompted the CSO and the World Bank 
(WB) to undertake an Integrated LCMSIII 
Survey, conducted over twelve months 
between November 2002 and October 2003 
(GRZ 2004, 156).  The resulting LCMS 
2003 was thus designed to take seasonality 
into account. The apparent drop in poverty 
by five percentage points could be due to 
the survey improvements and the effect of  
seasonal patterns inadequately treated in 
previous surveys.  It is worth comparing the 
results in LCMS III with those of  LCMS II 
for the same season.  In 2003 poverty 
incidence for the last quarter was seventy-
one percent, while the annualised estimate 
was sixty-seven percent, showing a drop in 
poverty from 1998.  However, if  one only 
considers the estimate for the last quarter 
there is virtually no fall in poverty incidence 
in the same period, seventy-three compared 
to seventy-one percent. 
Tables 3A.1 and 3A.2 are illustrative of  
the problems encountered when comparing 
surveys of  different design and period of  
implementation. Most researchers using 
poverty data completely ignore this crucial 
aspect.  The percentage for the 'extremely 
poor' grew in the last quarter, which coin-
cides with the 'hungry season', or plating 
period, during which food stocks are dep-
leted and cash income low.  Different hous-
eholds were sampled in each period imply-
ing that these seasonal patterns may also 
carry errors of  sample specificity; i.e. there 
may be statistically significant differences 
between household groups other than for 
consumption seasonality if, for example, 
richer farmers were interviewed in the first 
not collect the price information required to 
adjust for differences in the cost of  living 
across regions (GRZ 2004, 153).  Whether 
one adjusts consumption estimates by 
spatial or temporal price fluctuations makes 
a considerable difference. Miti et al. (1997)  
re-calculated poverty measures for the 1993 
and 1996 surveys with the use of  alternative 
price indices. Although trends did not cha-
nge dramatically, overall levels of  poverty 
incidence, depth and severity were substan-
tially reduced. Moreover, the ranking of  
provinces by poverty indicators was affe-
cted, and estimates for two provinces chan-
ged remarkably (Northern and Central).
A further problem, particularly for the 
comparison of  surveys, lies in sampling 
procedures.  Surveys during the 1990s used 
the Census 1990 as the sampling frame.  
However, the surveys six and eight years 
later almost certainly contained errors due 
to the out-of-date sampling base.  Given 
that the 1990s was a period of  recession and 
upheavals, one would expect that people 
became more mobile.  This is confirmed by 
the high incidence of  migration found in 
the various survey reports (GRZ 1994a);  In 
this context of  rural-rural and urban-urban 
ements, the 1990 Census may have mov- 
been inadequate as a sampling frame, part-
icularly for 1998. Thus the reliability of  
sampling weights used in later surveys (1996 
and 1998) may also be questioned. 
Moreover, the surveys mentioned varied 
in coverage, so the representativeness of  the 
samples also varied.  There were significant 
improvements in sample coverage both in 
1998 and 2003 compared to previous sur-
veys, in particular the availability of  sam-
pling frames at district levels (Kapungwe 
2004, 484 and Table 3A.2).
As mentioned above, the seasonality of  
consumption was not captured in the same 
way across the five surveys (Table 3A.2). 
The LCMS III report states the problem 
clearly (GRZ 2004, 4): 
Since 1991, the country has been utilizing cross- 
sectional sample data  to monitor the well-being 
of  the Zambian population, as was the case with  
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(TV, radio, bicycle, motor vehicle) or means 
of  production (plough, canoes, carts, 
tractor). In a situation of  deep recession 
one could expect divestiture in some cases, 
i.e. a decreasing proportion of  households 
owning particular assets. Otherwise, over 
time one expects ownership of  basic assets 
usually to increase especially when initial 
levels are low or when availability of  these 
goods was limited in the past. A glance at 
the data for 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2003 
shows a mixed picture. Overall, there is 
some improvement between 1993 and 1998 
and a deterioration, or reduction, in asset 
ownership between 1998 and 2003, which 
seems to counter consumption-based evi-
dence. For rural areas it appears that own-
ership of  most assets increases until 1998, 
notably for bicycles, but then it decreases. 
This is true for different population strata, 
including the 'ultra-poor', whose ownership 
of  bicycles increased from twenty-three to 
thirty-three percent between 1993 and 1998 
(and that of  radios too from twenty-three to 
thirty percent). However, ownership of  a 
basic and important farm implement such 
as a plough has reduced consistently bet-
ween 1993 and 2003, which is a sign of  
crisis among a large number of  rural 
households. Moreover, there is no system-
atic evidence on the availability of  oxen in 
rural areas, a basic asset for agricultural 
activities; but, other sources point to an 
alarming and growing scarcity since the late 
1980s, partly because of  the drought, and 
partly because of  the role of  animal sales as 
a coping strategy for the poor (Milimo et al. 
2002; Deininger and Olinto 2000). 
Reductions also apply to canoe owner-
ship, another item that is more typical of  
poorer rural households in certain areas of  
the country. Data on assets from the various 
household surveys also confirm the high 
levels of  inequality discussed in this chapter, 
both between urban and rural areas and 
within rural areas. 
Finally, qualitative and participatory 
research has overwhelmingly shown that 
households, both in urban and rural areas 
quarter compared to other quarters. Other 
problems that make comparisons difficult 
between expenditure results in 1991 and 
2003 are the following: 1) questions were 
not asked in the same way;  2) there was a 
difference in the items included in different 
expenditure groups in 1991 and 1998 
(Thurlow and Wobst 2004; and GRZ 2004, 
162);  3) the 1991 survey results contained a 
substantial number of  urban and rural 
households with implausibly low food 
consumption levels, which would lead to an 
overestimation of  improvements bet-ween 
both surveys (McCulloch et al. 2001, 16);  4) 
the sample coverage was different and the 
survey period not exactly the same for the 
same areas across surveys;  5) comp-arisons 
among surveys in the 1990s were based on a 
common food basket established in 1991, 
and other evidence suggests that consump-
tion patterns changed during this decade.  
The 2002/03 report points out that the 
1991 basket was biased towards consump-
tion patterns in urban areas, which may 
explain some of  the extreme values 
obtained from rural areas (GRZ 2004, 161).
In summary, the effects of  altering para-
meters in the databases, excluding extreme 
cases, using different consumption equiva-
lence scales, and the application or omission 
of  regional price indices can have significant 
effects on poverty measures making com-
65parisons very problematic.   Estimating the 
quantitative effect of  different sampling and 
questionnaire designs on the various poverty 
measures is beyond the scope of  this report.  
Some of  this work has been done elsewhere 
for 1991 and 1998 surveys (McCulloch et 
al., 2001).  The vast literature on poverty has 
drawn attention to these methodological 
issues and the care one needs to take when 
deducing poverty trends from different
 surveys (see Howes and Lanjow 1997; 
Lanjow and Ravallion 1996). 
Another useful indicator of  long-term 
material welfare is ownership of  some basic 
and luxury assets, usually consumer durables 
Alternative measures of poverty trends 
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generally perceive a marked deterioration of  
their living conditions (GRZ 2004; Milimo 
et al. 2002; Larmer 2005). Only medium-
scale rural farmers seem to acknowledge a 
recent improvement in their living condi-
tions (Table 13.10 in GRZ 2004, 174). Thus, 
perceptions on poverty status and its causes 
vary between rural and urban areas in 2003. 
In the former, households are particularly 
concerned about the lack of  farm imple-
ments and cattle/draught animals. In the 
latter, low wages and pensions and lack of  
employment opportunities are often cited as 
reasons for poverty. If  we compare between 
different surveys (1991, 1996, 1998 and 
2003), there is evidence that the proportion 
of  households reporting having recurred to 
'coping strategies' in situation of  distress 
increased in the same period. For example, 
the reporting of  'reducing food intake or 
number of  meals' increased from fifty-nine 
percent in 1996 to seventy-five in 2003 as 
well as the reporting of  'piecework on 
farms' and 'other piecework' from twenty-
eight and twenty-two percent respectively in 
1996 to thirty-seven in both cases in 2003. 
Between 1991 and 1996 similar increases 
had been reported. These trends were also 
consistent with systematic increases in the 
proportion of  expenditure on food, espe-
cially among the poorest strata of  the 
population, as reported in successive pov-
erty profiles (GRZ 1997 and 1999).
Employment modules in LSMS surveys are 
constrained by methodological choices that 
do not allow a more disaggregated and 
context-specific picture of  labour market 
patterns and changes. In fact, the reliance 
on 7-day recall questions for employment 
status and occupation, and on the dubious 
notion of  'main' and 'secondary' activity in a 
highly heterogeneous context, characterised 
by multiplicity of  occupations, irregularity 
and seasonality of  most non-formal regu-
lated activities, and by variable levels of  
remuneration, is unconvincing if  one is 
seriously interested in analysing labour mar-
Formal employment statistics
66ket trends.   Moreover, information about 
recorded 'formal sector' employment deri-
ved from quarterly registered firm-level 
surveys and LCMS also presents inconsis-
tencies as discrepancies exist among differ-
ent sources of  employment data (CSO 
Quarterly Digest and LCMS). In fact, not all 
the nearly 600,000 people who are reported 
as 'formal sector' employed in the latest 
2002 /03 LCMS appear in the labour stat-
istics. The latest figure available (2003) from 
Quarterly Employment and Earnings Inq-
uiry is 416,000 people. Part of  the discrep-
ancy may come from the fact that LCMS III 
classifies 144,000 small-scale farmers and 
6500 medium-scale farmers as pertaining to 
the 'formal sector', while the other source 
only accounts for 64,000 agricultural empl-
oyees, surely wage workers in large- and 
medium-scale commercial farms. Besides, 
the Quarterly Inquiry collects data from 
registered companies included in the CSO 
list, which may exclude some that are capt-
ured by the latest household surveys, which 
is not designed to discriminate between est-
ablishments, if  not in terms of  size, for the 
purposes of  the formal/informal dichot-
omy. These discrepancies may be unsurpris-
ing, given the problems and differences in 
employment reporting systems and the resu-
lting inconsistencies, but the margin of  
error is still quite large. 
In line with much of  the work on the 
informal economy we argue that its hetero-
geneity prevents any generalisation about 
trends and any stark contrast between 
organised (and regulated) and unorganised 
(unregulated) economies in Zambia as in 
any other developing country. 
A growing literature on the heterogene-
ity of  the info-rmal sector as a source of  
employment is available (Breman 1980, 
67Maloney 2004).   Notwithstanding this 
heterogeneity, Milimo et al (2002, 23) 
among other authors (Kamya 1994, for 
example), argue that the informal employ-
  ment in Zambia, especially in urban areas, 
The 'informal' economy
Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Case Study of Zambia
57
can be considered rather a second-best or 
-last resort survival strategy than a true accu
mulation-driven choice for the majority of  
68households and individuals involved.  
Some patterns of  participation in info-
rmal activities are shaped by age and gender. 
Women are more likely to engage in beer 
brewing, knitting, hairdressing and pottery 
whereas adult men often get casual jobs in 
brick laying and thatching (Milimo et al 
2002, 23). Given the size and significance of  
the informal (unorganised) sector, more 
micro-level information is needed to disti-
nguish between those pockets that show 
signs of  dynamic accumulation and profit-
ability with positive employment implica-
tions and those pockets most typically asso-
ciated with deprivation and marginalisation. 
According to some sources, individuals with 
previous wage employment in formal estab-
lishments or beneficiaries of  retrenchment 
packages have managed to succeed in susta-
ining petty businesses more than others 
(Kamya 1994; Milimo et al. 2002; PAG 1999).
As suggested in this chapter, the literature 
on poverty trends in Zambia relies much on 
comparisons between cumulative density 
functions (CDF) of  consumption expendi-
ture. A CDF represents (definition) the 
cumulative distribution of  ranked expendi-
ture values from poorest to richest. The 
vertical axis displays the proportion of  the 
population with PAE expenditure below the 
value given on the horizontal axis. In this 
graph poverty lines can be plotted as vertical 
lines from the expenditure-equivalent of  the 
poverty line.
The analysis of  poverty trends with 
CDF by McCulloch et al. (2001) took out 
552 households of  about 9800 households, 
or slightly less than five percent of  the orig-
inal sample.  Thurlow and Wobst (2004) use 
the McCulloch database, also excluding 
3A.2  Technical Aspects of Poverty
And Inequality 
Density functions and growth 
incidence curves
these low values on the grounds that their 
implied food consumption levels were impl-
ausibly low.  When the latter estimate gro-
wth incidence, curves drop a further 7.7 
percent from the McCulloch sample by eli-
minating households whose PAE expendi-
ture was ten percent below the lower pov-
erty line. Given that the lower poverty line 
states the minimum food basket, ten percent 
was a low figure and one could plausibly 
assume that people at lower consu-mption 
levels were effectively starving to death. 
On the basis of  the original 1991 sample 
(not the McCulloch clean version) we app-
lied the same rule (below ten percent of  the 
extreme poverty line) and as a result 941 
households would be dropped, i.e. 9.6 per-
cent of  the original sample (see Figure 3A.1 
and 3A.2). We do the same for the 1998 
PAE expenditure distribution but the 
number of  households dropped is far 
smaller than in 1991 (only two percent of  
the original sample). After dropping these 
bottom end outliers, the CDF curves look 
somewhat different and they cross each 
other at a much lower level of  PAE expen-
diture, around the thirty percent of  popula-
tion cumulative distribution. In fact, the 
initially observed effect of  an improvement 
for the bottom third of  the population 
becomes an improvement for a much 
smaller proportion, around one fifth. 
Growth incidence curves become flatter, 
suggesting a less markedly pro-poor gro-
wth/recession. For the rest of  the distribu-
tion, real PAE expenditure levels were lower 
than in 1991, so households suffered from 
an absolute recession in consumption levels. 
With the 'clean' samples, poverty more una-
mbiguously increases between 1991 and 
1998 and inequality is only reduced from 
0.57 to 0.55 (instead of  from 0.61 to 0.55 
with the original samples). In other words, 
by dropping these very implausible outliers 
the overall situation seems relatively worse 
in 1998, even if  a small proportion of  the 
very poorest manage to improve their living 
standards, albeit from an extremely low base 
(i.e. PAE expenditure levels that are a frac-
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63 There is also a series of  studies supported by the Zambia Social 
Investment Fund based on analysis of  official household survey data 
or on other micro-level topic-specific surveys such as Miti et al. (1997) 
and Milimo et al. (2002).
64 On the advantages of  asset-based poverty measures and the 
problems with consumption expenditure data collection and analysis 
see, for example, Sahn and Stifel (2004), Filmer and Pritchett 
(1998), Gwatkin et al. (2000), and Sender (2003).
65 See Table 3.1 for different poverty estimates from the same 
databases and Miti et al. (1997).
66 See Standing et al. (1996) on some of  the methodological 
problems in data collection for employment/labour market 
information in low income, especially SSA countries.
67 On the heterogeneity of  the urban informal sector in Zambia and 
formal-informal employment linkages, see Kamya (1994). 
68  The most frequent activities reported (street vending, hawking, 
backyard farming, and some 'illegal' occupations like prostitution or 
petty crime) and the generally bad perceptions that respondents attach 
to them suggest they are not real choices. The most frequent activities 
reported (street vending, hawking, backyard farming, and some 
'illegal' occupations like prostitution or petty crime) and the generally 
bad perceptions that respondents attach to them suggest they are not 
real choices.
tion of  the extreme poverty line).  If  the 
CDF for one year (1998) lie above the CDF 
for the other year (1991) this shows a 
deterioration of  conditions (lower mean 
expenditure levels) for the part of  the 
population concerned. If  a CDF for one 
year is always above or to the left of  the 
CDF for another year this means that pov-
erty will be higher for that year independ-
ently from the poverty measure chosen (in 
monetary terms). If  the two CDFs cross 
one another, this means that mean expendi-
tures have gone in opposite directions for 
different groups of  people.
Another way of  viewing poverty trends 
is with growth incidence curves. These 
graphically pair average growth rates of  per 
capita (PAE) consumption (from two or 
more data points) with ranked percentiles 
of  the population (from poorest to richest) 
thereby showing the pattern of  growth 
associated with poverty levels. In Figure 
3A.3 below, the impact of  low outliers is 
very dramatic. Dropping outliers makes the 
curve flatter and less relatively pro-poor. 
Note that from this curve we can also obs-
erve that from the third decile of  ranked 
population average growth is negative indic-
ating that at least seventy percent of  the 
population suffered from absolute real con-
sumption expenditure reductions in the 
1991-98 period.
The Lorenz curve illustrates the shape of  
income or consumption distribution by 
plotting the ranked cumulative population 
with consumption/income values. It shows 
the proportion of  the total expenditure on 
the vertical axis spent by the proportion of  
the population on the horizontal axis. The 
graph displays a 45o line that represents 
perfect equality (all individuals have the 
same expenditure). The more distant the 
Lorenz curve is from this line the greater 
the level of  inequality. Two Lorenz curves 
can be compared by plotting and super-
posing them on the same graph, so that 
changes in distribution can be observed 
Lorenz curve
independently from the mean expenditure. 
If  they do not cross each other and one 
(1998) lies everywhere above the other 
(1991), it may be concluded that 1998 dist-
ribution is less unequal (more equal) than 
1991 distribution. When lines cross, this 
means that distribution has improved for 
one part of  the population while it has 
worsened for the other. The chart below 
shows a very slight improvement in con-
sumption distribution between 1991 and 
1998 although levels of  inequality remain 
quite high.
3
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Second
Third
Fourth
First 40
41
46
52
22
24
22
19
62
65
68
71
38
35
32
29
Annual average
quarters
Extremely poor Moderately poor Total poor Non poor
Categories (figures in % total population)Categories
46 21 67 33
Source: GRZ, CSO (2004)
Table 3A.1:  Incidence of poverty by survey quarters  and poverty status,
Zambia, 2002/2003
Survey Period Sample size District coverage
Poverty 
incidence
SDA priority
survey I 1991
LCMS I 1996
October-November
April-June
September-November
November-December
Year round
SDA priority
survey II 1993
LCMS II 1998
LCMS III 2002/03
9950
(9886)
10200
(10212)
11800
(11752)
16800
72
57
57
57
72
69.7
73.8
69.2
72.9
67
Source: Author's elaboration from GRZ [CSO] 2004, 1998, 1997 and 1993
Table 3A.2. Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, periods covered
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Figure 3A.1:  CDF consumption 1991 and 1998, original sample
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Figure 3A.3: Growth incidence curves 1991-98, with and without low outliers
Figure 3A.4. Inequality compared: Lorenz curves 1991-98: clean sample
(low outliers dropped)
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Figure 3A.2: CDF consumption 1991 and 1998, 'clean' sample
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4 ~ A Development Strategy
           for Zambia
4.1 Introduction 
Zambia is a small open economy, and dep-
endent on the export of  a primary com-
modity, copper, whose price has been uns-
table and in decline until recently.  In the 
1980s this made the country dependent on 
external borrowing to alleviate its balance 
of  payments difficulties, and subsequently 
even more dependent to service that debt.  
The burden of  debt service was and rema-
ins the most important contributor to macr-
oeconomic instability, sustained growth and 
poverty reduction. 
The immediate post independence 
years,1964-1968, were characterised by 
excess of  foreign exchange.  During this 
period growth was constrained by lack of  
skilled workers, so that Zambia was unable 
to productively absorb its export earning 
(see also Mkandawire 1994).  This is fol-
lowed by the foreign exchange constrained 
period, 1969-1984, when increased govern-
ment investment, intended to diversify the 
economy, resulted in an import dependent 
manufacturing sector.  
This import dependence and a decline in 
copper prices led to a chronic shortage of  
foreign exchange, and hence growth was 
constrained.  The binding foreign exchange 
constraint persisted in to the 2000s.  
The primary cause of  the persistent 
constraint was the collapse of  the copper 
prices, and an inappropriate policy frame-
work in the 1990s that made the constraint 
stronger.  The adjustment measures to 
address these problems aggravated them.  
These pressures were based on the view that 
Zambia's foreign exchange constraint arose 
from policy-induced distortions, when the 
causes were of  a structural nature that 
created obstacles to the effective operation 
of  product and factor markets.  The funda-
mental constraints included:(a) the domi-
nant role of  copper and the collapse of  its 
price internationally; (b) a weak skill base at 
independence; (c) excessive optimism that 
led to the anticipation of  a reversal in 
copper prices, and the mounting indebted-
ness that resulted from that unrealised 
reversal; (d) and an uncontrollable fiscal 
deficit also resulting from the fall in the 
copper price (Mkandawire 1994).   
With copper no longer dominating the 
economic to the extent it did in the past and 
the skill shortage reduced by the disastrous 
fall in employment in mining and manufac-
61
4turing, the fiscal deficit asserted its primacy 
as the binding constraint in the 2000s.  In 
other words, if  the foreign exchange cons-
traint were somehow relieved, perhaps by 
rapid rejuvenation of  the copper price as 
the government hopes, the fiscal constraint 
would have been binding.  Both the foreign 
exchange and the fiscal constraint arose 
from the same source, the fall in the copper 
price.  The need to diversify the economy 
remains as great in the 2000s as it had 
twenty and thirty years earlier.  Indeed, were 
the predictions of  a rapid recovery in 
mining to be realised, Zambia would come 
full circle in its decline:  from a middle 
income country excessively dependent on 
copper to a low income country excessively 
dependent on copper.
This section suggests an approach for a 
pro-poor growth and development strategy. 
The chapter does not intend to provide a 
detailed sectoral policy analysis and recom-
mendations. Instead, we do so with refer-
ence to the agricultural sector, which has 
recently been singled out as a key driver of  
growth and development in Zambia. A 
more detailed analysis of  the manufacturing 
and services sector is called for, given its 
future strategic importance, as argued here, 
but it is beyond the scope of  this study.
The discussion of  a growth strategy for 
Zambia, and for any country, must be based 
on the principle that the full participation of  
both women and men in the development 
process is essential.  Emphasis must be 
given to policies that enhance women's 
access to the means of  production, espe-
cially land, and their participation in emp-
loyment and income generating activities 
(GRZ, 2002b). For this reason, a gender-
differentiated assessment of  programmes is 
important for the success of  a development 
strategy for Zambia.  We regret that the 
information to make such an assessment is 
largely absent.  Therefore, a high priority for 
4.2 A Growth and Development 
Strategy for Zambia
the government should be to collect syst-
ematically the information that would show 
the gender-differentiated gains and losses in 
the development process.
To the extent there was a formulation of  
development policy in the 1990s, agriculture 
was been singled out as a key sector, coin-
ciding with the deepening of  the crisis of  
the adjustment years. Few would deny that 
policies to foster an internationally competi-
tive agricultural sector would be one part of  
a strategy for sustainable growth and pov-
erty reduction in Zambia, but not the key-
stone of  that strategy. Similarly, the rejuve-
nation of  the mining sector during the 
2000s indicated that mining could play a 
major contributing role to a sustainable 
growth strategy; however, as with agricul-
ture, mining would not be the central ele-
ment of  that strategy.  In this the section, 
the basis of  these judgements are explained, 
and an integrated strategy proposed.
The objective of  the government is a 
sustainable and rapid growth rate that max-
imises poverty reduction; that is, sustainable 
growth for which the elasticity of  poverty 
reduction with respect to growth is high.  
Sustainability can be considered as the 
necessary condition for both, rapid growth 
rates over time and similarly rapid poverty 
reduction.  Over more than forty years the 
growth of  the Zambian economy was 
neither rapid nor sustained.  As demon-
strated in previous chapters the non-
sustainable nature of  growth derived 
directly from the instability of  the interna-
tional copper market.  Copper was not 
unique in this regard, and the experience of  
other sub-Saharan countries shows that the 
diversification of  mineral exports, antici-
pated with the emergence of  precious gem 
production, would not generate stable and 
sustained growth.  On the contrary, should 
Zambia return to an economic structure in 
which mineral production is the driver of  
growth, the result would be a return to the 
similar structural imbalances that generated 
the imbalances of  the 1960-1990 period that 
fostered a crushing debt burden.  Therefore, 
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if  the mineral sector exhibits the boom 
some predicted for the future, it should be 
welcomed as a source of  foreign exchange 
and public revenue.  However, it should be 
integrated into a growth strategy in which it 
plays a supporting, not a leading role.
Assessing the future role of  agriculture 
requires clarity on the fundamental charac-
teristics of  the economy and society of  
Zambia.  As a result of  the long decline of  
the economy during 1970-1999, the per 
capita income of  Zambia dropped into the 
World Bank's low income category.  How-
ever, at the beginning of  the twenty-first 
century, Zambia's economic and social 
structure differed substantially from that of  
the representative low income country.  In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, Zambia retained 
many of  the labour force characteristics of  
69its earlier middle income status.   
While there are countries with middle 
income labour force characteristics that 
have large agricultural exports, for example 
Argentina, there are no such countries with 
successful growth strategies based on 
agriculture.  There are simple and straight-
forward reasons for this.  First, middle 
income countries export agricultural prod-
ucts through high productivity, with produc-
tion usually organised on the basis of  wage 
labour and larger scale enterprises, not smal-
lholders.  As arguedbelow, agribusiness 
would be Zambia's route to successful 
competition with South African agriculture.
Second, middle income countries tend 
to have an educated labour force, and their 
competitive advantage lies in skilled and 
semi-skilled workers.  This, in turn, implies 
that employment expansion occurs in non-
agricultural sectors, while productivity incr-
eases in agribusiness reduce agricultural 
employment.  Therefore, for Zambia to 
pursue a strategy of  agriculture-led growth 
would imply either rising unemployment as 
productivity grew or wasting the skills of  its 
labour force. 
Such a strategy would be contrary to all 
historical experience of  successful develop-
ment. This analysis suggests that an appro-
priate strategy for sustained growth and 
poverty reduction in Zambia should include 
the rejuvenation of  the manufacturing 
sector, to avoid the instability of  mineral 
dependence and the poverty trap of  leaving 
most of  the rural population in smallholder 
agriculture.  The rejuvenation of  manufac-
turing will be a major policy challenge, given 
the openness of  the economy and the stru-
ctural factors that affect Zambian manufac-
turing competitiveness, notably high energy 
and transport costs and excessive import 
dependence.  There can be little doubt that 
the radical and rapid reduction of  tariffs and 
non-tariff  barriers, along with the abandon-
ment of  all aspects of  industrial policy in 
the 1990s dealt a devastating blow to the 
manufacturing sector.  Had a degree of  
protection been maintained on a selective 
basis, and effective elements of  industrial 
policy continued, the sweeping privatisation 
could have been consistent with strengthen-
70ing the country's manufacturing base.
Using tariffs to foster manufacturing 
would be precluded by the provisions of  the 
government's regional trade agreement, as 
would a number of  non-tariff  instruments. 
However, as Amsden (2006) showed for a 
number of  Asian countries, policy imagina-
tion and negotiating skills can counteract 
the limitations posed by regional and 
multilateral trade agreements. Thus this 
limitation on industrial policy requires an 
imaginative approach to reconstructing the 
country's manufacturing base, in which 
policy would aim to reduce domestic prod-
uction costs relatively to the price of  
competing imports.  Measures to achieve 
this could be within a strategy of  linking 
manufacturing to the country's primary 
sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. 
The tactics to implement the strategy 
would include public investment in infra-
structure to reduce costs of  transport, elec-
tricity and water; credit directed to priority 
sectors (agribusiness and resource-linked 
manufacturing); long term government pro-
curement contracts for the priority sectors; 
and government supported on the job 
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4training. These did not discriminate between 
foreign and domestic owners, and would be 
acceptable under WTO rules and regional 
71trade agreements.
The non-interventionist approach to 
strategy would at best result in growth based 
on minerals and commercial agriculture.  
This would leave the economic future of  
the country hostage to the shocks of  min-
eral and agricultural prices and the uncer-
tainties of  the climate.  If  poverty would be 
reduced within the time frame of  the 
MDGs, indeed, if  poverty would be more 
than marginally reduced over that time 
frame, a purposeful, integrated growth 
strategy is required that fosters an efficient 
manufacturing sector.  Such a growth 
strategy requires well-designed interventions 
derivative from clear sectoral priorities.  
Public investment, with its significant 
crowding-in and linkage effects is the key 
instrument in that strategy.
With the collapse of  mining, the agricultural 
sector became, by default, the hope for gro-
wth and poverty reduction strategy in Zam-
bia. The collapse of  manufacturing rein-
forced this role for agriculture, as refl-ected 
in the PRSP for 2002-2004 stating that:
The PRSP sees the [agricultural] sector as one of  
the driving engines for the anticipated economic 
growth that is required to reduce poverty. In 
view of  the potential multiplier effects that the 
agricultural sector has on the economy, the 
PRSP sees the restoration of  its high and sust- 
ained growth as constituting a critical step for 
reducing poverty in Zambia. (GRZ 2002b, 53)
According to the PRSP, the rationales were 
that a majority of  households depended on 
agricultural production for direct consump-
tion and income generation; that Zambia 
had great agricultural potential; that GDP 
growth was correlated with fluctuations in 
agricultural output; that food security 
4.3 Prospects for
Agricultural Development  
Agrarian Structures
depended on the performance of  the sector; 
and, that farm productivity and commercia-
lisation of  production were low, so mea-
sures to enhance yields and facilitate access 
to domestic and foreign markets would have 
a substantial impact on rural incomes and 
livelihoods. These rationales can be found in 
other PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa. On first 
inspection these seem appealing; however, 
they are oversimplifications in the absence 
of  a thorough analysis of  the sector.  This 
section inspects the nature of  agrarian 
structures in Zambia and its implications, 
and reviews evidence on effects of  succes-
sive liberalisation packages applied since the 
early 1980s.  Finally, it assesses evidence of  
the potential and competitiveness of  the 
agricultural sector and the sectoral policies 
that might enhance poverty reduction.
Despite the heterogeneity of  agricultural 
producers, there is no systematic compara-
ble evidence for different types of  farmers, 
which could be used to assess changes in 
the agrarian structure, and the relationship 
between those changes and policy measures.  
Data on large scale farming is not systemati-
cally available, especially on input use, and 
nor is data on employment, allegedly bec-
ause response rates are low (Zulu et al. 
2000, 3).  The existence of  a class of  middle 
scale 'emergent' farmers cannot be syste-
matically analysed over time due to the lack 
of  a consistent classification of  farmers and 
data gaps.
In great part as a result of  colonial 
policy, agrarian structures in Southern and 
Central Africa were characterised by a 
marked dualism, whereby a rather competi-
tive and technologically advanced commer-
cial sector coexisted with a largely uncom-
petitive and vulnerable smallholder sector, 
72and Zambia was no exception (Table 4.1).   
Smallholders can be found almost every-
where in the country, and the commercial 
farming sector is concentrated along the 
main communication networks (along the 
'line of  rail' and around Lusaka and 
Copperbelt areas).  Recent comparative 
analysis shows an advantage of  large 
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commercial farmers over smallholder 
farming in profit per hectare, using different 
sets of  assumptions with regards to input 
intensity and shadow prices for labour and 
land when there is no explicit market value.  
-Large commercial farmers were more effi
cient for a range of  crops, especially toba-
cco, cotton and horticulture, which are input 
demanding and employment intensive (ACF 
2001).  It could be argued that large com-
mercial farming was more competitive in 
marketing, especially after the liberalisation 
of  agricultural markets during the 90s.
Thus, it is analytically useful to 
dichotomise between middle and large-scale 
commercial farms and smallholders, the 
latter themselves being quite heterogeneous.  
According to the Census 2000, the majority 
of  agricultural households engaged in a 
combination of  activities, crop growing 
complemented by poultry and livestock.  
Most were classified in the agricultural cen-
sus and household surveys as 'small scale 
farmers'.  Often it is presumed that there is 
no hiring of  labour by these households and 
that production is for on farm consump-
73tion.   However, micro level evidence 
suggests that scale differentiation within the 
sector was substantial and might explain the 
varying fortunes of  producers in different 
parts of  the country.  
Heterogeneity among smallholder 
farmers is often explained by access to land, 
quality and quantity, proximity to markets 
and road networks, availability of  capital 
and cash income, hiring of  labour and 
diverse income generating strategies. The 
differences may vary across geographical 
locations, thus more marked pat-terns of  
differentiation may be found in cer-tain 
ecological and social contexts than others.  
Pressures on land were also significant 
in Zambia, making areas along the line of  
rail more prone to smallholder differentia-
tion.  Access to export markets, through 
public sector marketing boards or private 
companies with outgrowing schemes offe-
red more opportunities to small scale com-
mercial producers, thereby exacerbating dif-
ferentiation processes (Milimo et al 2002).
There is strong evidence of  a concentration 
of  the value of  crop production among the 
approximately eight-hundred-thousand 
smallholders (category 1 in Table 1, Zulu et 
al. 2000).  The top twenty percent of  this 
group of  farmers generated sixty percent of  
74total crop value.   For many 'high value' 
crops, horticulture, tobacco, sugar, wheat, 
soya beans, cut flowers and coffee, almost 
ninety percent of  marketed production 
came from large scale commercial farmers 
who increased in number after they dropped 
75to an all time low in the late 1960s.   Thus, 
increases in agricultural production might 
not have been evenly distributed across 
classes of  farmers.  Evidence seems to 
suggest that the level of  concentration may 
have increased with the reform process 
(Gibbon et al. 1993; Zulu et al. 2000), a 
plausible hypothesis given the unequal and 
increasingly difficult access to assets, inputs, 
labour and credit over the 1980s and 1990s.  
There is evidence of  existence of  a growing 
class of  so-called emergent commercial 
farmers (again, see Table 4.1) usually within 
the five to twenty hectare bracket, based on 
hiring labour from poorer households.
Territorial differentiation was also 
related to farmers' size differentiation.  
Eastern and Northern provinces contained 
one third of  all agricultural households in 
Zambia, mostly small scale, resource poor 
farmers (Census 2000).  These were prov-
inces characterised by climatic vulnerability, 
and for many crops they displayed below 
average performances.  At the national level, 
the most popular crops in Zambia were 
maize, grown by eighty-five percent of  
agricultural households, groundnuts by 
sixty-three percent, and sweet potatoes by 
sixty-one percent (Census 2000).  The 
largest concentration of  maize producers 
was found in Eastern province, which had 
twenty of  all agricultural households gro-
wing maize, followed by the Copperbelt 
with thirteen percent of  such farms.  Cash 
crop production was more unevenly distrib-
uted by province,  though cotton was con-
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476centrated in the Eastern province.   Toba-
cco, primarily a large scale crop, was dis-
persed, but more common in Eastern, 
Southern and Northern provinces, with 
some significant presence in Western 
province as well.
The fastest growth of  agricultural 
households was in Lusaka and Copperbelt 
provinces, which contain the major urban 
areas between the Censuses in 1990 and 
2000 (Census 2000 Agricultural Report).  
These were the provinces with the most 
dynamic agriculture, with non-traditional 
exports including fresh produce, cut flowers 
and to a lesser extent tobacco. 
This finding is consistent with the 
pattern of  social change that took place 
during the 1990s. This trend signals a pro-
cess of  'agrarianisation', which has to do with 
initial social structures and high rates of  
urbanisation, compared to other African 
countries up to 1990, coupled with the cha-
nges during the liberalisation period and the 
stagnation in urban wage employment.
Constraints on production differ among 
classes of  producers and regions.  At a 
national level, land was not a binding con-
straint, because of  the amount of  idle land 
77available in large parts of  the country.    
However, the value of  land varied, due to 
availability of  infrastructure, distance from 
markets and economies of  scale.  Thus, in 
some areas land pressure might be an issue, 
and access to land constrained.  The general 
rule observed in many countries, that land 
may be absolutely abundant but scarce for 
the poor, applies to Zambia.  In this con-
text, it should be noted that land titling was 
an issue largely limited to commercial 
farmers (Milimo et al 2002 and Skjonsberg 
2003).  Family labour constrained how 
much land a poor household could farm, 
given technology and input constraints; i.e. 
that many smallholders were too poor to 
expand their cultivated areas (WB 2004a).  
Moreover, the land lease system was convo-
luted and cumbersome (Jaffee 1999). 
Labour shortages constituted a major 
constraint on agricultural production, 
particularly for small and medium scale 
farmers (WB 2004a, 46).  Smallholders also 
suffered from being resource poor and 
distant from markets, which made access to 
inputs and market outlets very difficult, if  
not impossible.  Their bargaining power vis-
à-vis traders or companies managing out-
growing schemes (i.e. cotton) was low, 
which put them in a vulnerable position in 
an environment in which the liberalised 
markets tended to have barriers to entry 
(ACF 2001; Scott 2002). Access to finance 
was a constraint often mentioned by comm-
ercial farmers, perhaps because they had 
easier access than small farmers to markets 
requiring 'lumpy' expenditures.
In summary, the key features of  the 
Zambian agrarian structures were, first, a 
competitive large scale commercial sector. 
This sector was controlled by white settlers 
before Independence, and then gradually 
included African and Asian Zambian 
farmers after the 1970s.  After 2001 white 
farmers expelled from Zimbabwe also had a 
significant presence.  The commercial sector 
dominated production of  tobacco, coffee, 
sugar, wheat, vegetables, soya beans and 
  flowers.  In addition, it accounted for a third 
or more of  marketed maize and cotton. 
These farms could be highly mechanised 
and generated demand for substantial 
78seasonal and casual wage labour.
A commercially oriented small and 
medium scale farm sector emerged, concen-
trated near urban areas and along main 
transport networks, in the Eastern, Central 
and part of  Southern provinces. Many of  
these middle scale farmers, and some small 
scale ones, were integrated into agribusiness 
through outgrowing schemes.  A lower pro-
ductivity commercial small farm sector, with 
an increasing share of  cash crops since the 
1990s, was concentrated in zones with high 
agricultural potential.  Finally, a semi-subs-
istence small farm sector located in remote 
areas away from national markets and vuln-
erable to production and marketing con-
straints grew food crops.
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Agricultural trends and Policies 
The objective of  government agricultural 
policies before the 1990s was to ensure food 
security, with the emphasis on maize.  With 
growing urbanisation in the 1960s and 
1970s agricultural policies sought to main-
tain low and stable consumer prices for key 
commodities, like maize-meal (Gibbon et al. 
1993; Mkandawire 1993). Maize subsidies, 
guaranteed government market outlets 
through marketing boards (the NAM-
BOARD), cooperatives and state input 
distribution schemes, were the main mecha-
nisms to do so during the interventionist 
period of  1969-1983 (Chiwele et al. 1996).  
Not withstanding interpretations of  these 
policies as reflecting an 'urban bias' in 
favour of  a 'labour aristocracy' (Dodge 
791977; McPherson 2004, 308) ,  the Kaunda 
government invested substantial amounts in 
the agricultural sector and applied a devel-
opmental rather than an extractive approach 
to agriculture and rural areas (Gibbon et al. 
1993; Kydd 1988; Mkandawire 1993, 461). 
Nation-wide pricing and subsidies to 
farmers, both small and large producers, 
were mechanisms that also favoured more 
vulnerable and less viable farmers in remote 
areas of  the country.  Subsidies on inputs, 
transport, producer prices and consumer 
prices accounted for one-fourth of  govern-
ment revenues and 6.7 percent of  GDP in 
1980 (Gibbon et al. 1993, 86; McPherson 
2004, 307).   While it is difficult to measure 
the output effects of  subsidies, the resulting 
increase in maize production probably led 
to more abundant supplies of  maize in 
deficit periods, benefiting the poorest net 
maize buying households as found in 
Malawi which implemented similar policies 
(Peters 2006). Since one effect of  the 
subsidies was to maintain marginal produc-
ers, they did not foster the international 
competitiveness of  agriculture.  This 
conclusion would apply more to commercial 
producers than to small farmers, since the 
costs of  major inputs of  the latter, notably 
labour, were not market determined. 
There can be little doubt that subsidies 
and the introduction of  high yielding crop 
varieties had a positive effect on maize 
production and productivity, particularly in 
areas of  higher rainfall.  The objection of  
the World Bank, the main to the subsidies, 
was that they represented an excessive bur-
den in the public budget, and once foreign 
exchange constraints became binding, 
spending on subsidies would not be sustain-
80able.   In addition, some argued that the 
subsidies resulted in maize production in 
areas where this was not a comparative 
advantage (McPherson 2004, 307; 
Seshamani 1998), though verifying this 
hypothesis is elusive.  More serious and 
empirically sound is the hypothesis that 
support for maize reduced the capacity of  
the agricultural sector to generate exports.  
Agriculture in Zambia in the pre-adjustment 
years was highly import dependent, a drain 
on, rather than a source of, foreign exc-
hange.  Imported inputs, machinery, energy 
and seed underpinned much of  the produc-
tion by large and medium scale farmers. 
The government undertook World Bank 
and IMF reforms in marketing, pricing, 
subsidies and the exchange rate in 1982.  
These came to a halt in 1986 and 1987 after 
increases in maize prices provoked urban 
demonstrations that turned violent (Gibbon 
81et al. 1993, 94).   Under a government-
designed programme unsupported by 
external agencies, subsidies briefly resumed.  
This programme quickly collapsed, forcing 
the Kaunda government to turn again to 
external agencies, this time to face cond-
itionalities much more severe.  Agricultural 
output and food production trends were 
positive from 1983 until 1989 (Table 4.2 and 
see Figures 4.1 through 4.3).
This was partly due to a recovery in 
maize production after a collapse in the 
early 1980s and to gradual increases in other 
crops, cassava, tobacco and groundnuts 
(Figure 4.2). Reforms in this period were 
patchy and often inconsistent, responding to 
the short term trends and the status of  
negotiations between the government and 
the international financial agencies.
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4Between 1989 and 1995 agricultural value 
added, food production and maize declined, 
displaying considerable volatility.  This 
period was one of  rapid liberalisation 
combined with large devaluations, with 
fiscal austerity and tight monetary policies 
compounded by the effects of  the 1992 
drought.  By 1993 the Zambian agricultural 
sector was one of  the most liberalised in the 
continent.  Trends appear rather ambiguous 
if  one focuses on the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Production in general was volatile, especially 
for maize, but at the same time there 
occurred a growth of  non-traditional crop 
production.  Evidence suggests that the rise 
in exports was mainly accounted for by 
large commercial farmers and out grower 
schemes involving groups of  smallholders, 
particularly in the case of  cotton.  These 
exports included tobacco, horticultural 
products, cut flowers and sugar, which are 
highly concentrated among large and 
medium scale commercial farmers in the 
Central, Southern and Eastern provinces.  
Horticultural exports grew but not impres-
sively (WB 2004a).  The availability of  
finance, through an export credit scheme 
funded by the European Union and the 
World Bank and the arrival of  Zimbabwean 
farmers gave an impetus to large scale 
commercial farmers, who were concentrated 
near Lusaka airport (WB 2004b, 19).
Associated with the increase in cash 
cropping, a change in crop choice among 
farmers occurred after 1991, especially for 
smallholders.  With the removal of  sup-
ports, maize production decreased in 
importance (WB 2004b, 36). In fact, part of  
the reason for the reduction in maize 
production in the post-reform period was 
that 'the artificial comparative for maize was 
destroyed by price liberalisation' (Seshamani 
1998, 545). In areas where cash crops did 
not expand, other low value food crops 
replaced maize, notably cassava, groundnuts 
and other roots in the Northern and 
82Northwestern provinces.   This trend was 
similar to that in Malawi, where cash 
cropping expanded at the expense of  maize 
cultivation and undermined the livelihoods 
of  poor households in the context of  
harvest failures and increases in local maize 
prices (Harrigan 2003; Peters 2006).
The reduction in the adoption of  
fertilisers was perhaps the single most 
significant effect of  agricultural 
liberalisation (WB 2004a; Deininger and 
Olinto 2000; Chiwele et al. 1996).  As the 
World Bank commented, part of  the 
collapse in crop production in the first half  
of  the 1990s 'resulted from the govern-
ment's withdrawal from the highly subsi-
dised marketing of  maize and farm inputs' 
(WB 2004a, 36).  This effect had two 
aspects: fewer farmers used fertiliser, and 
those using fertilisers applied smaller doses 
or spread it across different crops. Both 
effects had a negative impact on the total 
crop output and productivity. 
The fertiliser constraint largely explains 
the weak supply response of  Zambian 
farmers to the introduction and acceleration 
of  marketing reforms (WB 1993; Deininger 
and Olinto 2000).  This was not due to lack 
of  profitability in the application of  fertilis-
ers, which a study for 1993-1995 showed to 
yield a return of  almost twenty percent (De-
ininger and Olinto 2000).  This implies the 
conclusion that reduced fertiliser use resu-
lted from poor farmers lacking the funds to 
purchase the input.  If  fertiliser adoption is 
profitable at the margin only farmers who 
can afford to buy a bag will adopt it.  Thus, 
empirical evidence corroborates the obvi-
ous: poor farmers benefited little from trade 
liberalisation and agricultural reforms, as 
only relatively rich farmers were able to 
compete in a liberalised environment.
     The World Bank concluded that at least a 
third of  smallholders, the poorest people in 
Zambia, did not benefit from the agricul-
tural reforms  since 1991, because of  
market failure or market absence (WB 
2004a, 36). In a report in 2004, one reads,
When the [new] government came to power in 
1991, it accelerated the pace of  economic 
reforms. This was done uncritically, and without 
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studying the implications of  the reforms and or 
making adequate preparations for them. 
(WB2004b, 4). 
To this it can be added that marketing 
reforms, rather than stimulating production, 
tended to marginalise most farmers living in 
remote areas (Chiwele et al. 1996).  These 
marginalised farmers faced a vicious cycle: 
the lack of  storage facilities and the need 
for cash to meet increasing expenditures 
(school fees, blankets for early winter per-
iod) forced many farmers to sell at very low 
prices to the first bidder, given the scarcity 
of  traders in these areas; further lower 
incomes and increasing prices for inputs 
meant lower capacity to produce the follo-
wing season and so on (Seshamani 1998, 
550). As a result, the perception of  the 
reforms by small farmers was overwhelm-
ingly negative, especially for those more 
distant from national and regional markets, 
with the most negative effects felt by the 
poor farmers with few farm assets 
(Milimo et al., 2002).  
The gains from liberalisation went to 
farmers in areas with access to transport.  
Some small farmers benefited from the 
expansion of  agribusiness through out 
grower schemes in cotton and tobacco.  
However, the problem of  obtaining 
credit also affected commercial farmers, a 
potential source of  increased investment 
and new technologies.  The collapse of  
credit delivery systems left a vacuum part-
ially covered by informal lenders (kaloba 
lending system), who charged interest rates as 
high as one-hundred percent per month 
(Chigunta 1998, 254).
The effect of  liberalisation of  agricul-
tural markets was not entirely negative 
(Seshamani 1998).  There was more compe-
tition from small-scale hammer maize 
millers and a wider range of  meal products 
available to consumers, as well as decreasing 
marketing costs, once the privileges granted 
to large-scale urban millers benefiting from 
subsidized maize prices disappeared. This 
was especially the case in areas where priv-
ate traders and millers were more abundant, 
i.e. closer to urban centres and infrastr-
uctural corridors. Some cash crops and non-
traditional agricultural exports expanded 
from the late 1990s.  The main state cotton 
company was privatised in 1995 and split in 
two parts.  The effect on the cotton market 
was to convert a state monopsony to a 
private oligopsony, with three buyers 
controlling ninety percent of  trade in 2002.  
However, the out grower schemes men-
tioned above brought benefits to small and 
medium producers.  Thus, the benefits from 
the changes in the cotton sector arose not 
from competitive markets, but from a 
continuation of  market concentration under 
private ownership. 
Large scale commercial farmers and 
corporate agribusiness began adopting out 
grower schemes as a result of  pressure 
from donors through the government, the 
experience of  transnational distributors in 
the region (cotton and tobacco for example) 
and problems in the implementation of  the 
New Land Act, which made access to land a 
cumbersome process in some areas, espe-
cially where land pressure is more severe. 
Out growing schemes may allow larger 
commercial farmers to spread the risk and 
uncertainty involved in seasonal hiring, 
while they still control a good deal of  the 
production process indirectly, deciding on 
use of  inputs, techniques, crop area and 
quality of  product.  A potential problem 
with these schemes is that payments to far-
mers follow strict quality standards, and the 
greater market power of  the corporations 
creates the potential for abuse (ACF 2001).
More generally, the positive perfor-
mance in a range of  cash crops in Zambia 
under liberalisation is endangered by 
regional integration and competition from 
South Africa.  In the course of  interviews 
with different stakeholders of  the agricul-
tural sector, it became clear that in the 2000s 
competition from South Africa threatened 
to bankrupt several agricultural businesses 
in Zambia.  It appears that large retailers, 
such as supermarkets, do not consider 
Zambian products sufficiently competitive 
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4even allowing for the extra transport costs 
incurred by South African products.  For 
example, orange plantations in the Zambezi 
valley suffered from the competitive pres-
sure of  SA operators and were forced to 
close down (Milimo et al, 2002, 11). The 
problems of  competition from South Africa 
have preoccupied the Agricultural Consul-
tative Forum, an organisation representing 
the interests of  commercial farmers, but no 
policy recommendations have emerged on 
this strategically important issue for Zambia.   
The threat of  regional competition was 
pointed out by the World Bank with refer-
ence to the reforms in the 1990s; ‘the quick 
and hasty openness of  the economy against 
the backdrop of  state ownership of  key 
producing units, created an “unequal” 
competition for domestic businesses, which 
saw many businesses exit the market' (WB 
2004b, 5). There was no consensus among 
commercial farmers on how to deal with the 
problem, on the one hand favouring prod-
uct market liberalisation and, and on the 
other, resisting liberalisation of  input and 
83credit markets.   For example, the some-
what erratic government interventions in 
maize marketing, input subsidies, fertiliser 
distribution and other measures in the 
1990s, resulted from pressures by powerful 
farming constituencies coming through the 
National Farmers' Union (Pletcher 2000).
In summary, the experience of  the 
1990s carries several lessons for agricultural 
policy making.  First, adequate and generally 
available credit linked to agricultural invest-
ment, especially for large scale commercial 
agriculture and outgrowing schemes, would 
be essential for future agricultural growth.  
Second, diversifying into high value crops 
can reduce vulnerability and increase emp-
loyment either directly in large estates or 
indirectly through small scale commercial 
growers.  Third, with respect to agriculture, 
the liberalisation and macroeconomic stab-
ilisation policies of  the 1990s were badly 
sequenced structural reforms, creating a 
shortage of  affordable credit.  
In addition, the large devaluations 
negatively affected import dependent 
agriculture, allowing little time for producers 
to adjust.  Fourth, the lack of  investment in 
infrastructure, market facilities, credit 
institutions, and insurance mechanisms 
made market liberalisation result in limited 
benefits to small producers.  Fifth, a more 
appropriate policy approach would be to 
design crop and farm specific policies rather 
than general 'reform' packages that are dif-
ficult to link to concrete outcomes.
Points similar to those above can be 
found in the PRSP, which was critical of  the 
design of  the liberalisation programme, 
especially during 1989-1994.  During that 
period of  'irrational exuberance' for liber-
alisation, neither external nor internal policy 
makers gave much thought to the possibility 
of  market failures (GRZ 2002, 59).  
In the mid-2000s, the government faced 
the issue of  how to correct the mistakes of  
that period.  One approach would be to 
treat liberalisation as irreversible in general 
and in detail, and just design policies to help 
those excluded from its benefit; a 'safety 
net', as it were.  Such an approach would 
have little likelihood of  success for several 
reasons.  First, evidence suggests that the 
non-beneficiaries far outnumbered the 
beneficiaries, implying that such a progra-
mme must be quite large.  Second, effective 
targeting would be administratively impossi-
ble because of  the intractability of  measur-
ing  the smallholder incomes.  
Considerably more promising would be 
selective market interventions that in prin-
ciple would benefit all producers, but are 
designed for the different circumstances of  
smallholders and larger scale commercial 
growers.   These are discussed at the end of  
this chapter.   Such interventions would 
address the structural constraints affecting 
different types of  farmers.  The cases of  
successful adjustment to liberalisation by 
farmers suggest that agricultural policy must 
be innovative, flexible and adapted to the 
particular circumstances of  a variety of  
classes of  farmers, processors, traders and 
regions.  Moreover, agricultural policies 
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should be treated within an integrated 
strategy that considers the impact of  macro-
economic measures on different aspects of  
agricultural development in Zambia.  This 
approach would be consistent with the 
observation in the 2004 government docu-
ment on agricultural priorities, that 'it is 
recognised that it will take time for markets 
to be fully liberalised and to function 
efficiently' (GRZ 2004, 11). 
Shifts in cropping patterns induced by 
adjustment policies altered the division of  
labour, and the control over produce and 
incomes within the household.  Small-scale 
producers tended to rely heavily on family 
labour, such that the intensification of  
production increased the workload of  
women, while they simultaneously had a 
reduced ability to control the income from 
sales.  In addition, women's independent 
production remains constrained by lack of  
access to land, credit, technology and 
information and, crucially, labour. 
The income possibilities for women are 
further disadvantaged by their lack of  access 
to improved agricultural techniques and 
inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides, and 
hybrid seeds, which are crucial to improving 
prod-uctivity.  Gender-differentiated access 
to farm equipment, particularly modern 
impl-ements, contributes to the differentia-
tion in resources available to female and 
male-headed households.  Women often 
spend long hours doing arduous agricultural 
tasks which could be relieved by access to 
farm implements (ZARD 1985:91). A 
recent assessment of  poverty in Zambia 
indicated that it was not female-headed 
households per se who were disadvantaged, 
but specifically female-headed households 
lacking male adult support (IDS, 1994:17).  
In general, female headed households 
tend to produce less than other households 
because of  labour constraints, especially for 
tasks considered men's jobs such as clearing 
land.  Women in general also have difficulty 
gaining access to credit, training  progra- 
Gender Aspects of Agriculture
mmes and extension services.  Thus, hous-
eholds headed by women tend to be over-
represented among the rural as well as 
84urban poor (Loxley, 1990:75). Shifts in 
cultivation have gender implications in 
terms of  control of  the crop and income, 
which vary according to the region and 
patterns of  production. 
If  a new cash crop is adopted as a direct 
substitute for maize grown on former maize 
fields, there is likely to be little change in the 
 control of resources as the crop and the land 
will be automatically embedded in male-
dominated marketing and extension struc-
tures and the husb-and will control the 
income.  This is the case with the adoption 
of  soya beans in Northern Province. 
Where land formerly used to produce 
crops for household consumption is taken 
over by cash crops, or where a traditional 
consumption crop gains importance in the 
cash sector, there is a tendency for men to 
take control of  the income derived from the 
crop.  This is even more likely when, as is 
the case now, men's incomes from some 
established cash crops are declining and the 
costs of  meeting their private consumption 
needs are increasing.  This is the case of  
mixed beans in Northern Province and for 
cotton and soya beans in Eastern Province.  
In Eastern Province, cotton and soya beans 
are increasingly replacing maize, which was 
an important food crop.  As men hold 
ultimate control over cotton and soya beans, 
wives have encountered greater difficulties 
in protecting scarce resources from male 
demands.  The fall in maize production 
severely threatens the food security of  a 
large number of  farming households lead-
ing to increasing problems of  seasonal 
hunger (Geisler, 1992:129).
Household food security tends to be 
dependent on the control exerted by women 
over land, labour and produce as women are 
generally held to be responsible for produc-
ing for household consumption.  As more 
of  these resources are channelled into the 
cash economy, there is a tendency for men 
to divert the profits away from the house-
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4hold and thus for the nutritional standards 
of  the household to diminish.
According to the World Bank (WB 2004b, 
19) 'Zambia is a sleeping agricultural giant, 
with one of  the best land and water endow-
ments in Africa and an above average hum-
an resource base, even in the smallholder 
sector'.  In keeping with this enthusiastic 
assessment, the World Bank concludes 
Zambia would be internationally competi-
tive on a different number of  crops, and 
that agriculture could be the basis of  
poverty reducing growth.
This section first considers Zambia's 
agricultural potential, and the broader 
question of  whether the agricultural sector 
could be an engine of  growth.  To begin, it 
should be noted that agricultural production 
is a human activity realised in a social con-
text, not merely a natural one derivative 
from the combination of  soil and water.  
Appropriate social conditions can render 
soil of  marginal natural endowment highly 
productive, and the absence of  appropriate 
social conditions renders fertile soil socially 
useless. Zambia, can potentially be interna-
tionally competitive on a number of  crops 
provided a host of  conditions are met, but 
this does not mean all types of  farmers in 
all locations of  the country can be part of  
an internationally competitive agriculture. 
As discussed above, it is unlikely that the 
large number of  dispersed smallholder 
farmers can constitute the basis for an 
internationally competitive agriculture.  
Their rain fed agriculture is plagued by high 
variations in yields, which are exacerbated 
by inadequate infrastructure, excessive 
import dependence and lack of  insurance 
mechanisms.  These severely limit the pot-
ential for the successful development of  
smallholder agriculture on a nationwide 
scale. Thus, Zambia, as for Mozambique 
and Angola, may have considerable agricul-
tural potential, perhaps equivalent to South 
Africa's in terms of  resource base, but the 
4.4 Agriculture-driven Growth
non-price constraints restrict the emergence 
of  competitive agribusiness, which could 
generate economies of  scale in marketing 
and foster innovation (Jaffee 1999, 2). The 
establishment of  production and marketing 
support structures for all or the majority of  
smallholders would require substantial 
investment which is  itself  constrained by 
the fiscal policies of  the 2000s. 
The Zambian government, in the PRSP 
and the most recent Agricultural Policy 
Vision, has stressed some potentially succ-
essful routes:1) enhancing business linkages 
between large scale farmers and small scale 
commercial producers; 2) promoting out-
growing schemes; 3)promoting non-trad-
itional agricultural exports to enhance 
export diversification; 4) lowering produc-
tion costs and constraints, especially on 
energy and transport.  The sub-sectors and 
crops for which Zambia's potential has been 
demonstrated in practice were tobacco, fac-
ilitated by the crisis in Zimbabwe and relo-
cation of  regional production; horticulture, 
including cut flowers, concentrated around 
Lusaka and produced by commercial far-
mers; and meat and dairy production, whose 
export potential remains untapped.  As 
noted above, it is not clear that fiscal space 
at the time of  this report was consistent 
with such ambitious goals.
The agricultural competitiveness reports 
of  2001 and 2002 show there were major 
differences in competitiveness across prod-
ucer types and regions, suggesting that dire-
cting investment towards more successful 
areas and farmers would be the policy most 
likely to generate an agricultural sector that 
could be competitive with South Africa.  
However, the poverty reduction impact of  
such a strategy could be considerably less 
than one that included smallholder develop-
ment.  Further, a corporate agribusiness 
strategy, for all its advantages, is not without 
problems.  Such businesses can easily move 
operations to other countries, as happened 
in Zimbabwe, a lesson that the Zambian 
government should consider seriously. A 
credible and sustained incentive system to 
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keep agribusiness investments in the cou-
ntry is essential. 
This includes both micro and macroeco-
nomic policies. If  a policy of  investing in 
infrastructure in areas of  greatest potential 
were chosen, the Zambian government 
could take a lesson from South Africa on 
the important role to be played by public 
and semi-public regulatory bodies in main-
taining quality and penetrating markets. 
Overall, a pro-poor agribusiness strat-
egy should consider several components 
and policy options that may be tried depe-
nding on the circumstances.  The most 
important are:
1. Avoiding dysfunctional sequencing 
between macro reforms (trade and 
financial liberalisation, fiscal squeeze, 
credit squeeze) and agricultural 
liberalisation cum subsidy removal 
typical of  the 1990s.
2. Better integration in global value 
chains (i.e. vegetable and tobacco 
exports) through proactive state inter
vention in negotiating for better, 
markets through international market
ing, and bilateral intergovernmen
tal agreements to ensure Zambian 
agribusinesses are well placed in more 
dynamic global value chains, like those 
buyer-driven chains associated with very 
large distributors/ retailers (Tesco and 
others). Encourage agro-processing and 
upgrading within value chains with a 
focus on product quality through 
technological upgrading and foreign 
direct investment promotion. The 
development of  agro-processing both 
for exports and consumer goods in the 
national market should be a priority in 
the medium term in order to better 
integrate agricultural and manufacturing 
labour-intensive development. 
3. Protection from South Africa. Not 
withstanding the SADC protocol, the 
Zambian government could explore 
ways of  managing the influx of  
competitive South African imports and 
foreign direct investments from South 
Africa, like those affecting the agricul
tural and manufacturing sectors, without 
breaking the rules of  current  trade 
agreements. Enhancing negotiating skills 
in this respect may be necessary in the 
short term. 
4. Reinforcement of  poles of  development 
around good infrastructure. Although 
there is a case for expanding infras-
tructural development in areas so far 
isolated from more dynamic regions, 
especially if  linked to public employ-
ment schemes as argued in chapter 3, 
there is a case for investing in the 
renewal and maintenance of  existing 
infrastructure to make sure existing 
poles of  development do not lose    
their dynamism.
5. Address access to credit and crop insu- 
rance for commercial farmers, since this 
is one of  the most important supply 
constraints on production and especially 
non-traditional exports. Attracting for- 
eign finance through foreign agribusi
ness in outgrowing schemes can be a 
route, albeit not without risks. There is 
need for financial institutions designed 
and publicly supported (with the contr-
ibution of  international partners) to add 
ress the financial needs of  the most dyn- 
amic and efficient agricultural producers 
with an export vocation. Any financial 
incentive should be linked to clearly est-
ablished performance criteria for bene-
ficiaries around two main aspects: (a) net 
foreign exchange generation and (b) 
employment creation and work cond-
itions (especially for female workers)
6. Monitoring work conditions (average 
wages, work days, health and safety, etc.) 
in agribusiness, especially of  the sea
sonal and casual workers (especially 
female labourers) who often are not 
covered by government regulation, will 
be necessary to make an agribusiness-
centred strategy more pro-poor. Most 
large and middle-scale commercial 
farmers can afford to offer decent 
73
69 When a cross country regression was calculated for thirty-five sub-
Saharan countries, excluding Zambia, for 1990, 1992, 1995, 
1997, 2000 and 2001, the following results were obtained:
ln[PCY] = 8.52 - .645[lnAgric/GDP] - .156[lnIlltrcy] + .276[Doil]
  (.000)  (.000)                      (.046)               (.018)
F = 45.42, Adj R-square = .425, Degrees of  Freedom 
= 177
Ln = natural logarithm 
PCY = per capita income in 1995 US dollars
Agric/GDP = percentage share of  agricultural value 
added in GDP
Illtrcy = percentage of  population over 15 illiterate, so 
literacy rate is 
(100 - Illtrcy)
Doil = binary variable taking the value of  unity for 
petroleum exporters
Zambia's actual per capita income across these years was US$ 418, 
while the regression predicts an average of  slightly over 1200.
70 This judgement is based on interviews with officials at the Zambia 
Privatisation Authority, the Ministry of  Finance and a former WB 
official.
71 See the annex to this chapter for a discussion of  industrial policy 
and trade agrements.
72 Smallholders normally cultivate two-thirds of  all arable land, 
with the rest in the hands of  medium and large scale commercial 
farmers (Jaffee 1999, 43).
73 There is evidence pointing to the contrary. Gibbon et al. (1993, 
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conditions to their workers, more than 
smallholder employers who lack the 
means and where unit labour costs can 
be higher due to low productivity.
If  successful, an agribusiness strategy 
like the one proposed above requires a 
complementary programme directed toward 
less viable smallholders and remote areas.  
The government of  Vietnam pursued such 
a dual approach with some success (Weeks, 
et. al. 2004).  The smallholder component 
of  the strategy would include policies for 
food security, to prevent seasonal hunger. 
Maize still constitutes the main crop for a 
high proportion of  small farmers, who are 
considered the bulk of  the poor in rural 
areas. Until alternative (more efficient and 
viable) maize producers emerge and markets 
expand to remote areas to make maize 
cheaper and available throughout the 
country, the reintroduction of  maize subs-
idies might be considered, with a limit on 
size of  payments to farmers. Such a policy 
would require a well-organised and moni-
tored farm gate purchasing system. This 
system should be territorially selective and 
an attempt should be made to differentiate 
'smallholders' into more meaningful social 
and farming categories, so that the real 
needs of  better defined groups can be esta-
blished, otherwise selectivity and targeting 
will be impossible.
Apart from these selective support 
interventions other concrete measures may 
be necessary to protect poorer small 
farmers. First, selective investments in water 
management to reduce crop risk in drier 
areas of  the country. Second, public work 
schemes designed to foster infrastructure in 
more remote areas and inject cash in poorer 
local economies, which may provide means 
to improve farming or finance migration to 
more lucrative areas. Third, facilitating 
resettlement schemes to more productive 
and profitable areas or existing outgrowing 
schemes, so more vulnerable groups can 
participate in poles of  development. Fourth, 
in a selective manner, the government could 
consider the possibility of  becoming buyer 
of  last resort with public finance, in areas or 
years in which a failure of  existing market-
ing systems may provoke socioeconomic 
crisis among small farmers trying to sell 
their crops. This is a guarantee that should 
be used only selectively and in circum-
stances where no other alternative appears 
in the short term.
In summary, a pro-poor growth strategy 
in agriculture must have two components, 
fostering agribusiness for export competi-
tiveness (and national markets as they 
develop through higher purchasing power 
and agro-processing development), and 
selectively supporting smallholder develop-
ment to reduce poverty among those not 
directly benefiting from the former. Both 
components require considerable public 
investment, albeit of  different types and in 
different areas.  Poverty reduction within 
the agribusiness sector would be further 
enhanced by incentives to employ labour 
more intensively (through credit and fiscal 
incentives conditional on employment 
creation), by an effectively enforced mini-
mum wage policy and by supporting empl-
oyees' organisations to foster improved 
working conditions.
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Table 4.1: Types of Agricultural Producers in Zambia
75
92) cite a study carried out in Northern Province, where the incidence 
of  agricultural wage employment is often ignored, which shows that 
different classes of  smallholders, depending on their scale of  
production, do hire wage labour up to twenty percent of  total labour 
inputs. For a small commercial farmer producing between two and 
thirteen tons and planting less than five hectares, this means over 
six hundred hours of  hired labour per hectare per season, a 
significant amount.
74 Note that the top twenty-five percent in terms of  farm-size 
cultivate a bit less than three hectares (national average), which is 
almost eight times more than the average cultivated area of  the 
bottom quartile of  smallholders (Zulu et al. 2000, 26), but far less 
than many medium scale 'emergent' farmers typically cultivating 
between five and twenty hectares.
75 Information provided by a representative of  the National 
Farmers Union in Lusaka, November 2004. See also Gibbon et al. 
(1993, 93).
76 Conventional cash crops were cotton, tobacco, soya beans, sugar, 
wheat, sunflower, and paprika among others. Maize can be regarded 
as a food crop or a cash crop depending on the extent of  its 
marketing.
77 It is estimated that only sixteen percent of  arable land is actu-
Ally cultivated.
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78 For example, in the highly intensive Lusaka-based horticultural 
and cut flower export farms it is estimated that more than ten 
thousand farm workers are engaged (information from National 
Farmers Union).
78 An analysis of  relative incomes in rural and urban areas reveals 
that the so-called urban-rural gap in incomes was relatively small 
(Jamal and Weeks 1989).
80 Good maize years usually implied increased costs for the 
government, which often resulted in growing indebtedness.
81 See Gibbon et al. (1993) and Saasa (1996) for details on specific 
policy reform measures undertaken in the period 1980-1992. See 
also WB (2004a), Deininger and Olinto (2000) and Poulton et al. 
(2003) for details concerning the post 1991 agricultural reform 
process. See Situmbeko and Zulu (2004) for a chronology of  IMF 
and WB sponsored-policy measures.
82 This food-crop choice may have also been driven by the HIV 
pandemic to compensate for the decrease in labour time available for 
agriculture, especially for food production (UNCTAD 2004, 37)
83 These seeming 'contradictions' were obvious in interviews at the 
National Farmers Union and the Agriculture Consultative Forum, 
November 2004.
A study measuring net per capita income in female and male-headed 
households found little difference between them. (Geisler,1993)
Type produced Number of
producers
Average farm size Techinology,
Cultivation
practice
Market orientation Location Major consumers
Small-scale 
producers
Emergent
farmers
Large scale
commercial 
farmers
Large corporate
operations
800,000
household
50,000
household
700 farms
10 farms
Less than 5 hectares
(With majority cultiva-
ting 2 hectares or less)
Hand hoe, minimal 
inputs, household 
labour
5 - 20 hectares
50 - 150 hectares
1,000+ hectares
Oxen, hybrid seed,
 fertilizer, few with 
irrigation, mostly 
household labour
Tractor, hybrid seed, 
fertilizer, some irrig-
ation, modern mana-
gement hired labour
High mechanisation, 
irrigation, modern 
management, hired 
labour
Staple foods, primarily 
home consumption
Staple foods and cash 
crops, primarily 
market orientation
Maize and crops
Maize, cash crops, 
vertical integration
Entire country
Mostly along rail lines 
(Central, Lusaka, 
Southern provinces), 
some Eastern, 
Western provinces
Mostly Central, 
Lusaka, Southern 
provinces
Remoteness, seasonal 
labour constraints, 
lack of input and 
output markets
Mostly Central, 
Lusaka, Southern 
provinces
Seasonal labour 
constraints, lack of 
credit, weak market 
information
High cost of credit, 
indebtedness
Uncertain policy 
environment
Source:  adopted from World Bank 2003a
4Maize
Groundnuts
Sunflower seeds
Cotton
Soya beans
Wheat
Tobacco, burley
Tobacco, Virginia
Paddy rice
Sorghum
Millet
Mixed beans
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
763,258
80,443
44,289
64,036
29,815
11,595
1,483
3,588
9,627
48,466
58,869
26,436
639,390
80,470
36,490
74,020
29,200
11,849
1,898
1,262
13,450
31,790
45,270
28,940
661,305
68,724
32,302
59,614
22,786
10,964
2,313
2,951
14,369
40,323
66,598
38,508
623,340
71,415
39,450
76,492
19,864
13,656
9,388
3,558
13,802
46,563
52,654
38,489
679,914
105,737
31,079
50,067
25,447
11,566
4,450
1,900
7,177
55,245
82,302
48,599
520,165
100,431
32,433
35,200
21,612
7,806
1,720
1,353
9,746
40,365
73,809
41,462
1995/96 1996/97 1997/981998/991999/00 2000/012001/02
675,565
89,488
47,621
66,217
25,489
10,327
2,059
1,594
9,888
47,839
76,930
43,240
649,069
126,573
20,745
89,879
17,273
10,693
2,762
3,497
12,412
40,237
78,639
41,541
510,374
154,682
15,692
80,254
11,681
11,251
3,464
5,400
9,065
35,864
90,047
35,379
598,181
119,945
14,280
70,629
11,716
12,682
3,157
4,730
13,364
36,405
77,292
30,780
605,648
69,532
12,982
36,947
11,721
14,113
3,337
4,060
10,532
37,388
61,277
39,853
583,850
135,108
37,666
16,754
14,380
4,247
3,715
14,321
43,354
69,738
51,025
56,939
696,619
139,562
22,600
87,026
17,963
22,600
3,855
3,010
13,050
33,955
61,347
40,043
699,276
150,460
22,521
86,431
17,402
26,277
3,944
-
10,305
37,054
56,751
44,002
631,080
116,978
30,689
121,593
33,186
-
8,052
5,464
12,379
45,350
59,081
45,270
2002/03 2003/04
Table 4.2:  Area under Cultivation for Selected Crops and Percentage Changes, 1989-2003 (hectares)
Groundnuts
Sunflower seeds
Soya beans
1989/90 1990/911991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/951995/96 1996/97 1997/981998/991999/00 2000/012001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Maize
Cotton
Wheat
Tobacco, burley
Tobacco, Virginia
Paddy rice
Sorghum
Millet
Mixed beans
-16.2
0.0
-17.6
15.6
-2.1
2.2
28.0
-64.8
39.7
-34.4
-23.1
9.5
3.4
14.6
-11.5
-19.5
-22.0
-7.5
21.9
133.8
6.8
26.8
47.1
33.1
-5.7
3.9
22.1
28.3
-12.8
24.6
305.9
20.6
-3.9
15.5
-20.9
-0.0
9.1
48.1
-21.2
-34.5
28.1
-15.3
-52.6
-46.6
-48.0
18.6
56.3
26.3
-23.5
-5.0
4.4
-29.7
-15.1
-32.5
-61.3
-28.8
35.8
-26.9
-10.3
-14.7
29.9
-10.9
46.8
88.1
17.9
32.3
19.7
17.8
1.5
18.5
4.2
4.3
-3.9
41.1
-56.4
35.7
-32.2
3.5
34.1
-
25.5
-15.9
2.2
-3.9
-21.4
22.2
-24.4
-
-32.4
5.2
25.4
-
-27.0
-10.9
14.5
-14.8
17.2
-22.5
-9.0
-
0.3
12.7
-8.9
-
47.2
1.5
-14.2
-13.0
1.2
-42.0
-9.1
-47.7
0.0
11.3
5.7
-
-21.1
2.7
-20.7
29.5
-3.6
97.2
190.1
54.1
42.9
1.9
27.3
-8.5
36.0
16.0
13.8
28.0
19
2
-40
53
7
57
-9
-19
-9
-22
-12
-22
0
8
-0
-1
-3
16
2
-100
-21
9
-7
10
-10
-22
36
41
91
-100
104
-
20
22
4
3
Percentages
Table 4.2  continued
Groundnuts
Sunflower seeds
Soya beans
1989/90 1990/911991/92 1992/93 1993/941994/ 951995/96 1996/97 1997/981998/99 1999/002000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Maize
Cotton
Wheat
Tobacco, burley
Tobacco, Virginia
Paddy rice
Sorghum
Millet
Mixed beans
Indices
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
84
100
82
116
98
102
128
35
140
66
77
109
87
85
73
93
76
95
156
82
149
83
113
146
82
89
119
67
89
118
633
99
143
96
89
146
89
131
70
78
85
100
300
53
75
114
140
184
68
125
73
55
72
67
116
38
101
83
125
157
89
111
108
103
85
89
139
44
103
99
131
164
85
157
47
140
58
92
186
97
129
83
134
157
67
192
35
125
39
97
234
151
94
74
153
134
78
149
32
110
39
109
213
132
139
75
131
116
79
86
29
58
39
122
225
113
109
77
104
151
76
170
85
89
56
124
286
104
149
89
118
193
91
173
51
135
58
227
266
-
107
76
96
166
51
136
60
195
260
84
136
70
104
151
92
187
83
145
69
190
111
-
543
152
129
94
100
171
Table 4.2 continued
Source: Central Statistical Office, Agriculture Branch.
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Figure 4.1: Production Trends for Selected Products, 1989-2003
(index 1989=100)
Figure 4.2: Acreage in Food Crops, 1990-2000 (index 1989=100)
Figure 4.3: Maize Production and Marketed Maize, 1989-2004 (metric tons)
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the WTO, involve a fundamental contradic-
tion:  if, as economists argue, free trade 
benefits all trading partners, there should be 
no need for negotiations to achieve free 
trade; each government should liberalise 
trade unilaterally.  The resolution of  this 
apparent contradiction is 1) all countries do 
not benefit equally and some not at all 
under actual trading conditions; 2) the 
WTO as an institution does not seek free 
trade, but the regulation of  trade under 
rules that benefit some countries more than 
others; and 3) unlike its predecessor the 
GATT, the WTO has expanded into non-
trade issues such as copyrights, investment 
rules, and public sector procurement.
The goal for Zambia in its membership 
of  the WTO is to achieve the best outcome 
for the development of  the country, which 
includes maintaining as much policy flexibil-
ity for the future as is possible.  While the 
specific agreements that were made at 
accession remain important, equally impor-
tant is for the government to have the 
flexibility to change policies when circum-
stances change.  The WTO allows for this.  
Some critics of  the WTO argue that the 
organisation severely restricts the policy 
options of  a member.  It is specifically 
argued that WTO rules leave a government 
unable to pursue an effective industrial 
policy.  This argument is true only if  the 
government of  the joining country con-
cedes its flexibility.  Under WTO rules there 
is considerable flexibility for industrial 
policy if  a government wishes to pursue it.
The WTO makes no distinction between 
developed and developing countries.  
However, there is a category, 'Least Deve-
loped Countries' (LstDCs), and a country 
that falls into this category, which Zambia 
does, achieves considerable policy flexibility.
     
The Decision on Measures in favour of  Least-
Developed Countries  establishes, among other 
Least Developed Country Status
Annex
4A.1Industrial Policy and 
Trade Agreements 
Introduction
Policy Flexibility
Zambia joined the World Trade 
Organisation in the 1990s during a period 
of  rushed across-the-board liberalisation.  
That period of  liberalisation was associated 
with a catastrophic collapse of  domestic 
manufacturing, and a poor performance of  
the agricultural sector.  Thus, revisiting the 
accession agreement to the WTO and regi-
onal trading agreements could be fruitful. 
The WTO was formed in 1994 by the 
'The Final Act Embodying the Results of  
the Uruguay Round of  Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations'.  Its purpose was to institu-
tionalise the negotiating process of  the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and extend that process into non-
commodity issues.  Until the Tokyo round 
of  GATT (begun 1973) governments of  
developing countries had little role in trade 
negotiations, asTable 4A.1 indicates.
Out of  the Uruguay Round came a 
series of  agreements, including the Agree-
ment on Agriculture.  Despite promises by 
the governments of  the developed countries 
that developing countries would gain from 
freer trade in agricultural commodities, it 
was explicitly recognised that some or many 
countries might suffer losses.  In light of  
this, the Uruguay agreements were supple-
mented by a document with the rather title, 
'The Decision on Measures Concerning the 
Possible Negative Effects of  the Reform 
Programme on Least-Developed and Net 
Food-Importing Countries'.  The negotia-
tion of  entry tariffs should be carried out in 
the context of  this document and the 
'Special and Differential Treatment' provi-
sions for developing countries. 
Over half  a century ago a famous trade 
economist pointed out that negotiations 
over liberalising trade, the stated purpose of  
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Round Date Countries
Geneva
Annecy
Torquay
Dillon
Kennedy
Tokyo
Uruguay
Geneva
1947
1949
1950
1956
1960-61
1962-67
1973-79
1986-93
23
33
34
22
45
48
99
118
79
government of  Zambia could give consider-
ation to reviewing its WTO accession 
agreement in the context of  introducing a 
purposeful industrial policy 
consistent with the flexibility allowed for 
Least Developed Countries. 
In practice regional trading agreements are 
more likely to bestow benefits across 
members the more similar the members are 
in levels of  development.  The enormous 
gap between the levels of  development of  
Zambia and South Africa is and will remain 
a major source of  tension between the two 
countries in their trade.  Changing the trade 
agreement with South Africa would be 
considerably easier than doing the same 
within the WTO.  A fundamental principle 
of  all commercial relations between coun-
tries is that all governments pursue their 
national interests.  Given that the govern-
ment of  Zambia seeks to develop an 
internationally competitive agricultural 
sector, it could consider reviewing the trade 
agreement with South Africa.  Treaties, 
including trade treaties, should be honoured.  
However, honouring such treaties need not 
preclude altering aspects of  them in a 
country's national interest. 
Regional Trading Agreements
Table 4A.1: GATT negotiating rounds:
things, that these countries will not be required to 
undertake any commitments and concessions which 
are inconsistent with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs. [http://www.wto.org/
English/docs_e/legal_e/Ursum_e.htm#Agreement,
 p. 3, emphasis added] 
One aspect of  the favourable treatment of  
LstDCs is that they are allowed an extended 
period for implementing the policy changes 
to which they agree in their accession 
negotiations.  Perhaps the most important 
concession to LstDCs is their exemption 
from the prohibition on export subsidies.  
The WTO rules identify three categories of  
subsidies, those that are prohibited, those 
that are 'actionable', and those that are not 
actionable.  The second type, 'actionable', 
can be defended on grounds that they do 
not harm trading partners.  In practice the 
seriously binding category is the first, 
'prohibited' subsidies.  The two major types 
of  prohibited subsidies are those linked to 
export performance, and those that encour-
age use of  domestic inputs rather than 
imported ones. LstDSCs are exempt from 
the rule on prohibited subsidies: 
The agreement recognizes that subsidies may 
play an important role in economic development 
programmes of  developing countries, and in the 
transformation of  centrally-planned economies 
to market economies. Least-developed countries 
and developing countries that have less than 
$1,000 per capita GNP are thus exempted from 
disciplines on prohibited export subsidies, and 
have a time-bound exemption from other proh- 
ibited subsidies. For other developing countries, 
the export subsidy prohibition would take effect 
8 years after the entry into force of  the agree
ment establishing the WTO, and they have a 
time-bound (though fewer years than for poorer 
developing countries) exemption from the other 
prohibited subsidies. http://www.wto.org/ 
English/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Agree
     ment, p. 10, emphasis added]
It would appear that this exemption applies 
to subsidies in place at the time of  acces-
sion;  that is, new subsidies cannot be added 
once a country is a member.  However, 
WTO rules allow for policy changes in the 
interest of  national development, and in 
response to changed conditions.  The 
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The chapter considers fiscal policy in 
Zambia, and how expenditure and taxation 
could be used to reduce poverty.  As sugg-
ested by the discussion of  the country's 
external debt in Chapter 1, since 1990 fiscal 
policy in Zambia has been closely linked to 
debt servicing and constrained by external 
loan conditionalities.  It would be accurate 
to say that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
government expenditure was derivative 
from the servicing of  external debts.
This inversion of  social priorities had a 
debilitating effect on growth, poverty 
reduction and combating the HIV-AIDS 
pandemic, which has been as severe as it 
was avoidable.  In mid-2006 it appeared that 
the debt burden had been reduced to less 
85 than US$ one billion.  
If  policy conditionalities set by external 
agencies were made flexible, there is the 
potential that Zambia could fully achieve all 
of  the MDGs by 2015.  However, doing so 
would represent a major challenge, requiring 
a substantial increase in government expen-
diture supported by donors and lenders, and 
a radical change in the approach to condi-
tionality by those donors and lenders.  In its 
MDG progress report for 2005, the UNDP 
categorised achieving the MDGs as 'likely' 
for five, 'potentially' for three, and 'unlikely' 
for two.  While this represented a substantial 
improvement from the prospects in 2003 
(zero, eight and two, respectively), implied 
that half  the MDGs might not be achieved.
A careful and thorough study of  the 
resource cost of  achieving the MDGs 
provides a reliable estimate of  the fiscal 
effort that the government faces (Mphuka 
2005).  On the basis of  this report and an 
analysis of  the potential for fiscal space over 
the years 2006-2015, this chapter proposes a 
financing package that could realise the 
MDGs.  If  anything, the proposal under-
estimates the fiscal effort required, implying 
that a more modest effort would ensure  
that the MDGs are not achieved.  To lay the 
basis for the discussion of  financing, the 
chapter first considers debt issues, the con-
straints created by external conditionalities.
It is no mystery why Zambia accumulated a 
massive external debt during the last thirty 
years of  the twentieth century. While many 
sub-Saharan countries suffer from debilitat-
ing debt burdens, for few would the prob-
lem be as severe as for Zambia.  Further, 
5.2 Debt and the Balance 
of Payments
5 ~ Fiscal Policy for the MDGs
5.1 Fiscal Cost of the MDGs 
few countries waited as long as Zambia to 
achieve debt reduction under the HIPC 
initiative.  In December 2000, Zambia 
reached the so-called decision point, form-
ally qualifying for HIPC relief.  The 'com-
pletion point' would come over four years 
later in April 2005, when the outstanding 
external debt was slightly larger than at the 
decision point.
Figure 5.1 shows external debt service as 
a share of  export earnings during 1975-
2004 for Zambia and the average of  other 
86sub-Saharan countries.   Only during the 
second half  of  the 1980s did Zambia's 
share fall below that of  the cross-country 
average.  The chart highlights the startling 
situation of  the 1990s, when the adjustment 
programmes of  the IMF and the World 
Bank were associated with four years of  
debt service ratios in excess of  twenty-five 
percent.  Even more striking is Figure 5.2, 
showing debt service as a share of  GDP, 
which averaged almost nine percent of  
GDP for Zambia over thirty years, double 
the ratio for the other countries.  The 
adjustment programmes did little to change 
this;  the average for Zambia after 1990 was 
only marginally less than for the years 
before.   To put such a debt service to GDP 
ratio in perspective, during the Latin 
American debt crisis of  the 1980s, only 
 three of  eighteen countries had  ratios for a 
decade above what Zambia averaged for 
three decades.
Measured per capita the debt burden 
appeared even more onerous.  Figure 5.3 
again compares Zambia to the other sub-
Saharan countries, over a slightly shorter 
period, 1980-2004, using three year moving 
averages to reduce the effect of  the extreme 
values of  the 1990s.  In current US dollars, 
the difference between Zambia and the 
other countries strikes the eye, a twenty-five 
year average of  US$ 720 for Zambia and 
US$ 466 for the other countries.  However, 
these numbers understate the difference 
between Zambia and other African coun-
tries, because of  terms of  trade changes.  
Since debts must ultimately be repaid with 
exports, a decline in export prices raises the 
real value of  debt.  When per capita debt is 
adjusted for the terms of  trade, the average 
for the other sub-Saharan countries declines 
slightly, to US$ 450, while that for Zambia 
increases  to over US$ 900.  Instead of  
being slightly lower after 1990 than before 
as is the case in current prices, the terms of  
trade adjusted per capita debt increases, 
from US$ 730 to 1030.
It should be clear from this discussion 
that debt was not only one of  the problems 
constraining growth and poverty reduction 
for Zambia, it was the central problem.  Full 
debt cancellation would increase the poten-
tial fiscal space for growth-enhancing pro-
poor expenditure by as much as five per-
centage points of  GDP.  First we consider 
the relief  realised by reaching the HIPC 
completion point.   The amount of  debt 
relief  under the HIPC derives from what is 
87called a 'sustainability analysis'.   This 
analysis involves a projection of  future 
estimation of  key debt indicators, the most 
important being the debt-to-export ratio.  
Thus, central to the amount of  debt relief  
granted is the projection of  export growth.
When Zambia reached its decision point 
in December 2000 (i.e.,  it qualified for 
relief), the IMF made a preliminary 
sustainability analysis, and in 2005 con-
cluded, 'export growth [during 1999-2003] 
was considerably slower than projected' 
(IMF 2005a, 23).  Not withstanding this 
unrealised optimism, in 2005 the decisive 
debt sustainability analysis presumed 'strong 
[export] growth over the medium term, 
reflecting major investments in mining and 
88agriculture' (IMF 2005a, 25).   Perhaps this 
prediction was made on the basis of  high 
prices for copper.  Before inspecting the 
details of  the sustainability exercise, it can 
be noted that it seemed to have a basic 
inconsistency.  Macroeconomic equilibrium 
requires that the sum of  all net demand 
equal zero; that investment minus saving, 
plus government expenditure minus govern-
ment revenue, plus exports minus imports, 
be zero (familiar condition that [IS]+-[G-
81
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T]+[X-M] = 0).  However, the sum app- 
89ears to be a plus 1.8.  This inconsistency 
may be a numerical error, because the assu-
mptions about grant inflows and foreign 
direct investment imply that a trade deficit 
of  eight percent of  GDP could be sus-
tained, which would eliminate the discrep-
ancy. Proceeding on the assumption that 
macro consistency could be resolved, there 
were several reasons to think that the 
sustainability analysis was too optimistic.  
Several of  the projections seem dubious 
compared to the economic record prior to 
the completion point.  The long term 
growth rate was predicted to be steady at 
five percent per year.  The average for 2001-
2004 was slightly less than this at 4.7, which 
could be viewed as unusually high compared 
to the previous decade.  The projected 
growth rate appeared all the more optimistic 
given that the investment share in GDP was 
predicted 'to hold steady at 22.5 percent of  
GDP, down over 2-3 percentage points 
from present levels', and foreign investment 
'is projected to fall off  from its current 
high'.  When combined with the falling 
investment share, the policy prescription 
that the public budget not be expansionary 
placed the entire burden of  demand genera-
tion on the optimistic export projection.  
Further, inflation, below ten percent in only 
three of  the forty years 1965-2004, is 
'expected to fall to 5 percent…by 2007' 
(IMF 2005a, 25).  The exercise does not 
explain how inflation would be so drastically 
reduced without contractionary policies that 
would also reduce growth.
The most important variables for the 
sustainability exercise are presented in Table 
5.1, which provides the assumed, or pro-
jected, values made in 2000 when Zambia 
reached the HIPC decision point.  These are 
accompanied by the actual outcomes, as 
presented by the IMF (IMF 2005a, Tables 
11 and 12).  It can be noted that the 
assumed growth rate for 2000-2004 was not 
far off  the actual outcome.  However, the 
growth rate during those five years was well 
in excess of  any previous five-year period 
for two decades.  Projecting this for the next 
nineteen years, 2005-2023, implies growth 
conditions would be considerably more 
favourable than in the past, not withstand-
ing the inflation reduction policy which 
would have a contractionary impact.
The most serious shortcoming of  the 
sustainability analysis assumptions was the 
underestimation of  copper price instability, 
an instability which implies that caution is 
required about the continuation the high 
prices of  the mid-2000s.  The sustainability 
exercise includes a 'sensitivity analysis' that 
includes the 'shock' of  a twenty percent fall 
in the copper price.  It is not clear that such 
a fall would shock anyone familiar with the 
international copper market, because the 
coefficient of  variation of  the copper price 
during 1995-2004 was .21.  This implies that 
a price fall in excess of  twenty percent can 
be expected in approximately one year out 
of  five.  This high degree of  instability in 
the copper price points to the serious 
danger to debt sustainability and, more 
fundamentally, to the sustainability of  
Zambian development: dependence on 
copper.  Past dependence on copper drove 
Zambia's unsustainable debt accumulation; a 
return to that dependence is unlikely to be 
the escape.  In the absence of  a purposeful 
plan for export diversification, strongly 
supported by public investment, copper 
could again dominate the economy.
Public investment for sustainable deve-
lopment requires fiscal space.  There-fore, it 
must have disappointed the government to 
discover how little fiscal space debt relief  
from HIPC would create.  The IMF com-
pletion point document reports that 'HIPC 
Initiative interim debt relief' amounted 
annually to a reduction of  debt service of  
905.7 percent of  GDP for 2001-2005.   How-
ever, reduction of  the debt service item in 
the public budget was less than half  this, 2.6 
percentage points of  GDP, and what were 
named 'Priority poverty reducing 
programme expenditures' only 1.5 percent-
age points.  The 3.1 percentage point 
difference between 'HIPC debt relief' and 
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budget payments represented debt service 
in another accounting category.  To quote 
from the IMF, 
     
Given that the Bank of  Zambia faced large debt 
service obligation, whose non-payment could 
have resulted in a curtailment of  non-HIPC 
donor assistance, HIPC interim debt relief  acc- 
ruing to the Bank of  Zambia was designated for 
debt service payments.  The remainder has 
mostly been allocated to priority poverty redu- 
cing programmes, which focused on investments 
in infrastructure, support for small-scale farmers 
and food security, and increased expenditures in 
the social sectors, in particular, education.  
(IMF 2005a, 19).
In other words, over half  of  HIPC interim 
debt relief, fifty-five percent, was an acc-
ounting entry.  Further, to write that the 
'remainder was mostly allocated' to poverty 
reduction programmes involves broad 
usage of  the word 'mostly', since less than 
sixty percent of  the 2.6 percentage points 
of  actual debt service reduction went to
 this item.   Whether the promise by the
 'G-8' heads of  state in July 2005 to com-
pletely cancel all IMF and WB debts to 
HIPC completion point countries would 
bring effective debt relief  to Zambia is 
91considered below.   
In the following section it will be shown 
that far from increasing fiscal space, the 
overall effect of  the HIPC process would 
slightly reduce it, primarily as a result of  
macroeconomic conditionalities.  Full impl-
ementation of  the G-8 debt cancellation 
would increase fiscal space, but within the 
binding policy conditionalities by less than 
one percentage point.  Thus, the constrain-
ing role of  these conditionalities on poverty 
expenditure and achieving the MDGS requ-
ires brief  consideration of  their appropri-
ateness in the context of  the poverty redu-
ction strategy process.
The constraining burden of  Zambia's debt 
5.3 Government Expenditure 
and Revenue
92Persistence of Donorship
for three decades was closely related to a 
second constraint, conditionalities placed 
upon lending from external agencies that 
severely limited the policy space in which 
successive governments could make deci-
sions.  Indeed, so numerous and specific 
have the conditionalities been, that once the 
conditionalities were accepted by the gove-
rnments, very little discretion remained for 
the important decisions affecting economic 
management. A review of  Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 indicate the extent to which the multilat-
eral agencies have affected policy in Zambia, 
the former listing the major interventions 
and the latter some of  the more important 
conditionalities.  The tables demonstrate 
clearly that from the late 1980s, policy 
making in Zambia was characterised by 
conditionalities that directly constrained the 
government's actions in almost every 
important area of  economic policy, and in 
some cases social policy.  Table 5.2 also 
indicates the extremely troubled interaction 
between the multilateral agencies and 
Zambian governments, with cancellation or 
suspension of  programmes shaded.
The major role played by policy condi-
tionalities in Zambia implies that a consider-
ation of  their appropriateness, both techni-
cally and in the lender-borrower relation-
ship, cannot be avoided.  Such external 
constraints played a major role in other 
countries included by the Global Progr-
amme on the Macroeconomics of  Poverty 
Reduction described in the Introduction.  A 
cornerstone of  the PRSP process, stressed 
by the World Bank as a fundamental change 
in its lending approach, is the principle of  
recipient ownership of  policy making 
(Klugman 2002).
It is useful to review the discussion in 
the reports on those countries (see Weeks et 
al, 2005, Chapter 1).  In the conditions they 
set, donors and lenders must distinguish 
between actions required by the recipient 
government in order that the funds be used 
effectively, and those policies that the 
donors and lenders have the bargaining 
power to impose, be they crucial to success 
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policies, and aware of  the need for them, 
but fail to implement them because of  
special interests within or outside of  the 
government.  In such circumstances, the 
argument goes, donors are justified in their 
criticism of  policy choices, and the criticism 
may strengthen domestic supporters of  
sound policies.  This argument is also in the 
tradition of  donorship, for it implicitly 
suggests that institutional, political, and 
economic interests do not motivate donors.   
This approach is increasingly unacceptable 
in the twenty-first century.  Following PRSP 
guidelines, the development strategy of  
every country should be established 
through the democratic process, which 
has functioned relatively well in Zambia 
since the 1980s.
It is the view of  this mission that 
relations between the Zambian government 
and donors and lenders continues to be one 
of  donorship, and considerably more so 
than in almost any other African country.  
As a result, for at least two decades Zambia 
suffered form a profound 'aid dependency', 
which included but went well beyond 
dependency on external funding.  In pra-
ctice, the capacity for national policy making 
was seriously undermined by the frequent 
interventions of  external Agencies, in dec-
isions both large and small.  This tendency 
was quite clear in the budgetary process, 
where the scope for independent national 
policy decisions was extremely limited.
The HIPC debt reduction process was 
very much a part of  the donorship 
approach.  Qualification for relief  reaching 
the 'decision point' explicitly required 
faithful adherence, over several years, to 
IMF and World Bank programmes charac-
terised by detailed conditionalities (see Table 
5.2).  The considerable delay in obtaining 
debt relief, 'completion point', resulted from 
the government making insufficient prog-
ress on a specific conditionality, privatisation 
of  the Zambian National Commercial Bank 
(see discussion in Situmbeko & Zulu 2004, 
-42ff).  In no areas of  policy were the cons
traints of  conditionalities more restrictive 
or not.  An essential characteristic of  the 
'donorship regime' was an omniscient 
external judgementalism.  The donor or 
lender reserved the right to pass unilateral 
judgement on the appropriateness of  and 
commitment to loan and grant conditio-
nalities.  In a national ownership regime, 
assessment of  policies passes to the recipi-
ent government, with consultation with the 
donor.  National ownership does not req-
uire external development agencies to sus-
pend all judgements; it implies that those 
judgements arise out of  an interactive proc-
ess with national stakeholders.
A central characteristic of  donorship 
was the presumption that if  development 
assistance failed in its goals, the blame lay 
with the recipient government, typically 
explained by a 'lack of  political will'.  
This approach by donors made 
several presumptions:
1. That there exist a set of  sound policies  
which the donors know and recipient 
governments do not (the recipient 
is ignorant);
2. that recipient governments must not 
only be informed of  the sound policies 
of  which they are ignorant, but they 
require convincing of  the need to 
implement these (in the absence of  
donor advocacy, the recipient lacks the 
judgement to distinguish good policies 
from bad ones); and, 
3. in the past, development failures arose 
from the mistakes of  omission or 
commission of  recipient governments, 
not in whole or part the result of  
unsound policies of  the donors 
(development failures are recipient 
government failures).
While not a characteristic of  the years 
immediately following independence, these 
presumptions tended to guide donors and 
lenders in their relations with Zambia from 
the late 1980s onwards.  A variation on the 
sound policy criticism of  recipient govern-
ments is that they may be aware of  the 
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than for fiscal policy.  After 1990, direct 
fiscal conditionalities included 1) deficit 
limits, 2) a cap on the share of  public sector 
wages in GDP, and 3) 'cash budgeting'.  The 
last, which limited expenditure to each 
ministry's own current cash balance, was 
particularly distorting for policy implemen-
tation.  The cash limit was particularly 
dysfunctional and irrational for capital 
projects, whose expenditure requirements 
were often 'front-loaded', leading to inter-
ruptions in the construction process.  These 
interruptions resulted in abandoning 
93projects in process.
The fundamental purpose of  the HIPC 
process and the G-8 debt cancellation is to 
create fiscal space for poverty reducing 
expenditures.  Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers were created as part of  this process, 
and later became more general in purpose, 
to serve as the basis for donor and lender 
support and to link growth to the MDGs.  
Thus, if  debt relief  fails to create space for 
increased expenditure for poverty reduction, 
the process was both futile and pointless.  A 
close inspection of  the official IMF projec-
tion of  revenue and expenditure in the five 
years immediately following Zambia reach-
ing the decision point yields the conclusion 
that as a portion of  GDP, HIPC debt relief  
slightly reduced the amount of  expenditure 
available for poverty programmes, and the 
G-8 cancellation increased only marginally.
During 2000-2004 the Zambian govern-
ment paid seven percent of  GDP as debt 
service, and the debt sustainability exercise 
described earlier in this chapter projected 
that this would fall to 1.7 percent during 
2006-2010 (see Table 5.4, data columns 2 
94and 3).   Someone unfamiliar with the 
HIPC process might conclude that the fall 
from seven to 1.7 percent would release the 
difference between the two, 5.3 percent of  
GDP, for expenditure at the discretion of  
the government.  Were this the case, the 
prospects for sustainable growth with 
poverty reduction would be dramatically 
Debt Reduction and Fiscal Space
improved in Zambia.  The IMF projection 
that tax and other revenue sources would 
generate a slightly larger share of  GDP, 
from 18.8 to nineteen, would be further 
cause for optimism.
Such optimism would be misplaced.  
First, the IMF exercise anticipated that 
grants and the grant component of  loans, 
over six percent of  GDP during 2000-2004, 
would fall to three percent (see notes to 
95Table 5.4),  though such a decline would 
seem to contradict a fundamental commit-
96ment associated with HIPC relief.   The 
decline in grants of  3.5 percentage points 
reduces relief  on budgeted debt service 
from 5.3 to 1.8 percentage points. For pra-
ctical purposes, total expenditure less 
external grants for 2006-2010 is mandated 
by the conditions that it not exceed, by 
more than one percent, total revenue.  With 
the added condition that domestic borrow-
ing be limited to .6 percent of  GDP (imply-
ing that .4 percentage points would be 
covered by external grants), the net reduc-
tion in the fiscal deficit must be 3.3 percent 
of  GDP.
This rather tedious tracking of  percent-
ages and fractions thereof  yields the 
conclusion that in the first five years after 
the HIPC decision point, assuming other 
public expenditure obligations are not 
reduced, the change in fiscal space for 
poverty expenditure would be minus .8 
percent of  GDP. We can summarise the 
calculations as follows: 1) other things 
unchanged, HIPC debt relief  would inc-
rease fiscal space by 5.3 percentage points 
of  GDP; 2) the expected increase in gov-
ernment revenue would increase this by a 
further .2 percentage points; 3) a reduction 
in grants by 3.5 percentage points reduces 
this to two percentage points of  GDP; and 
4) a lower deficit limit reduces it to minus .8 
percentage points. 
If  the G-8 cancellation of  IMF and 
World Bank debts were realised, the result 
improves, but only marginally.  The 
further reduction of  debt service, from 1.7 
to 0.1 percent of  GDP creates a small 
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positive change in fiscal space of  0.8 perc-
entage points.  Even without a detailed 
analysis of  the cost of  achieving the MDGs, 
it should be obvious that this change would 
be inadequate.
If  Zambia would achieve sustained growth 
with poverty reduction, and approach the 
MDGs, the fiscal space HIPC and the G-8 
fail to provide must be created through 
other means.  Though it brought an extr-
emely small poverty expenditure 'dividend', 
HIPC and the G-8 processes were not 
pointless, for they dramatically reduced 
Zambia's external debt and the servicing 
associated with that debt.  In the long run 
this could only assist the achievement of  
sustained growth; though the cost, in terms 
of  distorted policy priorities and govern-
ment human resource inputs, well exceeds 
what was achieved.  Higher levels of  non-
debt ODA assistance might be realised, but 
at the time of  this report there was no 
commitment on the part of  donors and 
lenders.  The long, protracted HIPC process 
carries an important lesson:  the present and 
future governments of  Zambia must seek 
domestically the resources for generating 
growth and poverty reduction.  To consider 
the scale of  the task to fund the achieve-
ment of  the MDGs, one can begin with the 
fiscal allocations for 2005, shown in the first 
data column of  Table 5.5, with the second 
column giving each item as a percentage of  
the domestic budget, and column three 
percentage of  GDP.  The fourth column 
reports the estimated expenditure share in 
GDP necessary to achieve the MDGs 
(Mphuka 2005, and see notes to Table 5.5).  
This fourth column sums to almost a 
quarter of  GDP, considerably larger then 
domestic budget.  If  an assumption is  
made that the expenditures in budget cate-
gories that correspond to the MDG catego-
ries are fully used to achieve the MDGs,  
then the net increase in expenditure sums to 
5.4 Creating Fiscal Space for 
97the MDGs
17.1 percent of  GDP (sum of  the 'MDG 
gaps', last cell of  the last column).
Having quantified the fiscal effort 
required, one can move to Table 5.6, which 
provides proposal for funding the 'MDG 
gap'.  The first two sources of  funding 
come from government interest payments.  
External interest payments were 0.4 percent 
of  GDP in 2005, and would fall to 0.1 after 
realisation of  the G-8 debt cancellation.  
Item 2 presumes a restructuring of  the 
domestic debt, by issuing new bonds to 
credits at a fifty percent discount.  This 
policy is discussed in Annexes 6A.3 
and 6A.4. 
Third, the proposal calls for an increase 
in tax revenue of  three percentage points in 
GDP.  Figure 5.4 shows that taxes acco-
unted for the overwhelming proportion of  
revenue, with fees and other sources making 
a minor contribution.  Increasing non-tax 
revenue would in most cases be regressive, 
as the discussion of  'user fees' in Chapter 7 
demonstrates.  Four major types of  taxes 
account for almost all of  tax revenue, as 
shown in Figure 5.5.  Unlike almost every 
other sub-Saharan country, personal income 
taxes brought the largest share of  revenue in 
Zambia.  Increasing the rates for the highest 
income earners would bring a small increase 
in revenue; though this might be better used 
to reduce rates on the poorest income tax 
payers, some of  whom were below the 
poverty line (see Chapter 3).  Given the 
tariff  reductions during the 1990s, trade 
taxes held remarkably steady in their cont-
ribution, suggesting there to be limited 
scope for increased revenue from this 
source.  The VAT levy, despite claims about 
its effectiveness,  generated relatively little 
revenue, and its expansion, were that cost 
effective in terms of  collection, would be 
aggressive and anti-poor.
There would be considerable scope for 
increasing the company tax, which in 1990 
brought over six percent of  total tax 
income.  Trade liberalisation and the decline 
of  copper reduced its contribution dramati-
cally.  However, the rejuvenation of  the 
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copper sector and the growth of  agribusi-
ness provide scope for expanding the tax 
base, especially if  various forms of  tax 
exemptions were removed.   Priority could 
be given to a study of  the potential for 
expanding the base and increasing the rates 
of  the company tax.
Fourth, the proposal assumes that one-
third of  'other expenditures' (9.9 percent of  
GDP, see Table 5.5) be shifted to MDG 
expenditure.  Some of  this shift may involve 
no more than re-labelling, because the cost 
of  implementing MDG expenditure would 
fall under general government operations.  
However, the majority of  the shift would 
require re-assigning civil servants to new 
activities, which would have a training cost. 
Item five calls for an increase in domes-
tic borrowing, which would be viable if  the 
domestic debt were restructured as sug-
gested above.  The domestic borrowing 
level for 2006-2010 to which the govern-
ment agreed as part of  the HIPC process, 
less than one percent of  GDP, has little 
practical justification in economics.  Once 
the domestic debt is made sustainable, such 
a small deficit would be far below the 
optimum level.  Accumulating domestic 
debt at the rate implied by .6 percent of  
GDP would imply a rapidly declining debt 
to GDP ratio if  the economy grows at the 
anticipated five percent per annum.  With 
regard to inflation, the Quantity Theory of  
Money suggests for a typical value for the 
velocity of  money that the inflationary 
impact would be small even if  the deficit 
were monetised.  If  covered by domestic 
borrowing, a deficit has no direct inflation-
ary effect because the net impact on the 
money supply is zero.  
The other possible impact of  a higher 
deficit would be upward pressure on 
commercial interest rates, which is shown to 
be unlikely in the next chapter.  If  this 
'crowding out' effect were operative, it 
would be demand reducing for the private 
sector through its impact on investment, but 
not inflationary.  However, since the 
increase in the deficit could be used for 
public investment, the net effect on aggre-
gate investment, private and public, would 
be positive, and growth-enhancing.  Finally, 
the capital expenditure required for the ach-
ievement of  the MDGs would bring public 
investment well above three percent of  
GDP.  It is contrary to economic theory and 
common sense to fund investment out of  
current income, since the investments gen-
erate a future flow of  income to fund the-
mselves (that is why there are capital mar-
kets).  The reason for the government not 
to fully fund investment by borrowing is the 
possible inflationary effect, which was dis-
cussed above.  Thus, there would be no co-
mpelling economic argument against exp-
anding fiscal space through domestic bor-
rowing in excess of  the extremely low 'cap' 
of  .6 percent of  GDP, to three percent.  
Item 6, 'foreign financed capital expen-
diture', is not part of  the domestic budget, 
and was 3.4 percent of  GDP in 2005.  The 
calculations assume that all of  this would 
contribute to achieving the MDGs during 
2006-2015.  Finally, an increase in ODA 
grants serves as the residual item to fill  the 
MDG gap.
The percentages for MDG expenditures 
in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 were calculated on the 
assumption of  a growth in per capita 
income of  2.2 percent per annum (Mphuka 
2005).  According to World Bank data, 
population growth was 1.4 percent in 2004.  
On the assumption that population will 
expand at the slightly higher rate of  1.5 
percent during 2006-1015, a per capita 
growth rate of  2.2 percent implies GDP 
growth of  3.7 percent.  At this rate of  
growth, the seven financing items would 
need to cover an increase in government 
expenditure of  8.8 percentage points, with 
the share of  expenditure in GDP rising 
form 27.1 to 35.9 percent. However, if  the 
economy were to grow at the IMF projected 
rate of  five percent per annum, the increase 
in government expenditure would decline to 
8.3 percentage points, for a share of  35.4 
percent of  GDP.  However, a five percent 
rate of  growth would not achieve the first 
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585 In early 2006, the Ministry of  Finance and National Planning 
estimated that on the assumption of  full implementation of  G-8 debt 
cancellation, the total debt stock would fall to  US$ 747 million, of  
which Paris Club bilateral debt would be US$ 110 million, bilateral 
non-Paris Club 280 million, and multilateral 356 million.  The only 
two creditors that Zambia would owe over fifty million would be the 
European Investment Bank (twenty-five percent of  the US$ 747 
million), China (twenty percent), Russia (fifteen percent), and 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (eleven percent).  
IMF and World Bank debts would be completely cancelled.  The 
source for these numbers is information provided by the ministry. 
86 The chart does not include 2005 and 2006 when debts were 
reduced dramatically, first by reaching the HIPC completion point in 
2005, and further bilateral relief, and the promise of  G-8 
relief  in 2006.  
87 A WB web page describes the debt sustainability analysis 
as follows: 
MDG, reduction of  extreme income 
poverty by half.  Assuming distribution 
neutral growth and a continuous distribu-
tion function for household income, 
reducing the number of  the extreme poor 
by fifty percent implies a doubling of  per 
98capita income.  This would require a ten 
year growth rate of  seven percent per 
-annum.  In this case, the incre ase in govern-
ment expenditure falls to 7.5 percent of  
GDP, and the share of  government expen-
diture to 34.5 percent.
It is the view of  the mission that a ten 
year growth rate of  seven percent is possi-
ble for Zambia under the full-funding of  
MDGs scenario.  The increased government 
expenditure, partly financed through dome-
stic borrowing, would provide the necessary 
demand stimulus even if  export growth 
slowed.  Supply constraints would be 
progressively relieved by the MDG public 
investment.  However, there would be little 
prospect for five percent growth, much less 
seven percent, if  the deficit target of  0.6 of  
GDP were maintained, and monetary policy 
pursued an inflation rate of  five percent.
For the MDG commitment to be more than 
a slogan in Zambia, it is necessary 1) to 
estimate the spending levels required to 
achieve them, 2) programme those spending 
levels into the fiscal budget, and 3) foster a 
macro framework that fosters the growth 
rates that sustain those spending levels.  
The Mphuka study accomplished the first 
task.  The second step would require bold, 
innovative and possibility controversial 
measures, such as domestic debt restructur-
ing, larger fiscal deficits, and increases in 
rates, coverage and types of  taxation.  
The third step requires one to address 
the potential that the funding measures 
would have negative effects on the econ-
omy.  The most important of  these would 
be 1) inflationary pressures created by the 
increased spending; 2) the 'Dutch Disease' 
effects of  a higher level of  ODA (McKinley 
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2005); 3) crowding out effects of  an 
increased fiscal deficit, 4) the probability of  
private sector disincentives of  higher 
taxation; and 5) public sector capacity to 
expand anti-poverty programmes.
Taking the MDGs seriously requires that 
none of  these potential difficulties be 
treated in a reductionist manner in which 
they serve as 'trump cards' for limiting 
public expenditure.  For example, the poss-
ibility of  inflationary effects arising from a 
larger fiscal deficit is not an argument 
against increasing deficits, but an issue for 
empirical investigation.  Further, empirical 
evidence that deficits above a certain level 
reduce growth should not be viewed as 
99precluding deficits above the 'trigger' level.   
Rather, the size of  the negative growth 
effect should be assessed, and compared to 
policies to compensate for the effect.  The 
same point holds for inflation effects.  Even 
if  moderate inflation can be shown to have 
a negative growth effect, the policy issue is 
the size of  the effect in Zambia, and the 
possibility of  policies to counter it without 
100reducing MDG expenditure.  
In this approach, poverty reduction is 
the goal, and a social cost-benefit analysis 
should be made of  the potentially negative 
effects of  inflation, Dutch disease, crowding 
out, disincentives and administrative cap-
acity.  This analysis would include consider-
ation of  policies consistent with poverty 
reduction targets to counter these effects.  
This approach would place the MDGs in 
the 'driver's seat’ of  fiscal policy in Zambia.
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   Reducing the threshold for a poor country's external debt to be 
considered unsustainable was an important area of  consensus of  
the HIPC review, and a major element of  the  enhancement 
endorsed in September 1999. As with the original frame work, 
external debt sustainability will continue to be determined by a 
Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) prepared by the debtor 
country, World Bank and the IMF, to determine   whether a 
country is facing an unsustainable debt situation after the full 
application of  traditional debt relief  mechanisms. The new 
framework also allows for two related set  of  criteria to be 
considered. The first, which will continue to apply to most HIPCs, 
is the ratio of  a country's debt to its exports. Under the enhanced 
framework, sustainable debt-to-export levels are defined at a fixed 
ratio of  150 percent (on a net present value basis, or NPV). The 
second, for those HIPCs with very open economies where 
   exclusive reliance on external indicators may not adequately reflect 
the fiscal burden of  external debt, an NPV debt-to-export target 
below 150 can be recommended if  the country concerned meets two 
criteria at the decision point: an export-to-GDP ratio of  at least 
30 percent and a minimum threshold of  fiscal revenue in relation 
to GDP of  15 percent.  For these countries, the NPV debt-to-
export target will be set at a level which achieves a 250 percent of  
the NPV debt-to-revenue ratio at the decision point. Côte d'Ivoire 
and Guyana qualified under this criteria [sic!] under the initial 
   framework.(http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/faq/faq.html)
88 Though the numbers for other variables are given, the precise rate 
at which exports would grow does not appear in the text of  the IMF 
document, or in the box entitled 'Macroeconomic Assumptions 
Underlying the Debt Sustainability Analysis over the Period 2004-
2023'.  In the box, the full statement that refers to exports reads 
as follows:
   Export volume is projected to show strong growth over the medium 
term, reflecting major investments in mining and agriculture, before 
slowing down to 4 percent annual growth over the long term, when 
mining exports are assume to expand at about 7 percent a year, 
while other (non-traditional) exports growth a about 7 percent a 
year.  (IMF 2005a, 25).
In the text of  the document virtually the same statement is found:
   Following a strong export performance over the medium term 
mainly reflecting recent and ongoing investments in mining, 
agriculture, and tourism, export volumes are expected to growth at 
a more moderate pace of  4 percent over the long term. 
   (IMF 2005a, 26)
However, the export growth rates can be calculated from a table in 
the IMF document, and this is done in Table 6.1.
89 In text Box 3 the investment ratio is specified as 'about 22.5 
percent of  GDP, down 2-3 percentage points from present levels'.  
For saving, the box states '[g]ross national savings (after official 
transfers and debt relief) is projected to remain in the range of  18-19 
percent of  GDP'(IMF 2005a, 25, Box 3).  The export and import 
shares can be calculated from Table 12, lines 4, 10 and 11.  
Government revenue excluding grants is given in line 6 of  the same 
table.  Box 3 specifies the deficit as .6 percent of  GDP above revenue 
plus grants.  A grant level of  three percent of  GDP is also given in 
the table.  These numbers imply: [22.5  18.5] + [22.6  18.5] + 
[29.2  35.4] = 1.8.
90 The percentages by year are given as 7.3, 7.1, 5.5, 2.9 and 5.9, 
respectively, with the penultimate 'estimated' and the last 'projected' 
(IMF 2005a, Table 2). 
91 A WB web page on developing country debt states the following:
   The bulk of  the debt relief  envisaged by the [G-8] proposal would 
be provided by IDA. A number of  issues need to be resolved 
before the proposal can be implemented, including key issues related 
to donor financing and additionality of  donor resources. Bank 
staff  have presented options for resolving key issues, which are 
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actively being considered by the Bank's Executive Directors as well 
as IDA donors.  This proposal was discussed by the Development 
Committee during the 2005 Annual Meetings.  It  was also 
endorsed by our shareholders. Bank staff  are working to resolve 
remaining  implementation issues so that the proposal can be 
presented to its Board. http://web.worldbank.org(/WBSITE 
/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentM
DK:20634753~menuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piP
K:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html)
92 For a comprehensive discussion, see Weeks (2006).
93 Officials at the Ministry of  Finance and National Planning cited 
examples of  cost increases and abandonment of  projects directly 
resulting from cash budgeting requirements (interviews conducted in 
November 2004).
94 The IMF extends its projections to 2023 (see Table 6.1).  Such a 
long time period involves too high a degree of  uncertainty of  
estimation for the purposes of  this report.  The five-year period 
2006-2010 is compared to 2000-2004, rather than 2001-2005, 
because relevant data for 2005 were not available when this report 
was written.
95 On page 35 (Table 12) of  the IMF's Selected Issues document 
(IMF 2004a), the following numbers are given for 2000-2003, for 
the category 'revenue and grants' as a proportion of  GDP, 25.1, 
24.8, 26.2 and 25.0.  The percentages category 'revenue' alone are 
19.4, 19.1, 17.9 and 18.1.  6.7 is the average difference over the 
four years.   The Ministry of  Finance and Economic Planning 
reported 24.2 and 18.5, respectively, for 2004.   The 'decision point' 
document provides figures only for the category 'revenue excluding 
grants'.  The only mention of  grant levels is in Box 2 (see quotation 
in Table 6.4).
96 On its HIPC web site (in 2005), the WB presents several 
'frequently asked questions' (FAQ).  In reply to the question, does 
debt relief  replace development assistance, the following answer is 
given:
   No. HIPC debt relief  can be fully beneficial to a country only if  it 
is provided in addition to previous rates of  development assistance. 
A comparison of  current debt service payments and concessional 
assistance illustrates how important continued aid programmes are 
to these countries. The ratio of  gross inflows (from long-term debt 
and grants) to debt service paid averaged about two-to-one for the 
HIPCs as a group during the 1990s, and ranged upwards four-to-
one in half  of  these countries. Annual net transfers to the HIPCs 
on medium- and long-term resource flows (including grants) 
   averaged about 10 percent of  GNP over the 1990-96 period. 
Debt reduction must be additional to development assistance. 
(Emphasis added, www.worldbank.org/hipc)  
97 This section draws on the draft Chapter 52 of  the forthcoming 
National Development Plan.
98 The relationship between poverty and per capita income depends 
on the distribution of  income.  For example, if  all households in 
extreme poverty were clustered just below the extreme poverty income 
line, a relatively small increase in per capita income would be needed 
to cut poverty by half.  The assumption that doubling per capita 
income cuts poverty by half  is a useful first approximation.   While it 
is an over-estimate if  households are clustered just under the poverty 
line, this may be offset by increased inequality in the distribution of  
the growth increment.
99 In a 2005 paper Adam and Bevan report a negative 'threshold 
effect [on growth] at a level of  the deficit around 1.5% of  GDP' 
based on cross-country regressions.  Their conclusion is highly 
qualified:
   While there appears to be a growth payoff  to reducing deficits to 
this level, this effect disappears or reverses itself  for further fiscal 
contraction.  The magnitude of  this  payoff, but not its general 
character, necessarily depends on how changes in the deficit 
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5Note:  Shaded Cells for Exports G&S are annual growth rates.  The other shaded cells give 
the percentage point difference between assumed values and outcomes.
Source:  IMF (2005a, Tables 11 and 12).
Table 5.1: HIPC Debt Sustainability Analysis:  assumptions and outcomes for 
GDP and exports, 2000 onwards 
90
   are financed…and on how the change in the deficit is accomm- 
odated elsewhere in the Budget. (Adam and Bevan 2005), p. 571)
100 In a 2001 IMF Staff  Paper, Khan and Senhadji report that 
'[t]he threshold level of  inflation above which inflation significantly 
slows growth is estimated at…11-12 percent for developing countries' 
(Khan and Senhadj 2001, 1).  However, the effect is quite small.  
For example, consider the IMF projected growth rate for Zambia of  
five percent, and assume that increasing the deficit increases in 
inflation.  According to the Khan and Senhadji statistics, an increase 
in the rate of  inflation from 11 percent (the threshold and about 
Zambia's inflation rate in 2006) to twenty per percent would reduce 
the growth rate by .47 percentage points.  This implies an arc 
elasticity of  -.11.  Ceterius paribus, from the threshold level, a 
doubling of  the inflation rate reduces the growth rate from an initial 
five percent to 4.4 percent (see Khan and Senhadji 2001, Table 3).  
With a velocity of  money of  four, a nine percent increase inflation 
requires an increase in the fiscal deficit of  2.25 percentage points of  
GDP. For any realistic capital-output ratio, this decline in the growth 
rate would easily be overcome by using the increased funds from the 
increased deficit for public investment.  
Item
GDP
Growth
assumed
actual
Exports
G7S US$ mn
assumed
actual
Indices
(1995-99=100)
Terms of trade
Export Earnings
Copper volume
Price
Earnings
actual
assumed
actual
assumed
assumed
actual
assumed
actual
assumed
2000 2001 2002 2004 2000-04 2005-13 2014-23
actual
4.0
3.0
5.0
4.6
5.0
5.3
5.0
5.0
5.0
3.9
4.8
4.5
5.0 5.0
2003
1036
861
1241
1028
1413
1052
1506
1217
1604
1820
1360
1196
2297
7.8
3977
5.7
22.9
-5.7
18.1
26.2
13.0
11.2
6.4
1.8
6.3
5.6
13.3
7.8 -5.5
113
96
114
94
117
88
117
92
117
110
115
96 -19.5
Export volume
(growth rate)
assumed
actual
96
80
105
101
116
112
130
120
145
131
118
109 -9.7
84
92
97
87
102
79
106
88
109
130
99
95 -4.4
80
73
102
87
118
88
135
105
158
170
119
105 -14.2
113
96
114
94
117
88
117
92
117
110
115
96 -19.5
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Table 5.2:  IMF and World Bank operations in Zambia, 1973-2005
Source: World Development Movement (2004), up-dated from WB and IMF websites.
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1973 one year standby agreement Programme loan for 1973 oil price shock
1976 one year standby agreement Programme loan in response to fall in 
copper prices
1978 two year standby agreement First IDA credit (previously Zambia was a 
middle-income country by WB measure)
1981 three year Extended Fund Facility
1982 Extended Fund Facility cancelled
1983 one year standby at end of year WB suspends disbursements due to 
government non-payment of external debts, 
negotiations resume at end of year
1984 21 month standby agreement Project loan for copper sector
1985 Standby suspended Policy package agreed with the WB, 
resulting in first Structural 
Adjustment loan
1987 Government cancels IMF programme Government cancels WB programme
1989-90 Preliminary agreement for new lending
1991 Lending agreement suspended by IMF Lending agreement suspended by WB 
1992 agreement reached allowing access to arrears to WB cleared
IMF loans despite arrears
1995 three year Enhanced Structural Adjust- Recovery & Investment Project (ERIP) 
ment Facility (ESAF), one year Structuralagreed, with sectoral 
Adjustment Facility (SAF), total of programmes resulting
US$1,300 millionEconomic 
1999 3 year ESAF (US$ 350 million) Sectoral & Project loans
2000 IPRSP positively reviewed by joint Sectoral & Project loans
IMF/WB board; in December HIPC 
decision point reached
2002 PRSP positively reviewed by joint Sectoral & Project loans
IMF/WB board, but HIPC process 
delayed over bank privatisation
2004 Poverty Reduction & Growth Facility Sectoral & Project loans
loan (PRGF) of US$ 320 million
2005 HIPC completion point reached in Sectoral & Project loans
April, after over four years
World BankDate IMF
Table 5.3: Some IMF & World Bank conditionalities for Zambia, 1991-2005
Source: World Development Movement (2004), up-dated from WB and IMF websites.
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1991 World Bank Economic Reform Credit 
deregulate maize markets, limit bank  credits, Remove tariff bans, 
reduce civil service employment, initiate privatisation
1992 World Bank Privatisation and Industrial Reform Credit (PIRC I)
harmonise sales taxes, broaden tax base, reduce tariffs, reduce 
public employment by ten thousand, pass privatisation law, 
restructure state mining company
1992 IMF Rights Accumulation Programme
pay arrears to international creditors
1993 World Bank PIRC II 
reduce tariffs, develop land market, change investment act, 
privatise 60 companies including state copper corporation
1994 World Bank Economic & Structural Adjustment Credit (ESAC I)
redirect budget funds to social sectors, eliminate export ban on 
maize, create legal framework for land leasehold, sell public owned 
farms, financial plan for Zambia Airways
1995 World Bank Economic Recovery& Investment Project (ERIP)
introduce value added tax, minimum budget and spending targets 
for social services, change social security system, privatise state 
copper corporation
1995 IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)
quantitative benchmarks including increase domestic assets of BOZ, 
increase foreign reserves, reduce government domestic debt 
arrears; restructure civil service, publish banking regulations, 
privatise state copper corporation
1996 World Bank ESAC II 
social sector funding at least 35% of total public budget, 
implement 1995 land act, amend employment & industrial labour 
relations act, formulate policy for NGOs to delivery social services
1999 World Bank Structural Adjustment Fund 
reform civil service, publish banking regulations, privatise state 
copper corporation
1999 IMF ESAF 
privatise state enterprises including ZCCM, telecommunica
tions, electricity, post office; no intervention in exchange rate 
market; deregulate strategic grain reserve; end public distribution 
of fertiliser; restrictive monetary & fiscal policy
2000 IMF & HIPC decision point
World Bank  complete privatisation of public enterprises
2001 IMF PRGF
privatisation of ZNCB & ZESCO, deregulate & privatise energy sector 
and ZNOC; no intervention in exchange rate market; limit 
government expenditure
Date IFI Details
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Table 5.4: The public budget, actual (2000-04) and IMF 
projections (2006-10)
Notes and Sources:
The averages for 2000-04 are from the Ministry of Finance and are the same as given in IMF reports.  For 2006-10 revenue 
and grants are from IMF (2005a) Table 12, and debt service from Table 15.  Eight percent for wages and salaries was the 
upper limit conditionality set by the IMF.  The 2006-10 overall deficit is set out in Box 3 under the heading 'fiscal policy'.  'Net 
change in fiscal space' is defined as the change in the level of government expenditure net of debt service, funded by revenue, 
grants and domestic borrowing.  The increase in revenue and decline in debt service increased fiscal space, while the fall in 
grants and the deficit decreased fiscal space.
The IMF source explains the parameters of the 2006-10 budget as follows:
The 3-year PRGF-supported programme is anchored on reducing government's domestic borrowing to 0.6 percent of GDP in 
2007, before falling to near zero over the long term. Government revenues are projected to rise gradually to 19 percent of GDP 
by 2011 and continue growing to 20 percent of GDP by 2016, before holding steady at that level.
Government spending, excluding externally financed projects, is expected to gradually fall to about 1 percentage point of GDP 
above government revenues, with the balance financed by budget support grants and loans. Externally financed projects are 
projected to decline gradually to 34 percent of GDP over the long term, with grants making up an increasing share of the total.  
(IMF 2005a, Box 3)
The G-8 differs from the HIPC one by debt service falling to one tenth of one percent of GDP (estimate by the Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning, based on the assumption that total debt will fall to below US$ 500 million).
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Actual
2000-04
HIPC
2006-10
HIPC & G8
2006-10
Change:
HIPC
HIPC & G8Fiscal categories
Total income
Revenue
Grants
Total expenditure
Non-external debt
External debt
Overall deficit
Fiscal space
25.3
18.8
6.5
29.2
22.2
7.0
-3.9 -0.6
1.7
21.4
23.1
3.5
19.0
22.5 22.5
19.0
-0.6
0.1
23.0
23.1
3.5
-3.3
0.2
-3.5
-6.6
0.8
-5.3
-3.3
-0.8 0.8
-3.3
-6.9
0.8
-6.1
-3.0
0.2
-2.8
94
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Table 5.5:  Government expenditures in 2005 and the MDG 'Gap’
Notes:
*Billions of Kwacha.
The MDG 'gap' is the difference between the 2005 budget allocation and the cost estimate of the achieving the MDG (both as percent of GDP).  This makes the strong 
assumption that all 2005 expenditures in the relevant categories contributed to achieving the MDGs.  The MDG costing categories are hunger, education, gender 
equality, health, water & sanitation, improving lives of slum dwellers, energy, roads and 'other' (Mphuka 2005, 35).  The total estimate is 24 percent of GDP (25 
percent in the source, presumably due to rounding).  The percentage estimates in the source are allocated as follows:  hunger to social safety nets; improving lives of 
slum dwellers to social safety nets; roads equality divided between construction and transport; and education, health, water & sanitation and energy 
to the same budget categories.  The allocation is for presentation and does not 
Affect the calculation. 
Expenditure items 2005
Actual
Percent
domestic budget GDP Percent of GDP
MDG
cost
MDG
gap
Econ sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Tourism
Communication &
Transport
Energy
Construction
Environment
Other
Social sectors
Education
Health
Water & Sanitation
Social safety nets
Disaster relief
Other 
Total domestic budget
Total discretionary
Total expenditure
Capital expenditure
Foreign financed
1023.6 17.0 3.1
346 5.8 1.1
16.4 0.3 0.1
0.10.740.8
437.4 7.3 1.3 3.0 -1.7
22.3 0.4 0.1 2.0 -1.9
82.4 1.4 0.3 3.0 -2.7
42.0 0.7 0.1Commerce
20.2 0.3 0.1
15.7 0.3 0.0
1763.9 29.3 5.4
1062.8 17.6 3.3 3.0 0.3
480.0 8.0 1.5 7.0 -5.5
32.4 0.5 0.1 2.0 -1.9
89.7 1.5 0.3 3.0 -2.7
52.3 0.9 0.2
46.7 0.8 0.1 1.0 -0.9
3235.1 53.7 9.9
Totals:
Other expenditure
6022.6 18.4
24.0 17.1
4697.7 14.4
6621.3 20.3
2224.5 6.8
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Figure 5.1: External debt service as percentage of exports,
Zambia and other sub-saharan countries, 1975-2004 
Sources:  Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Macroeconomic Indicators 
(1997-2005), IMF (2004b, 2004f, 2005a & 2005b), World Bank World 
Development Indicators (web site).
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Table 5.6: Proposal for the financing to achieve the MDGs in 2015*
Notes:
*All estimates are averages for 2006-2015.
**The income poverty target is only met in the 7 percent growth scenario (assuming distribution neutral
growth).
1. Reduction of external debt service: assuming full G8 cancellation and bilateral cancellation.
2. Restructure domestic debt: new government bonds replace domestic debt at a 50 percent discount.
3. Increased corporate tax, with most revenue coming from mining.
4. Reallocation of one-third of total from 'General public Services, Defence and Public Safety'.
5. Fiscal deficit (public borrowing) rises to three percent of GDP.
6. Increase in external grants (residual item to fully cover the MDG gap).
7. Budget item 'Foreign financed' capital expenditures, which is not included in Table 5.4.
All three per capita growth rates assume population increase of 1.5 percent per annum (see www.worldbank.
Org, Zambia page).
3.7%
%GDP Change 
5.0%
%GDP Change 
7.0%
%GDP Change 
Per capita growth=
MDG deficit
1. Reduction ext debt service
2. Restructure domestic debt
3. Increase tax revenue
4. Shift ‘other’ expenditures
5. Increase fiscal deficit
6. Foreign financial cap exp
7. Increase in ODA grants
Sum
Total expenditure 2005
Total expenditure, MDGs met*
-17.1 -16.1 -14.6
0.4 0.0 0.3 0.00.4 0.0
1.2
3.0
3.3
2.4
3.4
3.4
17.1 8.8
27.1
35.9
3.4
0.0
2.4
0.0
3.0
0.0 1.1
2.8
3.1
2.3
3.2
3.2 3.2
0.0
2.3
0.0
2.8
0.0
16.1 8.3
27.1
35.4
1.0 0.0
2.6 2.6
2.8 0.0
2.1 2.1
2.9 0.0
2.9 2.9
14.6 7.5
27.1
34.6
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Figure 5.2 External debt service as percentage of GDP, Zambia
and other sub-saharan countries, 1975-2004 
Sources:  See Figure 5.1.
Sources:  See Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.3 External debt per capita, Zambia and other sub-
saharan countries, observed and adjusted for the terms of
trade 1975-2004 (current US dollars, 3 year moving average)
Figure 5.4: External grants, revenue and taxes as percentage
of GDP,  percentage of GDP, 1990-2004
Sources: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Macroeconomic Indicators
 (1997-2005).
Note: Difference between taxes and revenue in 2000 was almost all proceeds from 
the privatisation of ZESCO.
Figure 5.5: Types of taxes as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2004
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Monetary, financial and exchange rate 
policies in Zambia went through two phases 
after independence. The first phase, until 
the late 1980s, was characterised by exten-
sive intervention in the economy, the fina-
ncial sector included, in order to support 
the government's growth policies. However, 
regulation and state intervention were not 
supported by a solid taxation system, the 
institutional strengthening of  the state or 
the diversification of  the country's eco-
nomic base. During this period, the Zamb-
ian state was interventionist, but not strong. 
It was institutionally weak, and unable to 
impose a consistent set of  economic prio-
rities upon conflicting social interests.
The most important feature of  the 
second phase, since the late 1980s, was the 
implementation of  an orthodox programme 
of  economic reforms guided by the IMF 
and World Bank. The financial sector, the 
exchange rate and the foreign currency 
flows were liberalised, and inflation control 
has become the main objective of  monetary 
policy.  These policies were associated with 
successes, including the reduction of  infla-
tion from 160 percent per annum to twenty 
percent, substantial expansion of  the fina-
ncial system, and stabilisation of  the nom-
inal exchange rate.  For the future, the inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs) and the 
government of  Zambia aim to consolidate 
these reforms. Their main objectives are to 
increase confidence in the economy, reduce 
inflation to single digit levels, and raise 
savings and investment in order to achieve 
annual GDP growth rates of  five percent 
per annum.  For the long term, the policy 
would create the institutions needed to 
support economic development in Zambia, 
including, for example, a bank-based fina-
ncial system, stock markets and venture 
capital funds, and monetary policies based 
on floating exchange rates, inflation target-
ing and central bank independence. 
This chapter shows that the outcome of  
the reforms has been partial and uneven. 
Although institutional development and the 
elimination of  high inflation have strength-
ened important areas of  the Zambian econ-
omy, certain aspects of  the adjustment and 
stabilisation programmes may have reached 
their limits; both in terms of  their capacity 
to deliver their stated goals, and to contrib-
ute to the achievement of  pro-poor objec-
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tives. These limitations help to explain the 
feeble and unstable growth rates of  the 
Zambian economy over the last fifteen 
years, and the concentration of  income and 
wealth that has accompanied the reforms. 
They also help to explain the partial dollar-
isation of  the economy and the financial 
fragility of  the public sector, especially the 
domestic debt overhang. 
The country continues to have severe 
-balance of  payments problems, and it rem
ains heavily dependent on international aid. 
Financial system development has been 
skewed towards the wealthier regions, and 
the supply of  financial services still bypasses 
the agricultural sector and the poor. Finally, 
the internal market remains unable to 
generate the supply responses required to 
address these structural weaknesses. The 
mission concludes that the so-called reform 
process has been insufficient, partly because 
of  poor design. In practice, reform imple-
mentation and the pursuit of  business 
confidence have occasionally become ends 
101  in themselves.  This is undesirable, because 
the economic policy-making process should 
include checks and balances facilitating 
policy evaluation and the fine-tuning of  
underperforming policies.  The government 
of  Zambia has often been left with no 
  alternative but to implement limited or 
failing policies with increasing determina-
tion, despite their disappointing outcomes. 
There is scope to deploy a new, pro-
poor economic strategy, using alternative 
policy tools to pursue socially desirable 
objectives.  The policy changes of  the past 
have failed to induce the rates of  economic 
growth. These changes have also not been 
conducive to the improvement of  Zambia's 
human development; or, even to sustain life 
expectancy in the country, which is the 
minimum requirement for the improvement 
102of  human welfare.    Given economic 
policies and the prevailing distribution of  
income and wealth, Zambia will fail to 
achieve the MDG. This failure raises two 
important questions: were the reforms 
appropriate in the first place, and, if  so, why 
did they fail to achieve the expected out-
comes. This chapter addresses these ques-
tions through assessment of  the govern-
ment of  Zambia's monetary, financial and 
exchange rate policies.
This chapter assumes, first, that the 
state, civil society organisations, trade 
unions and other stakeholders should cont-
ribute to decisions regarding the allocation 
and use of  social resources. This is espe-
cially necessary when there may be coordi-
nation failures or when the private sector 
systematically fails to target resource use 
towards socially desirable goals. This does 
not suggest that negotiations or state inter-
vention through dialogue, regulation, inter-
vention or public-private partnerships must 
lead to superior outcomes. However, it is 
evident that the state is the only social insti-
tution potentially accountable to the popula-
tion through the democratic process. Instit-
utions accountable to other stakeholders 
can also give an important contribution to 
the selection of  economic policy priorities 
in Zambia. 
In order to implement pro-poor policies, 
co-ordinate private sector activity and 
increase the democratic accountability of  
the state, the government of  Zambia needs 
to have additional political space to select its 
own priorities and identify the most suitable 
tools in each case. Zambian state institu-
tions have both the expertise and the sensi-
tivity to local realities and popular demands 
that are needed to drive endogenously gene-
rated pro-poor policies. In this sense, policy 
ownership must come from within. 
Ownership and good governance 
cannot be limited to, or measured, by the 
incorporation of  goals and methods 
selected by the IFIs and the donor agencies. 
Ownership and good governance require 
effective control over projects, budgets and 
modes of  delivery, and the ability to select 
the most desirable policies in the light of  
Zambian national interests. International 
organisations such as UNDP should sup-
port the pro-poor policies and choices of  
the Zambian government, and assist the 
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achievement of  these desirable outcomes, 
without seeking to control either the choice 
of  priorities or the selection of  policy tools 
by the government of  Zambia.
The second assumption is that there is 
gross underutilisation of  resources in 
Zambia. There is also ample scope for the 
collaboration between the government of  
Zambia and the private sector in order to 
mobilise these resources to achieve pro-
poor goals. Given the level of  poverty in 
Zambia, the urgent needs of  the population 
and the enormous potential of  the country, 
it is important to identify forms of  collabo-
ration between private enterprise and the 
state with a view to achieving socially desi-
rable goals. Collaboration is not only feas-
ible; it is also imperative. 
On the one hand, untrammelled private 
sector activity in Zambia has often not been 
conducive to, or even fully compatible with, 
pro-poor out-comes. On the other hand, a 
pro-poor dev-elopment strategy cannot be 
implemented by the state in isolation from 
the private sector. A strategic partnership 
between state institutions and private enter-
prise is essential for effective resource mobi-
lisation and the achievement of  pro-poor 
objectives. In other words, a strong private 
sector is poss-ible only when the state is 
strong, and the strength of  both depends, to 
a large extent, on the adequacy of  the 
macroeconomic policies.
For monetary, financial and exchange 
rate policy, this chapter claims that govern-
ment of  Zambia objectives have been cons-
trained at two closely related, but analytically 
distinct, levels. First, they are limited by the 
country's poverty and institutional underde-
velopment and, second, by the variance bet-
ween policies and their stated goals. This 
chapter reviews both sources of  weakness, 
and outlines an alternative monetary, fina-
ncial and exchange rate policy framework 
supporting a pro-poor development strategy 
for Zambia. These suggestions are offered 
in the form of  a menu of  policy choices for 
consideration by the authorities. These 
policies can contribute in two ways to the 
achievement of  pro-poor goals. First, they 
will expand the government of  Zambia's 
fiscal space, which is essential in order to 
channel resources to pro-poor development 
projects. Second, they will create incentives 
for the targeting of  private sector resources 
in support of  the country's pro-poor 
development strategy. 
The third assumption underpinning this 
chapter is that fiscal, financial, monetary and 
exchange rate policies should be nested in a 
consistent and pro-poor enabling macroeco-
nomic environment. This environment 
needs to include the country's industrial 
policy strategy, focusing on the develop-
ment of  complementary sectors, the achie-
vement of  balance of  payments stability and 
the development of  non-traditional compet-
itive advantages supporting the reduction of  
poverty. These objectives cannot be easily 
achieved in Zambia at the moment, because 
the social demands upon the state are too 
large, the international environment is freq-
uently too hostile, the available resources are 
too meagre, and the institutional framework 
is not always conducive to the achievement 
of  socially desirable goals. The policy sugg-
estions offered in this chapter aim to conso-
lidate internal and external balance (low infl-
ation, domestic debt sustainability, exchange 
rate stability, balance of  payments equilib-
rium and the reversal dollarisation), protect 
Zambia from adverse external shocks, 
transfer policy levers to the domestic auth-
orities, increase the degree of  intersectoral 
policy co-ordination, and link macroeco-
nomic stability with the achievement of  
pro-poor goals, in order to deliver economic 
prosperity and higher living standards for 
the majority of  the population.
The liberalisation of  the Zambian financial 
sector had two main objectives; first, to 
increase the scope for market mechanisms 
to determine the allocation of  resources 
6.2 Changes in the Policy 
Regime ('Reforms')
The Zambian Financial System
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and, second, to facilitate the adoption of  
market-based monetary policy instruments, 
reducing the scope for the monetisation of  
fiscal deficits and curtailing their inflationary 
103 impact.   The first stage of  the reforms 
was the liberalisation of  interest rates and 
the introduction of  government securities 
auctions, in 1993.  These securities included 
T-bills of  28, 91, 182 and 273 days and 
government of  Zambia bonds of  12, 18 
and 24 months. The Bank of  Zambia uses 
securities auctions both for liquidity man-
agement purposes and to influence market 
interest rates, since the T-bill rate is com-
monly used by the commercial banks as the 
benchmark for the price of  loans. The Bank 
of  Zambia started open market operations 
in 1995, and repurchase (repo) operations in 
1042002.    In 1998, the Bank of  Zambia listed 
government bonds on the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange for secondary trading, in order to 
promote the development of  the secondary 
market and increase the responsiveness of  
the money market to monetary policy. This 
initiative was largely unsuccessful, and 
secondary market activity remains extre-
105mely low.
 In mid-2003, the Zambian banking
106system included the Bank of  Zambia and 
fourteen commercial banks with a branch 
network of  140, and holding ninety-one 
percent of  the financial system's assets. 
Only one bank was state-owned (the 
Zambia National Commercial Bank, ZNCB, 
which was being privatised). Six were private 
foreign banks, two were foreign state-owned 
banks, and the others were locally owned. 
The subsidiaries of  transnational banks 
accounted for three-quarters of  the 
capitalisation of  the banking system, and 
controlled sixty-five percent of  assets, 
eighty-five percent of  loans, sixty-four 
percent of  deposits and seventy-three 
percent of  the industry's earnings (see 
Tables 6.1-6.3). The Zambian financial 
sector also included the state-owned 
National Savings and Credit Bank 
(NSCB) and the Development Bank of  
Zambia (DBZ), three building societies, 
several Microfinance institutions, bureaux 
de change, leasing and insurance compa-
nies, pension funds and the Lusaka 
107Stock Exchange.
The financial sector reforms led to the 
opening of  several banks, many with poorly 
qualified staff  and insufficient capital. The 
number of  banks increased from six, before 
the reforms, to twenty-five in December 
1081994, with 188 branches.    In the same 
period, the Bank of  Zambia reduced the 
statutory reserve ratio from thirty percent to 
three percent. The ensuing liquidity surge, 
and insider lending, imprudent foreign 
exchange operations and high levels of  non-
performing loans created difficulties in 
several institutions. There were thirteen 
bank failures in the late nineties, costing the 
government in excess of  K90 billion. 
Several failures remain unresolved. In 
response, the Bank of  Zambia tightened up 
the regulations on capital requirements and 
foreign exchange trading, and increased the 
statutory reserve ratio to eleven percent in 
2000, and to 17.5 percent in 2002. This ratio 
was cut to fourteen percent in October 
2003, in order to foster the reduction of  the 
lending rates. This move was consistent with 
the Bank of  Zambia policy of  increasing its 
reliance on indirect (market-based) mone-
tary policy instruments, rather than direct 
109regulation of  the financial sector.
The real interest rates on government 
securities have normally been positive, and 
the commercial lending rates are consis-
tently high. However, the real deposit rates 
tend to be negative (see Figures 6.1 through 
6.3). They may have discouraged savings in 
the banking system and created incentives 
for other forms of  saving, especially foreign 
currency deposits. Partly for this reason the 
financial system is highly dollarised, with 
approximately half  of  bank deposits and 
one third of  loans in foreign currency (see 
110Figures 6.4 and 6.5).
The government of  Zambia Financial 
Sector Development Plan (FSDP) admits 
that the Zambian financial sector has 
developed unevenly, and that it plays only a 
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limited role in the economy. Symptoms of  
these limitations are the lack of  financial 
intermediation, low market liquidity, high 
interest rates, high bank costs, absence of  
long-term lending, underdevelopment of  
the secondary markets and low public conf-
idence. There is also limited access to fina-
ncial services in the rural areas, and for the 
low and middle income earners. The ratio 
of  M2 to GDP in Zambia has been around 
fifteen to twenty percent, which is in the 
middle range for the sub-Saharan African 
region (in the early eighties, M2 reached 
thirty-five percent of  GDP).
However, private sector credit was only 
six percent of  GDP in 2001, one of  the 
lowest ratios in the region. In contrast, 
public sector credit, at fourteen percent of  
GDP, was relatively high by sub-Saharan 
African standards. Moreover, Zambian 
banks hold more fore-ign assets than banks 
elsewhere in Africa. Bank earnings depend 
heavily on fees, the margin between the 
loans and savings rates, loans to blue chip 
companies and foreign exchange and 
111government securities trading.
The FSDP attributes these imbalances 
to high inflation, crowding out of  the priv-
ate sector by the government, the lasting 
impact of  the failure of  several institutions 
and the regulatory shortcomings of  the 
Bank of  Zambia, the Securities and Exch-
ange Commission, the Pensions and Insur-
ance Authority, the Zambia Competition 
Commission and the Patents and Comp-
anies Registration Office. Zambian financial 
institutions are exposed to high risks due to 
the economy's dependence on copper, the 
accumulation of  public sector arrears and 
the potential volatility of  the interest rates 
112and exchange rates (see section 6.3).
In order to address these limitations, the 
FSDP proposes, first, the development of  a 
financial safety net including the Bank of  
Zambia as lender of  last resort, the intro-
duction of  a deposit insurance scheme and 
the reform of  the regulatory and supervi-
sory system, including revisions of  the Bank 
of  Zambia Act, the Banking and Financial 
Services Act, the Building Societies Act, the 
Companies Act, the Securities Act, the 
Pension Scheme Regulations Act, the 
Insurance Act and related legislation. It also 
proposes the creation of  a credit reference 
bureau and improvement of  bank capacity 
113to assess credit and loan performance.
Second, improvements are necessary in 
cash management by the government and 
the private sector, and better co-ordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy.  Proble-
matical cash management by the Ministry of  
Finance and National Planning (MoFNP), 
the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and 
the Bank of  Zambia cause large swings in 
the money market and volatility in the 
interbank interest rate. It also forces the 
commercial banks to hold large balances in 
114their settlement accounts. Moreover, the 
lack of  a developed secondary market leads 
to liquidity surges at the maturity of  the 
115government securities, and weaknesses in 
the payments system cause delays in the 
remittance of  tax revenues to the Bank of  
Zambia, creating a fiscally costly float in the 
financial system. 
Third, it is necessary to develop the 
capital market, which will require the 
116involvement of  the state at several levels.    
Government bonds with longer maturities 
should be introduced, because there was no 
pricing benchmark for long-term financial 
instruments. Regulation will be needed to 
permit trading in financial instruments such 
as bills of  exchange and acceptances, and 
large corporations should be offered ince-
ntives to fund long-term projects through 
bond sales. Incentives will also be needed 
for the development of  the stock markets 
and venture capital funds. The capitalisation 
of  the Lusaka Stock Exchange was limited 
to US$ 220m in March 2002 (eight percent 
of  GDP). This is among the lowest in 
Africa, in spite of  government support and 
donor technical assistance. Between its 
creation, in 1994, and December 2003, the 
number of  companies listed on the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange grew only from seven to 
eleven, and four companies had their shares 
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quoted. Only a small number of  companies 
made more than ten percent of  shares avail-
117able for trading. As to the venture capital 
funds, it is hoped that they will provide 
long-term capital to small and medium sized 
118businesses in Zambia.  
Fourth, the FSDP recommends the 
revision of  the Bank of  Zambia Act in 
order to grant independence to the Bank of  
119Zambia. Finally, the fiscal deficit should be 
reduced to 1.6 percent of  GDP by 2006, in 
order to reduce the inflationary pressures in 
the economy (if  they are financed through 
borrowing from the Bank of  Zambia) or 
crowding out (if  they are financed through 
domestic borrowing). As part of  the effort 
to curtail the fiscal deficit, the remaining 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should be 
privatised, the government arrears (esti-
mated at K600 billion) should be eliminated, 
the government's credit facility at the Bank 
of  Zambia (fifteen percent of  the previous 
year's revenue collection) should be cur-
tailed, and the maturity of  the Bank of  
Zambia bridge loans to the government 
should be reduced to less than one month. 
The economic reforms included the com-
plete liberalisation of  imports and the cap-
ital account of  the balance of  payments and 
the abolition of  exchange controls in order 
to improve resource allocation and attract 
foreign savings. Zambia adopted a managed 
floating exchange rate system in 1994, and 
the public is allowed to hold foreign cur-
rency accounts with the commercial banks. 
It was expected that these acco-unts would 
provide incentives for the internalisation of  
120the foreign exchange holdings.  
The Interbank Foreign Exchange 
Market (IFEM) system was introduced in 
 July 2003.Under this system, the exporters 
  deal directly with the banks (primary
dealers), and the banks are obliged to quote 
two-way prices. This should allow informa-
tion to flow more symmetrically, encourage 
competition and reduce market distortions. 
Balance of Payments and Exchange
Rate Management
The exchange rate was relatively stable after 
the introduction of  the IFEM, and the bid-
offer spread narrowed from four percent to 
approximately three-quarters percent (look 
back to Figure 2.11 for exchange rate move-
ments). The Bank of  Zambia intervenes in 
the spot market only to smooth out fluctua-
tions of  the kwacha and to accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves, but it does not 
aim to influence the underlying market 
trends (which would be impossible, because 
the Bank of  Zambia reserves are sufficient 
121only for 1.5 months of  imports).
In spite of  these achievements, there are 
three serious problems in the foreign exch-
ange market. First, foreign currency supply 
is heavily concentrated in a small number of  
122 exporters and foreign donors.  Second, the 
absence of  a developed forward and swap 
market impedes the expansion of  hedging 
123by the private sector,   and, third, it is 
necessary to contain the process of  dollar-
isation which took root during the late 
nineties. Under high inflation, domestic 
transactions were increasingly denominated 
in dollars, for example, in the real estate and 
cellular telephone sectors.
Dollarisation is undesirable because it 
compromises the effectiveness of  monetary 
policy and creates liability mismatches that 
can be conducive to large capital losses to 
the private sector or to state institutions, or 
both. Although it is now illegal for Zambian 
citizens to make payments using foreign 
currency, the FSDP does not offer a clear 
124programme of  de-dollarisation.  
As the country's balance of  payments prob-
lems worsened during the seventies and 
eighties, the Zambian government increased 
 its domestic and external borrowing inorder 
to sustain the level of  economic activity and 
 finance the rising SOE deficits.Unfortun-
ately, the copper prices and domestic 
demand failed to react. The combined pres-
sures of  the balance of  payments problems, 
fiscal deficits, adverse climatic conditions 
and the costs of  being a frontline state 
Inflation Policy
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fuelled a severe inflationary process in 
Zambia in the late eighties. Other problems 
followed. In order to finance the elections, 
the government monetised a large deficit in 
1990-91. The simultaneous liberalisation of  
several markets created an inflation bubble, 
which was fed by the drought and the 
financial crisis. Monetary control helped to 
reduce inflation, which dropped to around 
125 twenty percent (see Figures 6.6 and 6.7).
With the reforms, price stability, rather 
than output growth, became the main mon-
etary policy objective. This shift was forma-
lised by the Bank of  Zambia Act (Bank of  
Zambia 1996), which states that the Bank 
of  Zambia 'shall formulate and implement 
monetary and supervisory policies that will 
ensure the maintenance of  price and fina-
ncial systems stability so to promote bala-
nced macro-economic development'.  The 
government and the Bank of  Zambia set an 
annual inflation target, and the Bank of  
Zambia manages monetary policy with a 
view to achieving that target with IFI sup-
port. Essentially, the Bank of  Zambia 
imposes quarterly targets for monetary base 
(reserve money) growth, which are enforced 
through fiscal austerity (a cash budget sys-
tem has been in place since 1993) and direct 
and indirect monetary policy instruments, 
including auctions of  T-bills and govern-
ment of  Zambia bonds, repos, changes in 
statutory reserve and core liquid asset ratios 
as well as foreign exchange operations (see 
126Annex 6A.1).  
In spite of  the Bank of  Zambia efforts, 
the inflation targets have been missed every 
year for several reasons, including inflation 
inertia, unfavourable expectations, poor 
fiscal performance, dollarisation, currency 
depreciation and adverse terms of  trade and 
127supply shocks.  In spite of  this, increasing 
efforts have been made to reduce inflation 
to single digit levels in the near future and to 
consolidate the monetary policy framework 
through Bank of  Zambia independence and 
its increasing reliance on indirect instru-
ments of  monetary policy. This should eve-
ntually permit the adoption of  a fullyfl-
edged inflation targeting regime (ITR), 
where the manipulation of  interest rates is 
sufficient to control the rate of  inflation.
 
Before the economic reforms, long-term 
development projects and the expansion of  
productive capacity, agriculture and non-
traditional exports were financed, with 
significant insufficiencies, by the state-
owned banks, foreign debt, and inflation. 
This financing model had important 
fragilities, and it was disassembled in the 
nineties by a combination of  privatisations, 
the closure of  several state-owned institu-
tions and institutional changes.
Unfortunately, the Zambian financial 
system remains small, inefficient, high cost, 
shallow, short-sighted and speculative. It is 
also highly concentrated and dominated by 
foreign banks. The financial institutions 
tend to offer short-term loans backed up by 
readily available collateral for trading and 
working capital, and personal credit for 
formal sector workers, who do not exceed 
128ten percent of  the active population.   The 
banks also finance the public deficit and 
participate actively in the foreign exchange 
market, but they do not tend to fund the 
expansion of  priority economic areas. The 
'commercialisation' (i.e., privatisation) of  
ZNCB is unlikely to address these short-
comings, as it will inevitably be denatio-
nalised, and the long-term survival of  its 
branch network cannot be guaranteed.
In spite of  these limitations, the finan-
cial sector reforms achieved three important 
goals. First, they transferred part of  the 
state capacity to co-ordinate economic act-
ivity and allocate resources inter-sectorally 
and inter-temporally (the balance between 
investment and consumption and the com-
position of  investment) to the private 
sector. Second, they embedded private 
sector interests in the policy-making pro-
cess, through the decisive role of  the 
commercial banks in the pricing of  govern-
ment securities, the determination of  inte-
rest rates and the financing of  the public 
Pro-Poor Policy Alternatives
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sector expenditures. Third, they enhanced 
the role of  the private financial institutions 
in the foreign exchange market and, there-
fore, in the country's relations with the rest 
of  the world. 
Financial sector control of  the key 
sources of  capital has increased this sector's 
influence over state policies above and 
beyond its limited resources and the ambig-
uous outcome of  its activities from the 
point of  view of  the poor. In spite of  its 
disproportionate leverage over economic 
policies and outcomes, the financial sector 
remains structurally dependent upon the 
state. This is not only because of  the 
institutional and regulatory framework in 
which it operates, rather because its main 
sources of  revenue depend heavily upon the 
state: the provision of  finance for the public 
sector and the remaining SOEs, government 
securities trading, personal loans to civil 
servants, currency trading backed up by the 
Bank of  Zambia, and so on. In short, the 
financial system drains public funds and 
social resources, and systematically fails to 
channel them to priority and welfare-
enhancing economic sectors. 
These structural and policy shortcom-
ings make it difficult for the government of  
Zambia to implement a pro-poor economic 
development strategy. The shift to indirect 
monetary policy instruments will increase 
further the degree of  financial system con-
trol of  social resources, and there is no 
guarantee that higher liquidity (e.g., through 
the cumulative reduction of  compulsory 
reserves) will lead to an increase in the 
129supply of  loans to priority sectors.   
In this sense, the Zambian financial 
 system is onlypartially fulfilling its essential 
function of  making resources available for 
production and funding socially desirable 
investment projects. 
A pro-poor development strategy will 
require incentives for investment in priority 
sectors, especially agriculture, non-
traditional exports, housing and infrastruc-
ture. The theory underpinning the reforms 
implies that bank lending is a rational 
decision based on collateral and expert 
assessment of  specific projects. This is 
insufficient, because it ignores the environ-
ment in which investment takes place. 
Investment, especially in large or infra-
structural projects, can have a significant 
impact on the composition of  growth and 
the direction of  the development process. 
By the same token, economic growth can 
support investment projects that may not be 
viable otherwise. This does not imply that 
all projects can be equally profitable, but 
that investment co-ordination can improve 
loan performance and contribute to the 
achievement of  socially desirable goals.
It follows that the MoFNP should select 
the sectors that might benefit from addi-
130tional loans. Credit flows to these sectors 
can be fostered through tax rebates, the 
reduction of  compulsory reserve require-
ments (possibly in excess of  the value of  
the loans, up to a certain limit), adjustments 
in the calculation of  risk-weighted capital in 
order to favour long-term investment in 
socially desirable sectors, and loan protec-
tion to deflect part of  the cost of  loan def-
aults in priority sectors away from the 
banks. The government could also fund, 
through bond sales, a specialist agency to 
trade priority loan packages, in order to help 
131dilute the banks' credit risks. In addition to 
targeting priority areas, incentives should 
also be available for microcredit, especially 
in rural areas, due to its potential contribu-
tion to nutrition and other basic needs. In 
this case, commercial banks could be 
offered tax and other incentives to make 
microcredit loans available, or be given the 
alternative of  using part of  their compul-
sory reserves in Microcredit operations.
One important limitation to the achieve-
ment of  these socially desirable goals is the 
concentration and internationalisation of  
132the Zambian banking system.   Large and 
competitive state-owned banks can help to 
address these limitations. These banks can 
introduce competitive pricing practices into 
the financial market, and limit the bias of  
the transnational banks towards high value 
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transactions that bring little benefit to the 
poor. They can also satisfy the needs of  
markets that tend to be ignored by the 
private institutions, for example housing and 
small-scale farming. State institutions 
dedicated to these markets can be either 
founded or capitalised (where they already 
exist), for example through bond sales, 
possibly on the international market. 
Additional resources to support the achieve-
ment of  pro-poor goals could be generated 
through a small tax (between 0.1 and 0.5 
percent) on all financial transactions, 
including payments by cheque, transfers of  
funds and purchases of  financial assets. 
These funds could be dedicated to specific 
projects, for example the capitalisation of  
microcredit institutions, the treatment of  
HIV/AIDS or infrastructure provision.
The cost of  these regulatory changes for 
the banks can be reduced by the institution-
alisation of  the Bank of  Zambia's lender of  
last resort function, the institution of  a 
deposit safety net and the development of  
the secondary market, which will allow the 
banks to exit undesirable positions more 
easily. One step towards the consolidation 
of  the secondary market is for the Bank of  
Zambia to include government of  Zambia 
bonds in the core liquid assets of  the banks, 
and to start rediscounting these bonds. In 
contrast, the LuSE has not been able to 
deliver its promised benefits, and the 
support it has received from the govern-
ment of  Zambia may need to be reas-
133sessed.  It would also probably be wasteful 
for the state to invest in the creation of  
venture capital funds, since there is little 
realistic prospect that they will bear fruit. It 
may be more rewarding for Zambia to 
invest the state resources consumed by 
LuSE in agriculture research units to 
develop seeds, fertilisers and pesticides 
suitable for the climate and soil of  different 
regions of  Zambia. 
In addition to addressing the insufficien-
cies of  the Zambian financial system, a pro-
poor economic strategy needs to be sup-
ported by suitable monetary and fiscal 
policies.  Zambian monetary policy was 
heavily constrained by the domestic public 
debt (DPD) overhang, including more than 
K4 trillion in outstanding securities and K2 
trillion in other liabilities, including arrears, 
unpaid pensions contributions and contin-
gent liabilities (see Table 6.4). The DPD has 
been rising rapidly and, although its level 
remains sustainable, its rapid growth 
indicates that this may not always be the 
case. DPD interest payments alone consume 
ten percent of  the budget and three percent 
of  GDP. These figures are highly sensitive 
to the level of  the interest rates, because the 
average maturity of  the DPD is very short. 
At this stage, the DPD is a potential threat 
to macroeconomic stability. The debt is also 
distributionally regressive, because the 
-interest payments tend to benefit the fina
ncial sector and the financial asset-holders, 
which do not include the poor. There is 
currently no strategy in place to manage the 
growth of  the DPD or to address the 
accumulation of  arrears, other than to seek 
134fiscal restraint.   These problems need to 
be addressed urgently, in order to secure 
macroeconomic stability in the medium and 
long-run, and expand the fiscal space 
required for the success of  the govern-
ment's pro-poor programmes.
To begin, the domestic arrears include a 
wide range of  liabilities of  various state 
135institutions.   Some were contracted legally 
but remain unpaid because of  technical 
difficulties; others may have been contracted 
without the consent or even the knowledge 
of  the authorities in charge of  the budget. 
Certain expenditures were justified by the 
needs of  the ongoing programmes, whereas 
others need to be explained more fully 
before payment. From the point of  view of  
the private sector creditors, the arrears are 
partly a promise to pay for services deliv-
ered, and partly a speculative claim on 
public resources.
Attempts to address the accumulation 
of  arrears should include legislation abolish-
ing the cash budget system, which has been 
partly responsible for the diffusion of  
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unsound and occasionally dysfunctional 
136 fiscal practices.   In addition to this, it is 
necessary to enforce a stricter commitment 
to the budget approved by parliament. On 
this basis, legislation can be introduced to 
penalise more severely the misuse of  public 
funds, including unauthorised expenditures. 
The existing arrears should be considered 
on a case by case basis. This can be done by 
a specialist agency at the national level, or by 
specialist divisions within the key expendi-
ture units. In each case, the provenance of  
the debts needs to be assessed.  Discounts 
may be negotiated and payment could be 
made in cash, T-bills or long-term bonds, or 
-the claims could be taken to court for adjud
ication. A special judicial channel could be 
created to assess these cases rapidly, fairly 
and consistently.
The pensions system also needs a large 
injection of  resources, which may be funded 
by a combination of  long-term bond sales 
and tax or social security contributions 
payable primarily by the prospective benefi-
ciaries: formal sector workers and the state 
sector employees. Higher VAT on superflu-
ous goods and services could supplement 
these sources of  funds, for example, on 
luxury autos, air travel, electronic products 
and gourmet foods.
Improvements are also needed in the 
government's cash management, in order to 
reduce resource waste and the disequilibria 
in the interbank market.  Currently, the 
banks can wait four days before transferring 
tax payments to the ZRA. At the same time, 
different government agencies maintain a 
large number of  separate accounts in the 
commercial banks. These difficulties can be 
resolved relatively easily. All funds belonging 
to central government institutions should be 
transferred to the Bank of  Zambia, to be 
held at a single Treasury account. Payments 
drawing on this account need proper 
authorisation, which can help to limit the 
misuse of  public funds.
Finally, the commercial banks should 
transfer ZRA funds to the Treasury account 
daily (if  necessary, on the basis of  estimated 
values), or as rapidly as the Bank of  Zambia 
considers operationally feasible.
The expansion of  the fiscal space in 
order to finance pro-poor and other priority 
economic programmes will also require the 
removal of  other constraints on the public 
sector expenditures, among them the fiscal 
deficit. Deficits in Zambia have been 
modest by international standards. However, 
their inflationary impact depends not only 
on the size of  the deficit, but also on its 
origin. For example, deficits due to current 
expenditures tend to be more inflationary 
than those due to capital programmes, 
because the latter expand productive capa-
city while the former only expand demand. 
Unfortunately, in Zambia public investment 
programmes have been cut drastically, and 
the fiscal budget is heavily tied up with cur-
rent expenditures (most capital expenditures 
are aid-financed). Half  of  the tax revenues 
are used to pay the public sector employees; 
while state administration, DPD service and 
the constitutional reform consume another 
thirty percent of  the budget. Only twenty 
percent is available for pro-poor progra-
mmes and investment.
It would be misguided to address these 
difficulties primarily through additional 
public expenditure cuts (see Annex 6.2). In 
Zambia, the fiscal budget can play an 
important role in the generation of  demand, 
the expansion of  capacity and the financing 
of  pro-poor programmes. The fiscal deficit 
is also essential for the profitability of  the 
financial system and the development of  the 
capital markets. The expansion of  the fiscal 
space needed to carry out pro-poor activi-
ties requires policies at two levels. On the 
one hand, it is necessary to expand public 
expenditures in priority areas, even if  the 
fiscal deficit increases in the short-term. 
There is no reason to believe that this will 
crowd out private sector expenditures, 
because the Zambian economy is operating 
far from its production possibilities frontier 
due to the existence of  several significant 
supply constraints. Moreover, there is 
abundant liquidity available in the financial 
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system, as is demonstrated by the large 
balances held in foreign currency accounts 
and the banks' insatiable demand for 
government securities (especially as the 
secondary market develops). What Zambia 
currently lacks is profitable investment 
opportunities. Public expenditures can help 
to create such opportunities, both directly 
and through the removal of  the supply 
constraints, opening new frontiers for 
private accumulation and economic growth.
On the other hand, the government 
needs a strategy to stabilise the DPD and to 
manage its consolidated debt (after the 
incorporation of  the arrears and pensions 
liabilities), in order to secure monetary and 
137 financial system stability. This strategy may 
include four types of  policy measures. First, 
the government should support the devel-
opment of  the securities markets and make 
more intensive use of  repos for monetary 
138 policy. Second, the reduction of  the 
interest rates on the government securities, 
in order to cut the cost of  the DPD service. 
This will be facilitated by the introduction 
of  controls on capital flows and on foreign 
currency accounts (see below). In the 
absence of  competition from quality private 
sector financial assets, there is no reason 
why the state should pay high rates for its 
securities. Third, the introduction of  long-
term (ten to twenty year) bonds to finance 
pensions, infrastructure and social 
programmes. Fourth, the automatic transfer 
to the Treasury account of  all Bank of  
Zambia revenues in government securities. 
If  these measures are insufficient to 
stem the growth of  the domestic public 
debt, the government may be forced to 
choose between expanding its capacity to 
service the debt (through higher taxation or 
cuts in social spending and public invest-
ment) or reviewing the size and liquidity of  
the debt to make it compatible with the 
government's capacity to pay, given its pro-
poor policy commitments (see Annex 6A.3). 
This adjustment could be achieved in 
different ways. It could include, for example, 
negotiations to convert short-term T-bills 
and bonds into index-linked instruments 
bearing lower interest rates and longer 
maturity. This can be made simpler if  these 
securities are included into the compulsory 
bank reserves or the banks' risk-adjusted 
capital requirements. In extreme circum-
stances, the government may suspend 
temporarily the domestic public debt service 
(as well as payments on other financial 
contracts involving the Bank of  Zambia and 
the government of  Zambia) until a sensible 
solution can be found for the DPD over-
hang and its service costs. In this case, it 
may be necessary to restrict trading in 
public sector securities in the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange to protect traders against further 
capital losses, and as the prelude for restruc-
turing the domestic public debt and reduc-
ing its cost (see Annex 6A.4). Alternatively, 
the government might impose a substantial 
one-off  tax on financial assets to finance its 
social programmes, which would help to 
stabilise the domestic public debt and to 
direct resources to pro-poor priorities 
simultaneously. None of  these measures 
cancels property rights, but they make the 
exercise of  these rights compatible with 
domestic production capacity and macro-
economic stability, including the 
long-term viability of  the Zambian 
139financial markets.
It is also necessary to address the long-
term sustainability of  the balance of  
payments and the management of  the 
exchange rate. Let us consider each of  them 
in turn. A sustainable balance of  payments 
is essential for any development strategy, 
but this is especially important for pro-poor 
strategies because they require high and 
sustained growth rates and the expansion of  
the scope for autonomous policy decisions. 
Zambia's balance of  payments con-
straint is binding at three levels: trade, 
capital flows and the foreign debt overhang. 
Trade policies are reviewed elsewhere in this 
report. Here, it suffices to say that a more 
diversified trading pattern is essential to 
permit the capture of  gains from trade and 
to distribute them more equally across 
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society. The backward and forward linkages 
of  copper mining in Zambia are feeble, and 
it is important to internalise the chains of  
economic activity around copper, and 
distribute more widely the productivity 
gains obtained in this industry. This will 
require investment in related activities, 
including not only mineral processing and 
enriching, but also fuel, spare parts, mainte-
nance, housing, transport, communications 
and consumables. 
These investments will support produc-
tivity growth in copper mining, and help to 
transfer some of  these gains to the rest of  
the economy. In the long-run, they will also 
increase the economy's resilience against 
fluctuations in the copper prices. These 
investments can be funded in different ways, 
including portfolio diversification by the 
exporters, transfers through the financial 
system, and state investment funded by 
foreign aid or in the manner described 
below. Given the limited fiscal space 
available to the state, capital investment in 
export-related sectors and economic 
diversification may require an extraordinary 
levy on copper mining. This levy could be 
imposed in different ways. 
One alternative is to impose a substan-
tial one-off  tax on extraordinary profits. 
This has the advantage of  being non-
distortionary, but it may be inappropriate 
not only for legal reasons (depending on the 
interpretation of  the contracts with the 
concessionary companies), but also because 
the buoyancy of  the international copper 
market may last, in which case the concept 
of  'extraordinary profits' becomes inapplica-
ble. In this case, it may be more desirable to 
create a Copper Stabilisation and Develop-
ment Trust, financed by a permanent export 
levy and a small contribution from the 
government of  Zambia. In order to distin-
guish this levy from a regular tax, the Trust 
could be managed by an independent board 
appointed by parliament. Its remit would 
include the long-term stabilisation of  the 
industry, the promotion of  regional pro-
poor development, and economic diversifi-
cation. This can be interpreted broadly, to 
include not only the Copperbelt but also the 
construction of  supporting infrastructure in 
other parts of  Zambia. For example, the 
Trust could take responsibility for the devel-
opment of  transport links in the mining 
areas, cheapening the copper exports and 
increasing the profitability of  the sector. It 
could also develop transport links else-
where, if  this would support indirectly the 
expansion of  copper mining.
Moving to the capital account of  the 
balance of  payments, its liberalisation has 
changed the form of  the balance of  pay-
ments constraint in Zambia. Previously, it 
appeared through the absolute scarcity of  
foreign exchange; in contrast, it now 
appears through the potential volatility of  
the exchange rate and, increasingly, the need 
to maintain attractive interest rates to entice 
foreign capital and retain domestic capital in 
Zambia. It is necessary to stabilise the 
capital account in order to reduce the cou-
ntry's vulnerability to changes in the circum-
stances in the financial markets in the deve-
loped countries, as well as in South Africa. 
Zambia's vulnerability is significant because 
of  the denationalisation of  the banking 
system and the extent of  dollarisation. 
Three measures can help to address 
these weaknesses. First, capital flows need 
to be controlled. In order to preserve the 
incentives for foreign investment in Zambia, 
the Chilean model of  capital controls is 
probably the most appropriate. This model 
does not involve restrictions on outflows. 
However, all foreign capital inflows should 
be deposited in the Bank of  Zambia at zero 
interest for a fixed period of  time (for 
140example, two or three months). This 
should ensure that committed investors still 
find it profitable to invest in Zambia, while 
uncommitted speculators will find their 
profit margins severely eroded. This type of  
capital control would also help to reinforce, 
on a sustainable basis, the reserves of  the 
Bank of  Zambia. Alternatively, restrictions 
may be imposed on capital outflows, for 
example through a compulsory interest-free 
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deposit before repatriation, or through a 
small tax on capital exports or on foreign 
currency transactions, for example, those 
taking place in Zambia, involving Zambian 
nationals, firms based in Zambia or 
Zambian banks. 
Second, a foreign currency transactions 
register should be created, in order to 
minimise tax evasion and the scope for 
exchange rate volatility and capital flight. 
This register should be accompanied by the 
introduction of  a criminal offence of  filing 
misleading declarations, which should be 
supervised by the Bank of  Zambia. Along 
the same lines, it would also be important to 
introduce a small tax on all foreign currency 
remittances (except debt service), and to 
require MoFNP or parliamentary autho-
risation for all foreign currency borrowing 
and bond sales. The current stability of  the 
kwacha offers an opportunity for the 
introduction of  these stabilising measures, 
since it would be much harder to impose 
them when the exchange rate is unstable. 
Third, it is essential to reduce Zambia's 
foreign debt stock further, as is argued 
elsewhere in this report. This can be 
achieved partly through international 
negotiations and greater aid flows and, 
partly, through a careful audit of  the debt by 
expert consultants hired by the Zambian 
government. Other countries have been able 
to achieve significant reductions in their 
debt in this manner, indicating that this may 
be one of  the most profitable undertakings 
available to the government of  Zambia.
In addition to improving the current 
account and stabilising the capital account 
of  the balance of  payments, it is also 
important to implement an exchange rate 
regime compatible with the government's 
long-term anti-inflation policy and its pro-
poor objectives. In terms of  the former, the 
managed floating system has been very 
successful, as a result of  buoyant copper 
prices and the relative prosperity of  the 
non-traditional exports. However, this 
system has also led to a significant valorisa-
tion of  the kwacha, and it may lead to 
economic instability in the future. In 
addition to this, the potential contribution 
of  this policy regime to pro-poor policies 
and outcomes is intrinsically limited. A 
policy choice is needed, and the priority 
attributed to achieving very low rates of  
inflation may be sub-optimal. Exchange rate 
stability is essential for inflation control in a 
small open economy, especially if  it is highly 
dollarised. This implies that inflation 
targeting may not be adequate for Zambia, 
because this policy regime requires a 
floating exchange rate. However, it does not 
follow that nominal exchange rate targeting 
would be the appropriate alternative, 
because of  Zambia's diversified trading 
pattern and heavy import dependence. It is 
likely that the most appropriate exchange 
rate regime for Zambia would aim to 
stabilise the real effective exchange rate at a 
141slightly undervalued level.   This can be 
achieved either through the shift to an active 
crawling peg, or through a policy of  'talking 
down' the kwacha and, simultaneously, 
relaxing the fiscal and monetary policy 
stance in order to restore the incentives to 
the non-traditional export sector. This is 
especially important because the latter is 
likely to be more sensitive than copper 
mining to the level of  the exchange rate.
The foreign exchange market could also 
benefit from small regulatory changes, in 
order to assist the stabilisation of  the 
kwacha at the desired level. These changes 
include, especially, recognition of  the fact 
that the value of  the kwacha is heavily 
influenced by the aid flows, which are 
anything but driven by economic fundamen-
tals. Hence, although the value of  the 
kwacha is currently determined by market 
processes, it is in no way determined by 
market variables. In order to stabilise the 
exchange rate within the desired range, it 
might be useful to split the foreign exchange 
market into three channels: (a) a commercial 
channel for private current account transac-
tions, (b) a financial channel for capital and 
financial account flows (subject to the 
controls indicated above), and (c) a non-
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commercial channel for official and non-
government organisation currency flows. 
These channels, possibly operating under 
different exchange rates, would reflect the 
specific features of  each type of  currency 
flow. Transactions in the first two channels 
may be undertaken in the commercial 
banking system and the bureaux de change; 
but the third, including non-market flows 
only, that tend to be spasmodic, unpredict-
able and conditional, should be centralised 
in the Bank of  Zambia. This will help to 
stabilise the foreign exchange market, 
reduce the fiscal and monetary policy 
impact of  fluctuations in aid delivery, and 
facilitate the accumulation of  reserves by 
the Zambian government.
Dollarisation is the last potential source 
of  instability to be considered in this 
section. The foreign currency account 
overhang in Zambia is very large (see 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5), and sudden portfolio 
shifts by the account-holders could severely 
destabilise the kwacha. In extreme circum-
stances, these shifts may lead to hyperinfla-
tion. In this sense, the recent attempts by 
the Zambian authorities to limit the circula-
tion of  dollars are commendable, because 
they have helped to increase the potency of  
the monetary policy instruments, support 
exchange rate stability and expand the fiscal 
space of  the public sector. However, the 
overhang of  foreign currency deposits has 
not been addressed yet. 
In order to absorb the foreign currency 
deposits in a controlled manner, it may be 
appropriate to increase the risk imputed to 
bank deposits denominated in foreign 
currency, and raise the compulsory deposit 
ratio on foreign exchange deposits from 
14.5 percent (the same ratio as the kwacha 
deposits) to one hundred percent. These 
administrative measures will create disincen-
tives to the banks holding foreign currency 
deposits, possibly leading to restrictions in 
their availability to the public. It may also be 
useful to tax Zambian citizens holding 
assets denominated in foreign currency. In 
contrast, incentives should be offered to 
facilitate the conversion of  the foreign 
currency deposits into kwacha, for example, 
a limited tax amnesty. If  these measures are 
judged to be impractical, or if  there is a 
prospect of  capital flight or hyperinflation 
because of  the misuse of  the foreign 
currency accounts, the government should 
secure their compulsory conversion into 
long-term (ten to twenty year) domestic 
bonds. These bonds may be index-linked (in 
order to protect holders from domestic 
inflation), or linked to the exchange rate (to 
protect them from any devaluation of  the 
kwacha). These concessions will increase the 
cost of  conversion, but they may help to 
build consensus around these policy mea-
sures. The foreign currency resources made 
available to the state can be placed into a 
trust fund in charge of  the bond payments, 
and tasked to invest these resources in pro-
poor projects selected in consultation with 
the MoFNP. 
Alternatively, instead of  being converted 
into bonds the foreign currency account 
balances could be converted into shares in a 
holding company with a remit similar to the 
trust fund outlined above. In this case, the 
shares would be non-redeemable, rather be 
traded at the LuSE, and the fund would 
make regular dividend payments depending 
on the rate of  return on its investments.
 
The Zambian macroeconomic policy mix 
has been eclectic, aiming to stabilise infla-
tion, the financial system and the exchange 
rate, and to facilitate the accumulation of  
foreign reserves by the Bank of  Zambia. 
Significant successes have been achieved in 
all areas; however, the reduction of  inflation 
to single-digit levels has been elusive. Low 
inflation is perceived to be desirable not 
only because of  the supposed costs of  
inflation, but also because Zambia has 
become an outlier, with the inflation rates in 
most neighbouring countries being lower 
than those in Zambia. Inflation has tended 
to become rigid, despite the Bank of  
6.3 Inflation Policy
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Zambia efforts to reduce it further and the 
recent revaluation of  the real exchange rate. 
This may indicate that the scope for the use 
of  demand control measures is nearly 
exhausted.  They helped to eliminate high 
inflation, but the moderate inflation rates in 
Zambia may be due primarily to supply 
142factors.  These factors include the climate 
and infrastructure bottlenecks affecting 
food supply, changes in imported goods 
prices, indexation, and adverse expectations 
leading to speculative behaviour. None of  
these causes of  inflation responds directly 
  to the money supply controls being impo-
sed by the Bank of  Zambia. It is  increas-
ingly clear that the ambitious inflation 
targets of  the government of  Zambia are 
unachievable except at a very high cost for 
the economy and for social welfare. It may 
be more desirable to implement a medium-
term anti-inflation strategy, aiming to 
stabilise the rate of  inflation while the 
supply constraints are relaxed, in order to 
reduce the economic and social costs of  
inflation control. It is also likely that the 
financial programming model of  the Bank 
of  Zambia, which is being used to control 
the monetary aggregates, may be inade-
quate. The monetarist money supply 
targeting experiences in West Germany, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US did not 
vindicate the claims that money supply 
targeting was either feasible or conducive to 
rapid inflation stabilisation (Arestis and 
Sawyer 1998). In addition to these practical 
difficulties, the theory underpinning money 
supply targeting was fatally damaged by the 
criticisms inflicted by the new classical, 
Keynesian and radical political economists 
in the eighties (Levacic and Rebmann 1982 
and Sawyer 1989). 
Furthermore, it is unclear why the Bank 
of  Zambia should spend so much effort, at 
such a high cost to the economy, seeking to 
reduce inflation to single digit levels. The 
literature shows that moderate inflation, in 
the ten to forty percent range, generates few 
if  any economic costs, while attempts to 
impose very low inflation can be costly 
(Chowdhury 2004 and Rao 2002).  
Moderate inflation is not associated with 
slower growth, lower investment, higher 
unemployment, less foreign direct invest-
ment or the deterioration of  any important 
143real variable.    It is even possible that 
moderate inflation may help to sustain 
economic growth, especially when there is 
excess capacity and significant unemploy-
ment or underemployment. The literature 
does seem to indicate that, first, the rela-
tionship between inflation and growth is 
non-linear. Second, the optimal rate of  
inflation can change in space and over time, 
and it may even be positively correlated with 
144 the rate of  economic growth. Third, even 
though high inflation can harm the poor, 
excessively low inflation and conventional 
stabilisation policies can have the same 
result. Therefore, there seems to be no 
ground to claim that inflation should always 
be maintained in the single digit range 
(McKinley 2003). 
The government of  Zambia's anti-
inflation strategy should be reconsidered for 
other reasons too. Zambia's inflation 
targeting 'lite' does not constitute a full-
fledged inflation targeting regime (ITR), 
because ITR involves much more than 
having a desired inflation rate and assigning 
one policy tool (in Zambia, the broad 
money supply) to achieve this goal. ITR also 
requires a range of  supporting institutions 
and an elaborate institutional framework 
contributing to the achievement of  the 
145 central bank's main policy objective.   
Zambia is far from having the institutional 
capacity to adopt ITR, even though the 
country has been moving towards it for 
146several years.    At the moment, the Bank 
of  Zambia lacks a model of  inflation and a 
fuller understanding of  the monetary policy 
transmission process in the country. Its 
inflation and money supply targets are 
determined through a simple set of  identi-
ties, explained in Annex 6A.1, and the 
outcomes of  this strategy have been limited 
(Munacinga 2004, 27, 32-35).  In other 
words, the Bank of  Zambia has been largely 
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following rules of  thumb while it attempts 
to build its reputation (Stone 2003, 14).  
However, the outcomes of  this strategy are 
bound to be limited, because sustained gains 
in confidence must be based on policy 
achievements, rather than merely upon 
intentions. At the moment it is hoped that 
these achievements will derive largely from 
the confidence expected to flow from the 
good intentions of  the monetary authority. 
This is unlikely to offer the basis for 
sustainable economic policy.
There are other reasons why ITR may 
147be inappropriate for Zambia.  First, the 
economy is small and volatile and the 
inflation outturns are, correspondingly, 
variable, depending on imponderables (such 
as the climate) to a much greater extent than 
in larger economies. The variance of  the 
outturns implies that, in order to increase 
the probability of  achieving an inflation 
target, the Bank of  Zambia must adopt 
tighter monetary policies than would be 
required otherwise. These policies are costly 
and they will tend to depress the economy, 
which may be incompatible with poverty 
reduction and the alleviation of  existing 
148supply constraints.
Second, the Bank of  Zambia cannot 
count on the interest rate mechanism to 
steer the economy towards the inflation 
target, because the Zambian financial 
system is too shallow. At this stage, a   
comb-ination of  policy mechanisms is being 
used, including money supply targets backed 
up by fiscal austerity and OMOs. This has 
been inefficient, and it has increased the 
economic costs of  achieving low inflation  
in Zambia.
Third, ITR is incompatible with fiscal 
dominance, which is evidently present in 
Zambia. Moreover, economic volatility 
destabilises both the state expenditures and 
monetary policy, because tax revenues 
fluctuate and unexpected expenditures often 
cannot be deferred or even financed by 
recourse to the financial markets. These 
fluctuations are exacerbated by the volatility 
of  the aid flows.
Fourth, ITR is incompatible with financial 
or money market instability. It could be 
extremely costly to assert the priority of  the 
inflation target in the face of  an impending 
financial crisis, and conflicts of  this type are 
more likely to happen where the financial 
system is relatively shallow and undeveloped 
than in countries with developed financial 
systems. Furthermore, it can be difficult to 
control inflation when money supply and 
demand are unstable. Fluct-uations in the 
supply of  money were exam-ined above, but 
money demand in Zambia is volatile. This is 
partly because of  the recent financial sector 
reforms, the introduction of  financial 
market innovations and the chan-ges in 
portfolio associated with the reform process 
(Munacinga 2004, pp.85-6).  As a result, the 
Bank of  Zambia has been unable to esti-
mate with confidence the demand for 
money, which makes it difficult to pursue 
the inflation target.
Fifth, ITR is not suitable for countries 
with a tight balance of  payments constraint, 
149or where the exchange rate is volatile.    
Although the latter has been relatively stable 
in Zambia recently, the balance of  payments 
constraint remains binding. Moreover, the 
exchange rate channel seems to be more 
important than the monetary channel to 
150explain variations in the rate of  inflation.  
These limitations indicate that an 
alternative strategy of  inflation control may 
be desirable. This strategy should address 
primarily the causes of  inflation, and it 
should be compatible with the ahievement 
of  pro-poor outcomes. In other words, it 
should include a medium-term programme 
to address key supply constraints (roads, 
bridges, agricultural development, food 
storage and marketing, exports, and so on), 
while avoiding a superfluous obsession with 
single digit rates of  inflation. As long as 
inflation remains stable, its current level is 
low enough not to make it especially costly 
to the poor.  The current rate of  inflation is 
probably less costly than a harsh and pote-
ntially misguided disinflation programme 
would be, even if  it were successful.
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A more desirable medium-term anti-
inflation strategy should avoid overly 
restrictive constraints on the supply of  
money, or the domination of  the interest 
rates by inflation objectives. It should rely 
extensively on targeted fiscal policies, while 
suspending the drift towards Bank of  
Zambia independence, though literature has 
not demonstrated that central bank inde-
pendence brings benefits in terms of  
inflation performance, growth, volatility or 
the sacrifice ratio (the output cost of  
reducing inflation). Moreover, the central 
bank, like all other social institutions, needs 
to accommodate many different social 
interests, rather than merely sectoral ambi-
tions to achieve very low inflation and 
protection of  the financial sector. In this 
context, inflation control should be pursued 
as part of  a medium-term pro-poor devel-
opment strategy, including other objectives 
such as price, exchange rate and financial 
stability, export diversification, and eco-
nomic growth and distribution. 
The development of  pro-poor monetary, 
financial and exchange rate policies in 
Zambia requires careful policy co-
ordination, and the subordination of  these 
policies to an industrial policy strategy.  This 
strategy should aim to relieve the supply 
constraints that prevent the achievement of  
the welfare improvements pursued by 
government, and rightly expected by the 
population. A macroeconomic reform 
strategy focusing on the adjustment of  
relative prices and the construction of  the 
institutional edifice into which a thriving 
market economy would be expected to grow 
is risky, because it may put into place 
inappropriate structures given the state of  
development of  Zambia, the aspirations of  
its people, and the policy objectives of  the 
government. The ensuing conflicts and 
economic underperformance could be 
wasteful and potentially destabilising. It is 
impossible to wish into existence an institu-
6.4. Conclusion
tionally developed economy, and it is 
undesirable to attempt to mould economic 
structures in advance, and from the outside. 
Economic policies and institutional devel-
opment must correspond to the peculiarities 
and the state of  development of  the 
country while, at the same time, attempting 
to steer the economy towards the fulfilment 
of  socially desirable goals.
The reform programme was successful 
on several counts, explained above, but it 
has been unable to distribute these gains 
among the majority of  the population. This 
chapter has addressed some of  the short-
comings of  this policy strategy, while 
acknowledging its successes and offering 
concrete suggestions for the expansion and 
consolidation of  the pro-poor policies and 
programmes of  the government of  Zambia.
The proposed measures vary in scope 
and intensity, depending on the circum-
stances, and they may be adopted in differ-
ent combinations depending on the govern-
ment's priorities. Their main objectives are 
1) to increase the degree of  co-ordination 
across different policy areas, including 
industrial, trade, monetary, financial and 
exchange rate policy;  2) to restrict the ope-
nness of  the capital account of  the balance 
of  payments in order to expand the policy 
space of  the government of  Zambia;  3) to 
expand the government's fiscal space in 
order to facilitate the use of  public reso-
urces for the achievement of  socially desi-
rable goals; and 4) to harmonise the use of  
financial system resources with the pro-poor 
priorities of  the government, raise the pro-
ductivity of  these resources, and limit the 
ability of  financial system to control dom-
estic credit, the financing of  the state and 
the balance of  payments. These policies can 
contribute to the achievement of  pro-poor 
development objectives and, as such, they 
can claim the attention of  the authorities. 
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Table 6.1: Zambian banks: assets, capitalisation and profitability, 2003 (K million and %)
Table 6.2: Distribution of banking sector assets, loans and deposits (K billion and %)
Sources: Source: FSDP (2004, p.61).
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exchange rate stability (as reflected in frequent foreign exchange 
auctions and interventions), concentrating less on conventional 
monetary policy. This attachment to multiple policy goals has at times 
generated some inconsistencies between the stated objective of  price 
stability and exchange rate stability'. See also Gottschalk (2004).
Total
Assets (TA)
Share of 
TA
Total
Capital
Pre-tax
profit
Capitalisation (%) Return on
assets (%)
Branches
BBZ
ZNCB
SCB
STAN
CITI
INDO
FBZ
BOC
FAB
ABC
INVEST
CAV
IDH
N/CAP
TOTAL
1,017,991
931,475
787,330
544,837
487,878
272,082
284,162
62,992
65,621
101,386
45,865
26,830
26,645
21,217
4,676,311
21.8
19.9
16.8
11.7
10.4
5.8
6.1
1.3
1.4
2.2
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.5
107,308
59,372
92,222
53,784
109,728
47,678
31,013
5,801
21,543
12,188
7,292
5,055
7,927
4,959
565,870
80,655
15,230
61,765
43,504
43,080
16,008
18,011
109
10,520
4,987
1,253
2,784
3,553
1,151
302,610
10.5
60.4
11.7
9.9
22.5
17.5
10.9
9.2
32.8
12.0
15.9
18.8
29.8
23.4
7.9
1.8
9.0
8.7
10.0
7.1
6.4
0.2
17.3
59.7
3.2
12.9
13.2
6.0
27
43
15
8
2
7
32
1
3
1
2
1
1
8
140
% Loans Deposits Assets% Loans% % Deposits Assets% Loans% % Deposits %Assets %
Foreign banks
Government banks
Local banks
Total
2,284
857
319
3,460 100
66
25
9
783
251
45
1,079
73
23
4
100
1,546
673
187
2,406
64
28
8
100
3,029
1,251
444
4,724
64
26
9
99
798
94
83
975
82
10
8
100
2,142
913
202
3,257
66
28
6
100
3,274
1,321
449
5,044
65
26
9
100
925
75
86
1,086
85
7
8
100
2,274
1,005
254
3,533
64
28
8
100
Dec 01 Dec 02 Jun 03
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Table 6.3: Banking sector's earnings by type of ownership (K million and %)
Table 6.4: Domestic public debt and interest payments (% GDP)
Sources: IMF and Bank of Zambia.
Sources: Source: FSDP (2004, p.61).
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Dec 01 Dec 02 Jun 03
% % %
Foreign banks
Government banks
Local banks
Total
184,516
-54,963
18,963
147,907
125
-37
12
100
237,653
78,926
337,719
350,298
68
22
10
100
99,158
16,550
19,725
135,433
73
12
15
100
Pre-tax
profit
Pre-tax
profit
Pre-tax
profit
Central government
expenditure
T-bills and bonds
outstanding
Interest 
(% expenditure)
Interest (% GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3.2
na
4.3
1.4
40.2
na na na na
4.2
37.2 35.8 38.1
7.4 13.5 12.0
1.7 2.7 4.8 4.6
32.8
7.9
7.8
2.6 3.1
11.2
6.5
27.5 26.1
5.9
8.6
2.2 1.3
4.3
4.0
30.6 29.3
4.4
4.8
1.4 1.4
4.5
5.4
31.0 32.1
8.3
4.9
1.6
31.9
19.0
8.7
2.8 2.9
8.9
21.1
32.6 26.8
10.8
2.9
na
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6Figure 6.1:  Bank of Zambia Interest Rate and Inflation, 1998-2005 (percentages)
Figure 6.2: Lending Rate and Lending Margins, 1998- 2005 (percentages)
Sources: Bank of Zambia.
Figure 6.3: Real annual rates of return to saving instruments, 1998-2005
*Deposits over K20million
Sources: Bank of Zambia.
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Figure 6.4: Composition of the money supply, 1997-2005 (M3, billions of Kwacha)
DD- demand deposits
Sources: Bank of Zambia.
Figure 6.5: Composition of the money supply, 1997-2005 (M3, percentages)
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Figure 6.6: Annual inflation rate, 1961-2004 (GDP deflator, percentages)
Sources: IMF(2005) and  Bank of Zambia(2003).
Figure 6.7: Inflation rate, 1997-2005 (CPI, percentages)
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Annex
6A.1:  Money Supply Targeting 
 in Zambia
Monetary policy implementation in Zambia 
is based on the IMF financial programming 
framework. There is no model of  inflation 
or of  the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Zambia, and monetary policy 
departs from three identities (Munacinga 
(2004, pp.21, 36-9, 79-81, 128).  First, the 
equation of  exchange:
MV = Py (1)
where M is the supply of  broad money 
(M2), V is the velocity of  circulation, P is 
the price level and y is the real output. 
Second, the consolidated balance sheet 
of  the central bank:
Mh = NDA + NFA (2)
where Mh is base (reserve) money, NDA is 
net domestic assets and NFA is net foreign 
assets. NDA can be decomposed into credit 
to the government (Dcg), credit to 
non-government (Dcp) and other net 
items (ONI): 
Mh = Dcg + Dcp + ONI + NFA (3)
Therefore, 
dMh = dDcg + dDcp + dONI + 
dNFA (4)
Alternatively, base money includes currency 
in circulation and bank reserves:
 
Mh = C + RR + ER + VC (5)
where C is currency in circulation, RR and 
ER are required and excess reserves, and 
VC is vault cash in the banking system. The 
Bank of  Zambia can reduce (increase) the 
reserve ratio through regulation, OMOs or 
the discount window. The outcome of  the 
adjustment process is captured by the 
money multiplier, m:
M = mMh (6)
where m = (cd+1)/(cd+rr), cd is the 
currency-deposit ratio and rr is the required 
reserve ratio.
The third identity refers to the balance of  
payments:
CA = dMh  KA (7)
where CA is the current account and KA is 
the capital account .
In consultation with the government, 
the Bank of  Zambia and IMF and World 
Bank representatives set the annual targets 
for GDP growth and inflation, assuming a 
constant velocity of  circulation. Then the 
growth rate for broad money is set, which 
allows the calculation of  the desired growth 
rate of  reserve money. Subsequently, the 
individual components of  reserve money 
are determined. 
Finally, the operational target (the 
growth rate of  reserve money) is set. 
Discretionary monetary policy is estimated 
by subtracting NDA from the estimated 
operating target levels for reserve money. 
The projected paths for these variables are 
the benchmark for monetary policy opera-
tions. Policy implementation takes the form 
of  minimising deviations of  their actual 
paths from the target levels, using open 
market operations, changes in the statutory 
ratios, foreign exchange market interven-
tion, commercial bank loan restrictions and 
moral suasion, in addition to fiscal austerity.
Public sector deficits can be measured in 
different ways depending on the revenues 
6A.2  Definitions of the Public 
Sector Deficit
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6and expenditures included in the calculation 
(i.e., the concept of  'public sector'), and the 
form of  calculation of  each flow. This 
annex focuses on three common measures 
of  the public sector deficit, the nominal 
deficit (or public sector borrowing require-
ment, PSBR), and the primary and opera-
tional deficits.
The PSBR was formalised by the IMF in the 
eighties (IMF 1986).  It measures the 
difference between the expenditures of  the 
central government and its revenues in a 
given period (in what follows, one year) or, 
alternatively, the change of  the net debt of  
the non-financial public sector. The central 
government comprises all public sector 
agencies; among them national and local 
state units and semi-autonomous agencies, 
including social security and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). 
Their budget constraint can be 
represented by:
G = T + ΔMh + ΔB + EΔR* + ΔC
where G is expenditures, T is tax revenues, 
ΔMh and ΔB are the changes of  the 
monetary base (seigniorage) and the 
domestic debt with the non-government 
sector (i.e., excluding government securities 
held by the central bank), E is  the average 
nominal exchange rate, R* is the interna-
tional reserves, and C is the debt of  the 
151SOEs.    For simplicity, arrears and other 
non-conventional forms of  public expendi-
ture financing are excluded. The nominal 
deficit of  the central government (PSBR) is:
N = PSBR = G  T = ΔMh + ΔB + 
EΔR* + ΔC
The PSBR can also be measured through 
the variation of  the net debt of  the public 
sector (NDPS), where 
NDPS = Mh + B + ER* + C. 
Nominal Deficit (PSBR)
Primary Deficit
Operational Deficit
The primary deficit (P) excludes interest 
payments on the public sector debt:
P = N  iB
where i is the nominal interest rate, i = 
(1+π)(1+r)  1, π is the rate of  inflation, and 
r is the real interest rate.
The primary deficit is an indicator of  
the sustainability of  the domestic debt and, 
for this reason, it is often used as a proxy 
for the risk of  default of  the public sector. 
If  the primary deficit is positive the govern-
ment's debt has increased for non-financial 
reasons and, in this sense, it may be unsus-
tainable. Conversely, a primary surplus (even 
if  it is insufficient to eliminate the nominal 
deficit) indicates that the public sector is 
paying at least part of  the interest on its 
debt. In principle, this implies that the 
public sector debt is sustainable. 
The operational deficit (O) is the nominal 
deficit minus that part of  the interest 
paid by the government that corresponds 
to inflation:
O = N  πB
The rationale for the operational deficit is 
the following. If  there is inflation, part of  
the nominal variation of  the DPD is merely 
due to the increase in the general price 
index, compensating the holders of  securi-
ties for the devaluation of  their capital. This 
does not correspond to any fiscal imbalance. 
For illustration, see the example in  
Table 6A.1.
Suppose that the country's GDP is 100, 
that economic growth is nil, The rate of  
inflation is zero, and that the nominal and 
real interest rates are ten percent. The 
government's debt on 1 January is 9.1. 
Suppose also that the tax revenues cover the 
152government's non-financial expenditures.
On 31 December, when interest is due 
on the public sector bonds, 0.91 monetary 
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units must be financed. Since there are no 
tax revenues available (and monetisation is 
ruled out by assumption), the government 
must sell additional bonds to pay interest. 
Therefore, the primary deficit is nil, the 
nominal deficit is 0.91, and the DPD 
rises to 10.01:
In the following year there is one 
hundred percent inflation. Therefore, GDP 
rises to two hundred and, if  the real interest 
rate is to remain at ten percent, the nominal 
interest rate must rise to 120 percent (i = 
(1+π)(1+r)  1 = (1+1)(1+0.1)  1 = 1.2). If  
the government's tax revenues remain equal 
to its non-financial expenditures (P = 0), 
the DPD will grow by the amount of  the 
interest due. In this case, this interest 
will be:
iB = [(1 + π) (1 + r)  1] B = [(1 + 1) (1 
+ 0.1)  1] (9.1) = 10.92
which is also the nominal deficit. The DPD 
therefore increases to 9.1 + 10.92 = 20.02 
during this year.
If  we exclude the impact of  inflation on 
the DPD, we can determine the 
Operational deficit:
O = N  πB = 10.92  (0.2) 9.1 = 0.91
which is equal to the nominal deficit, purged 
of  the impact of  inflation (this is the same 
as the nominal deficit for the zero inflation 
case, illustrated in Table 6A.2): The signifi-
cance of  the operational deficit becomes 
clear in the following scenario. Suppose 
that, in the case as in Table 6A.3, the 
government decides to eliminate its nominal 
deficit, perhaps in order to reduce inflation. 
This would imply a fiscal effort of  eleven 
percent of  GDP, which is bound to gener-
ate severe political tensions. 
Yet, the nominal deficit is almost entirely 
due to inflation. What the economy needs, 
in this case, is not a lower nominal deficit 
(i.e., the public sector finances are not 'out 
of  control')  what it needs is lower inflation. 
Once this has been achieved, the deficit will 
vanish almost entirely  without any fiscal 
effort. In this sense, excessive focus on 
The reduction of  the PSBR, allegedly in 
order to reduce inflationary pressures, can 
be profoundly misguided. It can generate 
unemployment, poverty and other social 
costs for no economic reason. What the 
reduction of  the deficit will be doing, in 
reality, is to accelerate the repayment of  the 
DPD (its real value declines), which may or 
may not be warranted  this objective should 
be considered on its merits, rather than in 
the guise of  inflation control.
For an example closer to Zambia, 
suppose that, initially, GDP is one hundred, 
its growth rate is five percent, inflation is 
twenty percent, and the initial public debt is 
twenty (or twenty percent of  GDP).  If  the 
real interest rate is ten percent and the 
nominal interest rate is thirty-two percent 
(ten percent plus inflation), the nominal 
deficit will be 6.4 percent of  GDP, (when 
the primary deficit is zero). If  the real 
interest rate is zero, the nominal deficit will 
be four. In contrast, the operational deficit 
in both cases is only 2.4 (percent of  GDP).
Domestic debt sustainability can be defined 
in different ways and, consequently, diffe-
rent values can be found for the fiscal 
deficit compatible with a 'sustainable' DPD. 
The simplest way to approach this problem 
is to aim for the stabilisation of  the DPD at 
whatever level it is, and calculate the prim-
ary fiscal deficit that is compatible with this 
outcome (the debt stabilising primary 
deficit). Other scenarios can be derived 
easily from this baseline. The debt stab-
ilising primary deficit can be calculated as 
follows. Let Y be the GDP, M the money 
supply, B the domestic public debt stock, N 
the nominal fiscal deficit, P the primary 
deficit, i the nominal interest rate, r the real 
interest rate, y the real GDP growth rate 
and π the rate of  inflation. The nominal 
deficit at the end of  period t includes the 
6A.3  Sustainability of the Domestic 
Public Debt
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6primary deficit and the interest on the 
accumulated debt. This deficit can be 
financed either by monetisation 
(seigniorage) or bond sales (for simplicity, 
we ignore arrears and other non-
conventional financing strategies, SOEs and 
the foreign sector):
Nt = Pt + iBt-1 = (Mt-Mt-1) + 
(Bt-Bt-1)
Since i = (1+π)(1+r)  1,
Pt + [(1+π)(1+r)  1]Bt-1 = (Mt-Mt-1) + 
(Bt-Bt-1)
Simplifying and rearranging:
Bt = Pt + (1+π)(1+r)Bt-1  (Mt-Mt-1)
If  we define bt = Bt/Yt, bt-1 = Bt-
1/Yt-1, pt = Pt/Yt, mt = Mt/Yt and 
Mt-1 = Mt-1/Yt-1, note that Yt = 
(1+π)(1+y)Yt-1, and subtract bt-1 from 
both sides, we have:
This equation implies that the growth of  
the domestic debt as a proportion of  GDP 
depends on the size of  the debt, the 
primary deficit, the GDP growth rate, the 
real interest rate, the rate of  inflation and 
the degree of  monetisation (which 
determines the scope for seigniorage).
Suppose, for example, that we are 
interested in the debt stabilising primary 
deficit (the value of  pt needed to ensure 
that bt  bt-1 = 0), assuming that the real 
interest rate is ten percent per annum, the 
growth rate of  real GDP is five percent, the 
initial debt stock is 20 percent of  GDP, the 
ratio of  money to GDP rises from seven to 
eight percent during the year, and that infla-
tion is twenty percent (these were appro-
ximately the parameters for Zambia in 
2004). In this case,
and pt = 1.5 percent of  GDP.
If  the economic growth rate is only two 
percent, the maximum primary deficit 
compatible with the stabilisation of  the 
domestic public debt declines to 0.7 percent 
of  GDP (in other words, if  the primary 
deficit exceeds 0.7 percent of  GDP, the 
DPD will increase). Alternatively, if  the 
GDP growth rate is five percent but the real 
interest rate is zero, the maximum primary 
deficit is as high as 3.4 percent of  GDP.
The policy implication is that low 
interest rates and rapid GDP growth can 
make a substantial difference for debt 
sustainability. It should also be noted that, 
as the DPD rises as a share of  GDP, 
stabilisation becomes a more demanding 
exercise, requiring lower fiscal deficits. 
Reciprocally, the difference between the 
current primary deficit and its debt 
stabilising level indicates the size of  the 
required adjustment to stabilise the DPD, 
which may take the form of  expenditure 
cuts, tax increases, or reductions in the 
interest rates. Faster growth or the reduction 
of  the debt stock through a debt adjustment 
programme (see Annex 6A.4) could also 
lead to the same result.
The state can restructure its liabilities mainly 
through changes in the supply of  money or 
in the stock of  government securities. In 
what follows, these alternatives will be 
briefly considered in turn. 
The state can reduce the value of  the 
money supply if  it deliberately creates 
inflation, but this is trivial. Monetary 
reforms offer more interesting examples of  
the reduction of  the real value of  the 
monetary base. They cannot be reviewed 
here in detail. These experiences generally 
involve the announcement by the govern-
ment that the existing notes and coins (or 
that some notes, for example, the high value 
ones) will cease to be legal tender after a 
certain date. The population is invited to 
deposit those assets in the banking system, 
where they may be discounted or frozen 
temporarily, or exchange their holdings for a 
new currency, possibly at a discount. Those 
failing to exchange their holdings after a 
6A.4  Restructuring the Domestic Debt
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collapsed. In late December the government 
imposed the 'Bonex plan'. The plan 
included the conversion of  all fixed-term 
bank deposits, government securities and 
bank reserves into bonos externos (Bonex), 
ten-year dollar-linked government bonds, 
with returns determined by the libor. The 
currency in circulation, current accounts 
and savings accounts were left untouched, 
and the asset-holders were allowed to 
withdraw only 1m australes (approximately 
US$600) from their frozen funds. There was 
a severe reduction in liquidity in the 
economy (M3 declined by sixty percent in 
real terms) in the wake of  the plan. This 
contraction of  liquidity had severe 
economic implications, and the government 
gradually released additional funds during 
the next few months in order to stimulate 
the level of  activity. The Bonex plan was 
unsuccessful in eliminating hyperinflation, 
but it helped to improve the public sector 
finances significantly; for example, interest 
payments on the domestic public debt 
(DPD) declined by 4.8 percent of  GDP. In 
order to tackle inflation, the government 
introduced in the following months a succe-
ssion of  stabilisation measures, culminating 
in the well known 'convertibility plan'.
The Brazilian economy was also under 
severe stress in early 1990, with inflation 
peaking at eighty percent in one month. The 
incoming Collor de Mello administration 
imposed a stabilisation programme in 
March known as the 'Collor plan' (Carvalho 
2000 and Faro 1990).  The lynchpin of  the 
plan was the temporary freeze of  most 
financial assets held in the banking system, 
including current and savings accounts, 
financial investments and government 
security holdings. For example, all balances 
in current and savings accounts in excess of  
fifty thousand cruzados novos (approxi-
mately US$1,000) were frozen, and so were 
eighty percent of  the balances on term 
deposits, seventy-five percent of  DPD 
holdings, and so on. The frozen funds were 
held by the central bank, and they were 
returned in eighteen monthly instalments, at 
given deadline lose everything. Examples 
include the monetary reforms in Tunisia and 
Corsica (1943), Belgium (1944), Finland 
(1945), Japan (1946), West Germany and 
China (1948), and Czechoslovakia (1953). 
Other monetary reforms followed the 
collapse of  the Austro-Hungarian Empire at 
the end of  World War 1, and the dissolution 
of  the Soviet bloc in the early nineties.
Monetary reforms can have several 
objectives, among them the elimination of  
hyperinflation, the demonetisation of  
currency held abroad, or the capitalisation 
of  the public sector. For example, in 1922 
the Greek government imposed a monetary 
reform in order to control inflation, in 
which the notes were literally cut in half. 
One part was returned to their owners 
(worth fifty percent of  their previous value), 
while the other part became a compulsory 
loan to the government. In 1926 the 
government imposed another reform on 
similar lines, but the currency-holders were 
allowed to retain three-quarters of  the value 
of  their monetary holdings (bank deposits 
were left untouched in both episodes). 
The restructuring of  the government 
securities is different. The process basically 
involves the restriction of  the liquidity of  
the securities held by the public, normally in 
order to stabilise inflation or public sector 
finances. IMF (2003, p.140) reviews twenty-
six episodes of  debt reduction in the 
emerging market economies. This study 
concludes that, in most cases, the restru-
cturing contributed to the reduction of  the 
debt-GDP ratio and the reduction of  the 
public sector deficit (because of  the 
reduction of  the debt servicing costs).  It is 
instructive to briefly review two such 
experiences, taking place in Argentina 
(1989-90) and Brazil (1990).
The Argentine economy was under 
severe stress in 1989 (Carvalho 1999).  
Inflation had reached two hundred percent 
in the month of  July, M1 had declined to 2.2 
percent of  GDP, and there was very little 
demand for government securities. The 
public sector finances had essentially 
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six percent interest plus inflation indexation. 
During the first two months of  the plan, 
some of  the frozen funds could also be 
transferred between accounts in order to 
pay outstanding bills. 
The Collor plan had three main 
objectives: reducing demand and inflation, 
limiting DPD growth (which was rising 
exponentially at that time, mainly through 
the sale of  highly liquid securities that were 
used as reserve value), and controlling the 
speed of  remonetisation (in the wake of  a 
sudden elimination of  hyperinflation the 
demand for money tends to rise rapidly, and 
temporary mismatches between money 
supply and demand can disrupt the real 
sector). Although the Collor plan stopped 
the drift towards hyperinflation, it did not 
eliminate high inflation. Its limited success 
was partly due to the need to expand 
liquidity more rapidly than the government 
had anticipated, in order to stem the 
contraction of  the economy (real GDP 
declined by 4.5 percent in 1990). In spite of  
this, the plan reduced the DPD held by the 
public from fifteen to five percent of  GDP 
in 1990 and, further, to two percent in 1992. 
This was achieved largely because the six 
percent real return on the frozen securities 
was less than the interest rates paid 
previously, and because the plan was 
supplemented by a temporary tax on 
financial transactions, which was used to 
repurchase the outstanding securities.
151 The foreign public debt does not need to be considered separately 
because it is included the other terms in this identity. 
152 This example draws on Bresser-Pereira (1983).
Table 6A.1
Table 6A.3
Table 6A.2
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Variable I Jan (t)
GDP
GDP growth
Nominal interest rate (i,%)
Real interest rate (r,%)
Domestic public debt (B)
Inflation(π)
100
0
0
10
10
9.1
GDP
GDP growth
Nominal interest rate (i,%)
Real interest rate (r,%)
Domestic public debt (B)
Inflation(π)
Primary deficit (P)
Nominal deficit (N)
Variable 31 Dec (t)
100
0
0
10
10
10.01
0
0.91
Operational deficit (O)
GDP
GDP growth
Nominal interest rate (i,%)
Real interest rate (r,%)
Domestic public debt (B)
Inflation(π,%)
Primary deficit (P)
Nominal deficit (N)
Variable 31 Dec t + 1I Jan  t+1
100
0
0
10
10
9.1
200
0
100
120
10
20.02
0
10.92
0.91
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In Africa governments have been advised by 
multilateral financial institutions to privatise 
their public services, with this advice linked 
to policy conditionalities in many cases. 
While privatisation has proceeded apace in 
many other regions, in Africa it has pro-
gressed slowly. The performance of  priva-
tised public services has been mixed, at best. 
There have been some successes in increas-
ing efficiency, but little evidence of  a 
positive impact on improving equity and 
reducing poverty.  With regard to poverty 
impact, it appears likely that the access of  
poor households to public services has 
worsened.  The principal problem in much 
of  Africa, however, is not so much inequita-
ble access but lack of  access (a more 
extreme form of  inequity).  This is often the 
case in rural areas, where a majority of  the 
population is likely to live, and most fre-
quently where most of  the poor live.
While, privatisation of  public services is 
designed to promote social objectives, they 
are geared to commercial objectives.  A 
compromise approach followed by many 
governments in Africa has been to 'com-
mercialise' public services instead of  
privatise them. This has taken many forms, 
including the introduction of  user fees 
(such as for health services), linking the 
delivery of  public services to cost recovery 
criteria (such as raising tariffs to full cost-
reflective levels) or setting up independent 
commercially-run utilities. Sometimes, 
decentralisation of  services has been part of  
a commercialisation reform package.
Even though tariffs have often been 
raised, cost recovery is usually only partial. 
Expecting cost recovery to finance rehabili-
tation or expansion of  infrastructure has 
proved to be notably unrealistic. Even 
covering recurrent expenditures, including 
maintenance, has proved to be difficult.  
Rarely has commercialisation succeeded in 
expanding coverage of  services. Rural areas 
remain largely without service. Poorer 
peri-urban areas or slums also see little 
improvement in access. Especially for 
services that rely on grids, such as 
electricity, new beneficiaries are likely to be 
urban and non-poor. 
Efforts to make tariffs more progressive 
only affect the households that are con-
nected to services. Such tariffs usually rely 
on some kind of  metering. Most of  the 
7 ~ Commersalisation of the
           Public Service in Zambia
7.1 Introduction
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poor. Due to lack of  capacities at the local 
level, especially in local governments, 
decentralisation might be more expensive 
than centrally based provision of  services. 
Supposedly, decentralisation of  services 
should also give consumers greater voice 
and empower local communities. But, this 
usually depends on the social groups that 
control local government. Local elites might 
have an even stronger hold over local 
government than national elites do over 
central government.
Underlying the form of  governance is 
the bedrock problem of  the woeful lack of  
public resources to provide essential public 
services. This is likely to be a more severe 
problem at the local level. But it is also 
indeed a paramount problem at the national 
level. Methods of  cost recovery can contrib-
ute to solving this problem but cannot be, 
by themselves, the full solution. In order to 
achieve broad and equitable coverage of  
services, mobilizing general public revenue 
is necessary. This would enhance the ability 
of  government to provide subsidies to 
poorer households on the services that they 
receive and expand the coverage of  services 
to which they have no access.
Official Development Assistance can 
play an important role, either through grants 
or concessional lending. In many low-
income countries, dramatically up-scaling 
ODA will be necessary if  they are to have a 
reasonable chance of  reaching the interna-
tionally agreed MDG targets.  Within the 
context of  these general concerns, this 
chapter examines commercialisation in the 
water, energy and health sectors in Zambia.
In the late 1980s, Zambia's public provision 
of  water faced mounting problems: 
accounting and billing systems were ineffi-
cient and collection rates were low; late 
payments and non-payments were wide-
spread; and, maintenance of  water supply 
systems was poor and water quality low.  
1537.2  Water and Sanitation
Introduction 
poor are not connected nor metered. 
Identifying income-poor households is also 
problematic, especially if  poverty is defined 
by 'inability to pay'. Sometimes the quality 
of  housing is taken as a proxy for income 
level, and this approach has some practical 
advantages. But, a household's inability to 
pay implies that it should be subsidised by 
the higher tariffs paid by richer households, 
or by general public revenue.
For some services, such as the supply of  
water or health services, governments have 
a basic public responsibility to ensure 
access. Some consider that access to such 
services is a human right.  For other com-
pelling reasons, if  not human rights, govern-
ments should guarantee a minimum level of  
service without cost.  Assuming that 
difficulties in implementing a vertically 
equitable system of  access and cost recov-
ery could be resolved, there is still the 
fundamental problem of  a lack of  public 
financial resources. This is one of  major 
justifications for instituting tariffs and 
raising them to cost-recovery levels. Not 
surprisingly, such cost-recovery objectives 
can run counter to equity objectives. 
Assuming that poor households do have 
access to a public service, they could be 
forced to shoulder a disproportionate 
burden of  tariffs. But, this concern does not 
address the larger problem, namely, that 
many, if  not most, poor households might 
have no access at all.  
Public investment is necessary to expand 
infrastructure to provide service to these 
households, who often live in urban slums, 
small towns or rural areas. The fixed costs 
involved in expanding a grid-based service, 
such as electricity, can be quite high. Perh-
aps providing alternative forms of  energy 
(such as improving the efficiency in the use 
of  biomass) might be cost-effective for 
government, though not commercially 
viable. Decentralisation of  services is often 
advocated by proponents of  commerciali-
sation as a means to hold down costs 
and/or more effectively raise revenue. But 
the record of  such decentralisation has been 
Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Case Study of Zambia
These issues jeopardised the financial 
sustainability of  public water provision and 
failed to provide the excess returns with 
which to fortify and expand services, espe-
cially in rural areas, leading the government 
to consider commercialisation.  The danger 
was that if  commercialisation raised tariffs 
to achieve greater financial sustainability, 
water and sanitation would become unaf-
fordable for many low-income households.  
Yet, the central government, strapped for 
tax revenue because of  falling household 
incomes, thought that it had few other opti-
ons, and initiated commercialisation in 1989.
 The first step was the formation of  the 
Water and Sewerage Company in Lusaka, an 
independent commercial utility owned by 
the municipality. The second such utility was 
formed in Chipata in 1992 and several other 
municipalities have adopted, since then, the 
same model. While leasing arrangements 
and partnerships with private providers 
were investigated, publicly owned, but 
commercially run, municipal utilities 
emerged as the preferred choice. 
These municipal commercial utilities 
were later consolidated into ten regional 
utilities, called Water and Sanitation Comp-
anies (WSCs). These ten utilities nominally 
covered ninety percent of  the population.  
Local non-commercial utilities covered the 
remaining ten percent.  Previously, the 
central government had supplied the muni-
cipalities with water and sanitation, which 
they had distributed at subsidised rates. In 
the Copperbelt, the Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) was responsible for 
water supply to the mines and households. 
Overall, rural areas had negligible access to 
piped water, so households relied mainly on 
wells and bore holes. 
After commercialisation, full cost recovery 
on the supply of  water and sanitation 
became the governing principle. In the first 
stage, the aim was recovery of  the costs for 
current operations and maintenance and in 
the second stage recovery of  capital costs as 
Efforts at Cost Recovery
well. However, available evidence from the 
late 1980s (before commercialisation) 
suggests that the provision of  water and 
sanitation to urban areas could have become 
financially sustainable, at least on current 
operations, had the government made 
progress on billing, collection and water 
losses. Table 7.1 shows that operation and 
maintenance costs exceeded revenue 
('actual collection') by only about twenty-
two percent. However, the financial situa-
tion in rural areas, where coverage was very 
low, was far worse: operation and mainte-
nance costs exceeded revenue by over three 
hundred percent.
Before commercialisation, the govern-
ment had not aimed to cover all costs with 
revenue. All households were provided with 
water and sanitation at subsidised rates. The 
system also strove to be equitable: low-cost 
housing (a proxy for low-income house-
holds) received the highest subsidies.  As a 
result of  commercialisation, most of  the 
Water and Sanitation Companies raised their 
tariffs and were able to cover their opera-
tional costs. But most have remained far 
from covering both operational and mainte-
nance costs (OC&M). For example, Lusaka 
Water and Sewerage Company, which has 
existed the longest, still could cover only 
about three-quarters of  its OC&M costs  in 
2002 (Table 7.2).
Several factors caused the financial 
losses of  the Water and Sanitation 
Companies. A significant factor was water 
losses. 'Unaccounted-for Water' (UFW) 
represents about half  of  available supply, 
for example. Part of  the problem was 
leakages, due to old infrastructure, missing 
taps or vandalism. Another part arose from 
lack of  metering, the cost of  which was too 
high for most customers to shoulder. Table 
7.3 provides information on factors relevant 
to financial losses.
Table 7.3 also indicates that a second 
problem plagued WSCs, lack of  revenue 
collection. This has been partly due to lack 
of  administrative capacity with regard to 
creating customer databases and instituting 
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7government has used the cost of  housing 
for determining progressive rates. 
Differential flat rates were applied to 
three grades of  housing: low-cost, medium-
cost and high-cost. Table 7.4 provides the 
tariff  rates for 1990 (before commerciali-
sation) and 1994 (after) for various catego-
ries of  water users. Table 7.5 shows similar 
data for selected WSCs in 2002.  Table 7.5 
also includes data on three different rates of  
water consumption: fifteen, twenty-five and 
fifty cubic meters per month per household. 
The government regulatory agency for the 
water sector considered twenty-five cubic 
meters to be minimally adequate for house-
holds. The data in the table show that the 
Lusaka WSC had the most progressive rate 
structure for households. A close examina-
tion of  the data in Table 7.5 compared to 
that in Table 7.4 also underscores that the 
flat rates for low-cost housing have 
increased the most since 1990. 
One of  the most important barometers of  
the success of  commercialisation is the 
affordability of  access to water. A critical 
issue is whether low-income households can 
have continued access. A general rule is that 
water bills should not constitute more than 
five to six percent of  monthly household 
income.  Based on a six percent benchmark, 
Table 7.6 demonstrates that fifty-nine 
percent of  households in Lusaka in 1998 
would have had problems paying their water 
bills had they been charged the rates for 
low-cost housing.  If  a five percent bench-
mark were used, seventy-two percent of  
households could not afford their bills.  
Alternatively, if  we calculate based on the 
cost of  a threshold of  twenty-five cubic 
meters of  water consumption per house-
hold per month, then forty-one percent of  
all households would have had difficulty in 
paying their bills.
Access to water and sanitation was much 
less prevalent in rural areas than in urban, 
though rural access improved from 1992 to 
1996.  For example, the proportion of  the 
Access to Water and Sanitation
effective payment systems. There were  no 
effective mechanisms to deal with non-
payment, particularly by big users, for 
example, government institutions and 
privatised mines. But, non-payment by 
residential customers also occurred. This 
was most likely due to the rise in tariffs on 
water usage along with declining income 
levels. The Living Conditions Monitoring 
Survey of  1998 reported, for example, that 
eighty-six percent of  low-cost housing 
residents, forty-one percent of  medium-cost 
housing residents and twenty-five percent 
of  high-cost housing residents were in 
arrears on water bills. In response, some of  
the commercial utilities resorted to discon-
necting households, a drastic measure that 
gravely threatens access.
In order to achieve financial sustai-
nability, the commercial utilities backed by 
government, donors and lenders concen-
trated on raising tariffs.  However, they gave 
less attention to correcting water losses or 
improving administrative efficiency.  
Orthodox microeconomic theory suggests 
that cost recovery should be based on 
calculating the long-term marginal cost of  
providing a service, such as supplying water. 
In practice, however, this is difficult, 
particularly in an environment, such as 
Zambia's, where there is widespread lack of  
metering.  So, the practical alternative is to 
calculate average cost.
But having to address issues of  poverty 
and equity cannot be avoided.  Since water 
is a necessity, low-income and poor house-
holds must be provided with affordable 
access. One approach is to institute a 
progressive system of  'rising block tariffs' 
(RBT), based on raising tariffs as water 
usage increases.  The higher rates on 
households with high usage of  water are 
used to cross-subsidise the lower rates on 
low-usage households. A variation on this 
approach is to provide a minimum block of  
free consumption of  water. But the RBT 
approach is not practical in Zambia because 
many households do not have water meters.  
Hence, as a proxy for this approach, the 
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rural population with access to safe drinking 
water rose from thirty-one percent to forty-
two, and the proportion with access to 
sanitation from forty-six to fifty-seven 
(Table 7.7).  Between 1996 and 2001/2, 
there was no progress on either water or 
sanitation. Urban-rural differentials were 
notable. In urban areas in 2001/2, about 
ninety percent of  the population had access 
to 'safe drinking water', whereas only slightly 
over forty percent of  the rural population 
did. Similarly, while ninety-five percent of  
the urban population had access to sanita-
tion in 2001/2, this was the case for only 
fifty-seven percent of  the rural population.   
While there have been increases in access in 
rural areas, access decreased in some urban 
areas.  In 1992, over fifty-five percent of  
urban households had water piped into their 
residence, but by 2001-2002 only about 
forty percent did, a reduction of  almost one 
quarter. These households switched to 
public taps or wells and boreholes.
Service coverage provided to the urban 
population by the ten commercial Water and 
Sanitation Companies remained inadequate. 
While the WSCs in the Copperbelt provided 
acceptable levels of  provision of  water, the 
others performed decidedly worse. Two of  
the WSCs provided only thirty percent 
service coverage for water (Table 7.8). The 
coverage for sanitation was lower: on 
average, the WSCs had only thirty-two 
percent coverage.  The Western WSC 
provided only one percent coverage for 
sanitation, and the AHC-MMS was the only 
provider close to three-quarters coverage.
These coverage statistics overstate 
provision, because services were not 
provided on a twenty-four hour basis, with 
the exception of  the Chipata WSC.  The 
national average was sixteen hours per day 
in 2002, with two WSCs operating the ser-
vice for roughly twelve (Table 7.8).  One of  
the major challenges for the provision of  
water and sanitation to low-income house-
holds is to cover peri-urban areas. In Zam-
bia, about sixty percent of  the population 
lived in shantytowns. Communal taps and 
boreholes, financed by external donors and 
NGOs, provided most water in these areas. 
For sanitation, households relied on septic 
tanks, pit latrines and similar methods.
 
The record of  commercialisation of  the 
water sector in Zambia has been mixed. 
There have been some gains in efficiency. 
But, increases in tariffs had an adverse 
impact on access, especially in urban areas. 
Where access increased, as in rural areas, 
this was due more to financing by donors or 
government than by commercial utilities.  
Government regulation of  the sector, 
though improving, remains weak. The 
government's regulatory body could encour-
age commercial utilities to expand their 
coverage in peri-urban areas, but has no 
enforcement powers to oblige them do so.
The effects of  commercialisation on the 
workforce were deplorable. Many workers 
were retrenched, and the number of  casual 
workers rose.  In most cases of  retrench-
ment, the government did not pay severance 
packages, which by law it was obligated to 
do. In general, the impact of  commerciali-
sation on public workers was adverse.  This 
problem received little attention, as primary 
focus was on consumers.
There has been excessive emphasis on 
'tariff  rationalisation', with less attention to 
reducing inefficiencies, such as 'unac-
counted-for water' and lack of  tariff  collec-
tion. In addition, the tariff  structure was not 
very progressive.  After 1992, flat rate tariffs 
for households in low-cost housing incre-
ased most.  Given widespread poverty, the 
government could consider providing a 
minimum amount of  water without charge.  
Such a service is critical for basic human 
development and should be an obligation of  
any government. Above this minimum level, 
the government could strengthen the 
progressive structure of  tariffs.
Commercialisation did not lead to 
greater capital investment, but rather a 
significant decline. As a result, in some 
municipalities, including Lusaka, infrastruc-
Conclusions and Recommendations
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7At the same time, this drive towards com-
mercialisation was mitigated by a stated 
policy of  providing a minimum level of  
service to persons who were unable to 
afford the full cost. The contradiction 
between the two objectives of  affordability 
of  tariffs and expansion of  service remains 
an issue today.
Zambia has considerable potential in 
hydro-electric power. While it has an 
installed capacity of  1,700 MW, its potential 
is six thousand. Thus, if  financing were 
available, it could substantially expand its 
capacity and export electricity to the 
Southern African Development Comm-
unity, where electricity shortfalls are pro-
jected for 2007 onwards.  But, the most 
pressing needs for electrification are in rural 
areas. In 2003, legislation was enacted to set 
up the Rural Electrification Authority in 
order to develop plans to extend the rural 
electricity network. Rural electrification 
projects were already supposed to be funded 
from a seven percent levy charged on 
consumer bills but the revenue raised so far 
has been woefully inadequate. The Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper, adopted in 2002, 
re-emphasised the importance of  rural 
electrification. In general, it recognised the 
need to rehabilitate the existing capacity of  
the energy grid, substantially expand its 
capacity and implement targeted interven-
tions to improve access.
Despite the adoption of  these policy 
documents, access to electricity in rural 
areas remains abysmally low. In rural areas 
in 1998, only one to two percent of  the 
population had access to electricity for 
cooking or lighting (Table 7.9). By contrast, 
thirty-nine to forty-eight percent of  the 
urban population had such access. More-
over, while access to electricity had 
expanded in urban areas from 1991 to 1998, 
it expanded hardly at all in rural areas.
Statistics for total household electricity 
consumption confirm the overall increase in 
access during the 1990s. This has been 
limited, however, to urban areas. 
Calculations, based on statistics for aggre-
ture badly needed rehabilitation. While 
commercial utilities could improve revenue 
collection, more financing for investment 
will have to come from government and 
external agencies.  Many of  the commercial 
utilities began with  liabilities and did not 
receive new infusions of  public capital in 
order to rehabilitate their infrastructure. The 
Chipata WSC, which performed well, was an 
exception.  It carried over no debt from 
previous operations, enjoyed an injection of  
new public capital, and had all its connec-
tions metered. 
This example illustrates that if  a govern-
ment chooses commercialisation of  service 
provision, it still has an obligation to 
provide financing for capital investment.  
Also, it will still have an obligation to 
regulate commercial utilities in order to 
ensure that lower-income households are 
not deprived of  vital services. Government 
incentives, such as loan guarantees, will still 
have to be provided to induce commercial 
utilities to expand coverage to under-served 
areas and social groups. Given the limits on 
government capacities in many poor 
developing countries, it is wiser to maintain 
government ownership of  utilities and 
oblige them to make their operations more 
cost-effective by applying commercial 
criteria of  assessment.
In 1994, Zambia developed its first National 
Energy Policy. The immediate objectives of  
this policy were to commercialise the public 
provider, Zambia Electricity Supply Corpo-
ration (ZESCO), privatise the distribution 
function of  ZESCO and allow the entry of  
private providers into the sector.  The main 
emphasis was on instituting energy pricing 
that would promote an efficient allocation 
of  resources. This invo-lved allocating costs 
among consumers according to the burden 
that their use of  energy imposed on the 
delivery system. The guiding principle was 
to base prices on long-term marginal costs. 
154 7.3 Energy Sector
Zambia's National Energy Policy
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gate household consumption and average 
household size, suggest that there were 
57,000 new household connections between 
1990 and 1995. This translates into a yearly 
average increase of  11,400. However, this 
slowed to 3,800 new household connections 
per year between 1996 and 2000. So, 
commercialisation of  the power sector in 
Zambia has not led to a more rapid expan-
sion of  the electricity network. The lack of  
progress is most pronounced, however, in 
rural areas.
In 2004, the Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation had exclusive rights to electric-
ity generation, transmission and distribu-
tion, with one exception, the Copperbelt 
Energy Corporation, which provides 
electricity to the Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines.  ZESCO accounts for over 
ninety percent of  total generating capacity, 
i.e., 1,638 MW in 2004. However, data on 
two of  its largest hydro plants, at Kafue 
Gorge and Victoria Falls, illustrate that they 
typically operate below full capacity (Table 
7.10). 'Plant Availability', the period in a year 
during which full energy capacity is useable, 
averaged eighty-six percent for Kafue 
Gorge between 1999 and 2003 while it 
averaged only about seventy-one percent for 
Victoria Falls. The industry norms are over 
ninety percent availability.
Transmission and distribution losses are 
significant problems in the energy sector in 
Zambia. For example, distribution losses 
between 1999 and 2003 were about one 
fifth higher than in the previous five years 
despite the efforts at commercialisation and 
a focus on minimizing such losses. An aging 
infrastructure is part of  the problem. Often, 
commercial and industrial users have to 
resort to stand-by diesel generators, which 
are more expensive, in order to ensure 
continuous power. Illegal connections and 
vandalism are also problems that contribute 
to energy losses.
Lack of  operational efficiency was 
highlighted as ZESCO needed to generate 
Performance of the Energy Sector
financial surpluses in order to cover mainte-
nance and support the expansion of  its 
network. Either it must improve its level of  
efficiency, increase tariffs or be subsidised.  
The broader problem was that many low-
income households, particularly in rural 
areas, do not have access to electricity.  
Large-scale investment in network expan-
sion is critical.  ZESCO has incurred high 
and rising operating costs. Together with 
depreciation expenses, this led to negative 
net operating income. Thus, ZESCO's core 
activity did not perform well. In 2004, for 
example, net operating income was a 
negative 7.5 percent (Table 7.11).
Some point to the share of  labour costs 
in total operating expenses, about sixty 
percent in 2004, as evidence of  ZESCO's 
inefficiency.  But, its labour productivity 
appears to be relatively high by African 
standards. One measure of  such productiv-
ity is energy production per employees and, 
with the exception of  a dip in 2003, this 
measure rose after 1999.  Zambia's perfor-
mance on this measure was exceeded only 
by South Africa and Namibia among the 
countries of  the Southern Africa Develo-
155pment Community (SADC).   A second 
measure of  labour productivity, the number 
of  customers per employee, exhibited a 
similar rising trend, increasing steadily from 
fifty in 2000 to eighty in 2003. 
One of  the objectives of  commercialisation 
of  the power sector in Zambia was to 
introduce cost-reflective tariffs, as a means 
to eventually induce private investment in 
the sector and expand coverage. This cost 
would have to incorporate the investment 
necessary to expand the sector's capacity.  
However, cost reflective tariffs were not 
likely to be affordable for a significant 
proportion of  the Zambian population. 
Hence, there was an inherent contradiction 
between the two objectives, that is, Cost-
reflective and affordable tariffs. Resolving 
this contradiction would involve devising a 
transparent system of  subsidies to ensure 
The Tariff Structure
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between ZESCO and CEC, established 
when the mines were privatised, determined 
the tariff  structure for the latter. While CEC 
paid ZESCO 2.1 US cents per kWh for the 
electricity that the latter generated, CEC 
charged its customers 3.0 US cents. In 
accordance with the agreement, if  ZESCO 
invested in expanding its generating capac-
ity, none of  this expense could be passed on 
to CEC.  The bulk of  CEC's business was 
with the mines. It avoided providing 
electricity to residential customers because 
this would be less profitable.  Thus, com-
pared to ZESCO's provision of  electricity 
to non-mining customers, the CEC was 
profitable. For 2002, its net operating 
income was eighty-four percent, and for 
2003 it was seventy-seven percent. By 
contrast, ZESCO's net operating income 
was negative 4.6 percent in 2002 and 
negative 3.6 percent in 2003. In 2003 the 
total operating income of  ZESCO was 
US$135 million while for CEC it was almost 
as high, at US$115 million.
 
The energy sector in Zambia is plagued by 
several problems. Electricity supplies only 
about eleven percent of  the total energy 
consumption in the country. The rural pop-
ulation is virtually without access to electric-
ity: only two percent of  rural households 
have access.  Yet there were no plans to 
expand electricity in rural areas, with the 
Rural Electrification Authority formed only 
in 2004.
Half  of  the transmission and distribu-
tion of  electricity in Zambia was privatised, 
namely, taken over by the privately owned 
Copperbelt Energy Corporation. While this 
privatisation and the associated agreement 
between CEC and ZESCO guaranteed the 
supply of  electricity to the mines at rela-
tively low and stable tariffs, non-mining 
customers received little direct benefit. 
While CEC was a profitable company, 
ZESCO was not. Moreover, ZESCO was 
constrained in raising revenue because it 
could not raise tariffs for half  of  the energy 
Conclusions and Recommendations
broad access to electricity. It would involve 
identifying how to mobilise additional 
public resources, domestically or externally, 
to finance expanded capacity.
There were two broad categories of  
consumers, mining and non-mining, for 
which electricity needed to be provided in 
Zambia. The copper mining industry 
consumed over half  of  the total electricity 
in the country, but its tariffs were not 
subject to regulatory oversight. For non-
mining consumers, although tariffs rose, 
they remained below the level necessary for 
cost recovery.  ZESCO regarded this level 
to be four to five US cents per KWh.  Table 
7.12 shows the tariff  structure for 
unmetered and metered residential consum-
ers. The average Zambian residential 
consumer used over 700 kWh and thus 
would pay three US cents per kWh.  Those 
consumers that used less than this threshold 
benefited from the tariff  structure, paying 
either 1.3 US cents or 1.8. Unmetered 
consumers, which were subject to monthly 
charges, benefit even more.
Outside of  the mining sector, commer-
cial consumers of  electricity essentially 
subsidised residential consumers whose 
average tariff  for 2003/2004 was 1.01 US 
cents per kWh while that for commercial 
consumers 2.6 US cents. In 2003, while 
residential customers used sixty-eight 
percent of  total energy (not including 
energy for mining), they contributed thirty-
eight percent of  total revenue.  Those 
residential customers in rural areas that 
received ZESCO electricity benefited from 
subsidies, but they account for a very small 
share of  total energy consumption, two 
tenths of  a percent. Because they relied on 
more expensive off-grid diesel generators, 
these customers paid only fifteen 
percent of  the total cost of  supplying them 
with electricity.
For the mining sector, ZESCO gener-
ated electricity for the Copperbelt Energy 
Corporation (CEC), a private company that 
then transmitted and distributed it to the 
mining areas. A fifteen year agreement 
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consumed in the country. Thus, it had 
limited ability to use pricing to cover the 
capital costs of  expanding its grid.
Another constraint on raising tariffs is 
that many of  ZESCO's residential custom-
ers could not afford higher tariffs. 
Superficial evidence suggests that commer-
cial customers subsidised residential cus-
tomers and higher-income residential 
customers (proxied by their greater electric-
ity consumption) subsidised lower-income 
ones.  It remains that less than half  of  
urban households had access to electricity.  
While existing tariffs should be made more 
progressive, expansion of  access should 
take priority over cross-subsidisation of  
existing customers.
Higher tariffs, however, was not the 
primary problem facing many potential 
customers who lived in informal urban 
settlements or rural areas; it was access. 
Expanding the grid and providing other 
cheaper forms of  energy are the only 
solutions to this problem. Over two-thirds 
of  the energy needs of  households in 
Zambia were met by firewood. So, expand-
ing the consumption of  renewable energy 
sources is an option that should command 
greater attention.
For expansion of  the grid, financing for 
extensive public investment in generation, 
transmission and distribution is necessary.  
ZESCO was forced to borrow from 
international banks in order to rehabilitate 
its existing capacity. Expanding this capacity 
would involve even more borrowing.  The 
immediate answer is to seek greater interna-
tional concessional lending and supportive 
grant financing for expanding the provision 
of  energy. Such an objective should be 
incorporated, as an essential component, 
into Zambia's MDG-based Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. Energy services are 
critical to achievement of  many of  the 
MDG targets.  For the longer term, the 
public sector will have to raise additional 
domestic resources to finance public 
investment in the energy sector. The 
government will need to use general reve-
nues to cover a significant proportion of  
energy-related public investment, instead of  
relying on raising tariffs to levels that can 
cover both recurrent and capital costs. Such 
cost-reflective tariffs would run counter to 
the equity objectives of  providing broad-
based affordable service.
The government of  Zambia initiated 
significant reforms in the health sector in 
1992. It created a new, more decentralised 
system of  health institutions, including a 
Central Board of  Health, District Health 
Boards and Neighbourhood Health 
Committees. It also mandated that each 
health facility, particularly in rural areas, 
deliver an Essential Health Service 
Package. It introduced a new financial 
management system based, in part, on the 
introduction of  'user fees' (usually desig-
nated as 'cost sharing').
Decentralisation of  the health system 
was supposed to increase community 
participation and make it more effective in 
delivering services. The Essential Health 
Service Package was designed to ensure a 
minimum level of  service for the whole 
population, i.e., primary health care services 
for sexually transmitted diseases, child 
health, waterborne diseases, malaria, TB and 
reproductive health. 
User fees have been the most controver-
sial of  the changes. They have been 
designed to raise more revenue within a 
health care system in which government 
revenues have been in sharp decline. A 
portion of  these revenues has been ear-
marked for performance bonuses in order 
to enhance the motivation and accountabil-
ity of  health workers. Payment for services 
is also supposed to strengthen the demands 
of  patients for better service.
In order to make the application of  user 
fees more equitable, certain groups of  the 
population have been exempted from them. 
Criteria have been based on age (e.g., 
1567.4  Health Sector
Introduction
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children under five years of  age and adults 
over sixty-five years of  age), type of  disease 
(e.g., diabetes, tuberculosis, STDs and 
epidemics, such as cholera) and ability to 
pay. Usually, fees have to be paid in cash 
although in-kind payments have sometimes 
been accepted.
The health sector changes were introduced 
in 1992 in order to counteract the deteriora-
tion in the population's health that was 
evident in the 1980s. However, although 
deterioration in health conditions slowed 
after 1992, reversing this negative trend has 
not been common.  Where progress has 
occurred, it has been marginal. The under-
five mortality rate has continued to rise, 
primarily as a result of  a rise in mortality 
among children in rural areas (Table 7.13). 
Life expectancy has improved marginally in 
the last ten years but still stands below the 
level achieved in 1980. Between 1996 and 
2000/2001, maternal mortality rose from 
649 per one hundred thousand live births to 
729. The rate of  incidence of  malaria 
increased from twenty-six percent of  the 
population in 1990 to thirty-eight percent in 
2000. And the incidence of  HIV rose to 
sixteen percent in 2000/2001, one of  the 
highest in Africa.
While the main provider of  health in 
Zambia is the government, its facilities are 
disproportionately located in urban areas. 
The chief  providers of  health care in rural 
areas are church-related hospitals and health 
centres. The private sector has a limited role 
in health provision in the country; its 
activities confined to basic or primary health 
care. Part of  the reason for the limited 
private role is the expenses involved in 
starting a private facility and their low 
profits. Thus, these facilities are heavily 
concentrated in the richer urban areas of  
the country, e.g., the Copperbelt and Lusaka.
Related to the health sector changes, 
expenditures on health rose appreciably 
during the 1990s. As a percentage of  GDP, 
they rose from 3.3 percent in 1990 to 6.9 
Health Trends and Resources
percent in 1998 (Table 7.14). In per capita 
terms, they rose from US$ 15.9 to US$ 23.3. 
But government health expenditures per 
capita dropped during this period from US$ 
5.9 to US$ 2.2 (constant 1995 prices).  From 
1990 to 2002, government's share of  total 
health spending declined from 45 percent to 
about 23 percent (Table 7.15). At the same 
time, the importance of  donor funding rose 
dramatically, from only 6 percent in 1990 to 
almost 42 percent in 2002.
The share borne by households also 
rose, from twenty-one percent to 31.5 
percenta sharp fifty percent increase (Table 
7.15). This was mainly due to rising drug 
expenditures and greater resort to private 
health facilities. As a share of  total house-
hold health expenditures, drugs rose from 
fifty to over seventy percent during this 
period.  In public health institutions, 
patients are supposed to receive prescribed 
drugs free but often they are in short supply. 
Consequently, the patients have to buy the 
drugs from private pharmacies. In health 
facilities in richer urban areas, such as 
Lusaka and Livingstone, user fees have 
accounted for a higher share of  total 
revenue. In rural areas and poorer areas, 
there has been a greater reliance on govern-
ment grants and donor funds.
One effect of  the system of  user fees is to 
motivate health clinics to refer patients to 
hospitals after they have collected their own 
fees. In this way, they can pass on the cost 
of  treatment to the hospitals. This is one of  
the reasons that the health care system has 
not become more efficient. Hospitals are 
still involved in primary health care, espe-
cially in urban areas and richer areas. A 
major reason is that they are perceived to 
provide better quality service. As a result, 
when patients now skip a primary health 
care centre and go directly to hospitals for 
treatment, they are charged a 'bypass fee'. 
Hence, hospitals have come to rely more 
heavily on user fees than primary health 
facilities. Patients are willing to pay such 
Access and Community Participation
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fees because they avoid the waiting involved 
in referrals from primary health facilities. So, 
decentralisation of  health care has not appr-
eciably improved the System's effectiveness.
Decentralisation of  the health care 
system in Zambia was also supposed to 
enhance community participation in deci-
sion-making with regard to local health 
facilities. However, such participation 
remains weak. For example, in 2000/2001, 
only five percent of  women reported ever 
having attended a meeting of  a Neighbo-
urhood Health Committee (Table 7.16) and 
less than one percent of  men had attended a 
meeting. Interviews of  community mem-
bers indicate that they remain mistrustful or 
wary of  such initiatives. Not infrequently, 
their main participation involves providing 
free labour to health projects.
Attendance at health facilities has 
dropped after the new health policy, declin-
ing by thirty-five percent for health centres 
and twenty-five for hospitals. Part of  the 
reason was that the burden of  the total 
costs of  access to health care, including 
transport costs and user fees, was regressive. 
Residents in rural areas and low-income 
urban areas paid a higher share of  their 
income. One estimate in 2002 suggested 
that residents in rural areas spent fifteen 
percent of  their monthly income on health 
care, while residents in low-cost housing in 
urban areas paid nine percent, and residents 
of  high-cost housing in urban areas only 
four percent. 
Methods for providing exemptions for 
user fees were problematic. Exemptions 
based on age worked well as did exemptions 
based on disease.  But exemptions based on 
inability to pay did not function effectively.  
Such decisions are left up to the discretion 
of  community health centres.  Not only 
were some people denied access because of  
their inability to pay, others declined to visit 
a health centre because they lacked the 
money to pay for care.  A 2001 survey 
found that about one fifth of  all prospective 
patients, both in rural and urban areas, were 
denied access to health care (Table 7.17). In 
urban areas, one third of  the population 
stated that they could not pay for medicines. 
Accessing health care was a significant 
problem for women, particularly in rural 
areas. About seventy-two percent of  
women in rural areas reported lack of  
money for treatment or transport to a 
health facility. Almost sixty percent cited the 
distance from a facility as a problem in 
securing access to health care.
Lack of  staff  in the health care system in 
Zambia is a formidable problem. Retaining 
medical staff, especially doctors and nurses, 
has been difficult, and assigning them to 
rural areas was even more problematic. 
Most clinical staff  was concentrated in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the richer areas 
of  the country. In addition, the policy 
measure to 'de-link' medical staff  from the 
civil service severely aggravated an already 
difficult staff  situation. 
The de-linking, which began in 1997, 
was intended to give greater powers to 
health districts in bargaining with staff  and 
enforcing discipline. It was also intended to 
introduce greater labour flexibility; i.e., 
more flexibility in hiring and firing of  staff.   
When staff  was assigned to locally managed 
employment systems, entitlements to 
pensions and other Benefits were jeopar-
dised. Related to this problem, the union for 
medical staff  lobbied for severance pay, but 
the government was unable or unwilling to 
bear this a financial responsibility. 
As a result, the government abandoned 
the change in labour policy in 2004. But one 
third of  medical staff  had been assigned to 
local health systems. Consequently, the 
public health care system in 2005 had a dual 
employment system, with significant 
disparities in pay and benefits.  A voluntary 
redundancy programme for medical staff, 
supported by external donors, made matters 
worse. This resulted in a loss of  1,400 
professional health workers. An additional 
problem undercutting retention of  staff  was 
low salaries.  Doctors and nurses emigrated 
Human Resource Problems
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153 This section is based on the background paper, 
“Commercialisation of  Water Supply in Zambia” by Hulya 
Dagdeviren, which was written for the UNDP global project 
“Privatisation and Poverty Reduction”.
154 This section is based on the paper “Impact of  Power Sector 
Reforms in Zambia on Performance and Delivery”, written by Jorry 
M. Mwenechanya for the UNDP global project “Privatisation and 
Poverty Reduction”.
155 See Mwenechanya (2005), who used data from Southern 
African Power Pool Annual Report 2004.
156 This section is based on the paper “An Assessment of  the 
Health Sector Reforms in Zambia”, written by Hulya Dagdeviren 
for the UNDP global project “Privatisation and Poverty Reduction”.
to Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, 
where salaries were higher. As a conse-
quence, out of  the 836 Zambian doctors 
who graduated between 1992 and 1997, 
only 239, or less than thirty percent, 
remained in public service at the end of  the 
period. Expatriate doctors from China and 
Cuba have been recruited to fill the vacan-
cies. Even though  this has not overcome 
the decline in the number of  doctors per 
one hundred thousand people. While this 
ratio had been fourteen in 1985, it dropped 
to seven by 1999. 
Decentralisation of  the health care system 
in Zambia, and its accompanying quasi-
commercial reliance on cost recovery, has 
had a mixed record of  success. According 
to many basic indicators, health has contin-
ued to decline despite the reforms. The lack 
of  financial and human resources has been 
a major obstacle to improving the country's 
health care system. An overriding problem 
has been the cutback in government 
resources for healthcare. This has forced 
health facilities to rely more on donor 
funding or cost recovery. 
De-linking health care workers from the 
civil service, in the name of  promoting 
greater labour flexibility, compounded the 
problem of  a decline in financing. Clearly, if  
Zambia is to retain qualified personnel, it 
needs to provide adequate incentives, such 
as better salaries and conditions of  service. 
De-linking personnel from the civil service 
appears to have been a major mistake and 
has weakened the whole system.  Retaining 
health workers in rural areas is a particularly 
serious problem. One option is to issue 
medical licenses to new graduates after they 
have served for a specified period of  time in 
rural areas. Those regular personnel that 
serve in rural areas should be provided with 
assurances that they will be subsequently re-
assigned to more attractive locations.
In addition to the deterioration of  
health care's availability, user fees and 
distance to facilities adversely affected 
Conclusions and Recommendations
demand. The policy of  charging fees for 
basic health care should be re-considered.  
Much of  the impact on household incomes 
appears regressive. The available evidence 
suggests that the utilisation of  health 
facilities has declined because of  user fees. 
Moreover, the system of  granting exemp-
tions from fees because of  inability to pay 
for services has not proved to be effective. 
Government should re-assume responsibil-
ity for providing, free of  charge, a minimum 
level of  primary health care for the whole 
population. Financing this basic level of  
service must come from general revenue.
The problem that many patients had in 
traversing long distances to reach a health 
facility can be addressed only through 
substantially increasing public investment in 
more facilities. This would rely on public 
resources, either through mobilizing more 
government revenue or accessing more 
external resources. 
Most public health facilities were located 
in urban areas, and rural areas were served 
mainly by church-related facilities. Sector 
reforms had little impact on health condi-
tions in rural areas.  The methods used for 
decentralizing health care should be re-
examined, for they do not appear successful 
in empowering patients or eliciting more 
community participation. Further, after 
commercialisation more of  the costs of  
health care fell into administrative expendi-
tures. By some measures, decentralizing the 
system led to greater inefficiencies.
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Table 7.1. Cost recovery in water and sanitation schemes, 1987
Table 7.2. Cost recovery before and after commercialisation 
in water and sanitation
Table 7.3. Selected performance indicators on cost recovery, 2002
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b, based on Coopers & Lybrand (1988)
Note: O+M is Operation plus maintenance costs
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b. 1992 numbers are from Department of Water Affairs, 
Ministry of Energy and Water Development. 2002 figures are estimated by using data
 from NWASCO (2003).
*  excludes salaries, including power, chemicals, transport and others 
** includes wages and salaries
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b based on NWASCO, 2003. 
UFW: Unaccounted-for water.
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Lusaka WSC
Copperbelt
Southern ESC
Western WSC
Northwestern WSC
Chipata WSC
AHC-MMS
Nkana
Kafubu
Mulonga
265.4
259.1
356.6
189.7
372.8
140.0
132.0
125.7
132.9 94.4
76.1
94.1
100.9
113.6
79.5
155.5
124.7
138.7 76
68
81
49
53
55
56
45
50
Name of
commercial 
utility
Collection as
% of OC*
Collection as
% of OC**
Collection/
(OC & M)
2002
Lusaka
Southern
Western
Northwestern
Chipata
AHC-MMS
Nkana
Kafubu
Mulonga
58 66 32
43
50
59
52
50
51
49
27
75
52
30
39
48
73
108
47
1
55
6
20
12
28
1
100
Water &
Sanitation
authority
UFW (%)
Revenue 
collection as 
(%) of billing
Metering
ratio (%)
Tariffs (Kw) Tariffs (US$)
1990 1994 1990 1994
15.4
8.8
5
1.3
50
60
40020-40
50-100
20-10
0.3-0.1
1-0.5
3-1.5
3-1.56300
3500
2000
500
20000
3000
--
1000
400
6
20
60
60
Medium cost housing
High cost housing
Low cost housing
Public taps
Parastatals, industrial,
& commercial consumers
Reconnection charge
Exchange rate ($/Kw)
Recovery measures National Urban Rural
Actual billing (% of billable)
Actual collection (% of actual billing)
O+M payment (% of actual collection)
71.2
68.7
130.7
71.0
68.7
121.6
75.5
68.9
327.3
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b, based on Department of Water Affairs, Ministry of 
Energy and Water Development 
Table 7.4. National water tariffs in the 1990s (monthly
flat rates)
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Table 7.5. Tariffs of selected water and sanitation  authorities, 2002
Table 7.6. Approximate rates of affordability of water charges in Lusaka  1998*
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b, based on NWASCO
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b, based on estimates using LWSC tariffs for 1998 which 
were obtained from NWASCO, distribution for 1998, from NWASCO, and distribution of 
household income from the Living conditions Monitoring Survey 1998.
*Note that these estimates are valid only for water charges. The bill of households 
connected to the main sewerage network of the town includes a separate sanitation 
charge that varies from one utility to another. The most common practice is to charge a 
fixed proportion of the water bill (varying between thirty-five and fifty percent) over and 
above the charge for water.  
Lusaka SouthernWestern ChipataAHC-MMS NkanaMulonga
2500
16960
27160
95520
7200
13920
29920
12000
18000
23000
35000
6000
10000
26000
3000
20500
35500
35500
8500
16900
14200
-
20900
33600
44980
10200
16730
22250
3500
8000
12000
21000
10500
18000
27500
3500
12000
20000
36000
7200
21600
43350
-
32000
66600
66000
20125
37375
89700
No charge 5000fix 40% 40% 50%
0.6
3.8
6.0
21.2
1.6
3.1
6.6
2.7
4.0
5.1
7.8
1.3
2.2
5.8
0.7
4.6
7.9
7.9
1.9
3.8
3.2
-
4.6
7.5
10.0
2.3
3.7
4.9
0.8
1.8
2.7
4.7
2.3
4.0
6.1
0.8
2.7
4.4
8.0
1.6
4.8
9.6
-
14.8
14.7
4.5
8.3
19.9
7.1
Amount in Kwacha
First rate
Public taps
Low cost
Medium cost
High  cost
3Charge for 15M
3Charge for 25M
3Charge for 50M
Sewerage (%
of water bill)
Public taps
Low cost
Medium cost
High  cost
3Charge for 15M
3Charge for 25M
3Charge for 50M
Tariffs in US$ (exchange rate K4500 in 2002)
Monthly household
income
% of HH in each
income category
Ratio of low
cost water charges 
to maximum income
15001 - 30000
30001 - 750000
75001 - 150000
150001 - 225000
225001 - 300000
300000+
Mean income:
417280
less than 15000 3
2
9
27
18
12
28
na
103.7
51.9
20.7
10.4
6.9
5.2
-
3.7 2.5
4
5
7
14
35
70
3
Cost of 25M
to income (%)
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Table 7.8. Service coverage by WSCs in 2002 
(percentage of the population in the service area)
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b based on Zambia Demographic and Health Surveys, 1992, 
1996, 2001-2
*Excludes water from unprotected wells, river, spring and stream, ponds and lakes.
Table 7.7. Sources of drinking water and access to sanitation (Percent of population)
Source: Dagdeviren 2005b, based on NWASCO
Urban Rural Zambia
Access to safe drinking water*
Piped into residence
Public tap
Wells & b. Holes
River, ponds, lakes etc
Other
Access to Sanitation
1992 1996 2001-2 1992 1996 2001-2 2001-2
93
55.5
33.6
9
1.7
0
96 95
2.4
1.3
15.2
33.9
46.7
88 90.2
42.1
37.2
15.8
1.6
2.3
95 46
48.4
40.6
7.2
3.3
31
0.2
42
1.7
5.3
66.9
25.5
0.4
57 57
0.4
28.8
64.2
4.2
2.4
41.4 51.4
15.9
15.8
47.7
19.6
65
0.5
Water Sanitation
Hours of
supply
Lusaka WSC
Copperbelt
Southern WSC
Western WSC
Northwestern WSC
Chipata WSC
Average
70 33 15
96 74 17.4
92 54 16.5
84 50 15.3
91 8 16
54 50 12.1
30 1 19.3
31 2 12
71 12 24
73w 32w 16.4s
AHC-MMS
Nkana
Kafubu
Mulonga
Table 7.9. Households access to electricity (%)
Source: Mwenechanya 2005 based on CSO Priority and Living Conditions Survey 
19911998
All Zambia
Cooking Lighting
Rural
Urban
Province
Central
Copperbelt
Eastern
Luapula
Lusaka
Northern
N/Wstern
Southern
1991 1996 1998
Cooking Lighting Cooking Lighting
11 18 13 17 15 19
0 2 1 2 1 2
26 39 36 45 39 48
10
20
3
2
33
4
6
6
17
35
8
40
10
16
13
5
12
29
2
3
37
1
3
5
18
35
4
5
44
3
5
8
16
33
1
2
36
4
1
12
20
14
2
6
42
16
3
16
Western 4 8 2 4 2 3
Table 7.11.  ZESCO expenses and net 
operating income
Source: Mwenechanya (2005), based on  ZESCO annual reports.
Table 7.13. Child mortality and life expectancy
Table 7.12:  Residential Tariffs for 2003
Source: Mwenechanya 2005 based on Energy Regulation Board
Tariff (US$)
1. Unmetered Charge period
1.1 Consumption up to 2Amps
1.2 Consumption between 2 - 15 Amps
2. Metered
(Capacity 15 kVA)
R1 -  Consumption up to 300 kWh
R2 -  Consumption from 301 - 700 kWh
R3 -  Consumption above 700 kWh
Month
Month
kWh
kWh
kWh
Fixed
monthly 1.075
0.030
0.018
0.013
3.267
0.903
Under-five mortality rate
(per 100)
Life expectancy at birth
(years)
2000
Zambia
Rural
Urban
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990
121
132
108
151
164
128
162
180
126
52
50
54
47
45
51
50
48
54
Table 7.10. Plant availability
Source: Mwenechanya (2005), from ZESCO 
annual Reports.
Income and expenses
1. Operating expenses
(% of operating income)
2. Depreciation
(% of operating income)
Net operating income
(100%-[1+2])
2001 2002 2003 2004
77.8
16.4
5.8 -4.6
15.5
89.1 88.1
15.4
-3.6
94.1
13.4
-7.5
Source: Dagdeviren 2005a based on the 2000 Census.
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Kafue Gorge Victoria Falls
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
82.1
91.1
89.1
83.5
84.4
60.0
62.5
76.1
80.5
78.0
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Rural
Urban
20 17.2
22.1 32.5
71.6 59.1
58.5 25.2
Denied access 
to a health
facility
Did not access
because could 
not afford
Problems for women in accessing
health care
Lack of money for
treatment or transport
Long distance to
health facility
Percentage of not aware of NHC
in their community
Percentage of who ever attended
an NHC meeting
Rural
Urban
Women Men Women Men
51.6 53.4
67.4 97.4
13 21
5 0.8
Total health 
expenditure
(% of GDP)*
Government Health Budget**
Health budget
(Million Kw)
Per capita health 
expenditure (Kw)
Per capita health 
expenditure (US$)
Total Per 
capita health 
expenditure (US$)*
1980
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
-
-
3.3
3.4
4.2
4.1
4.5
5.2
5.9
6.1
6.9
-
95,9897
80,599
41,755
61,729
38,378
39,931
57,127
55,658
39,068
36,414
39,750
33,730
16,936
12,114
5,341
7,643
4,589
4,615
8,293
5,989
4,060
3,654
3,897
3,186
18.8
13.5
5.9
8.5
5.1
5.1
9.2
6.7
3.7
2.8
2.2
1.5
-
-
15.9
14.2
16.7
15.7
17.2
20.1
20.8
25.1
23.3
-
* Figures are from World Development Indicators (WDI) in 1995 constant prices 
and in US$. 
They  are consistent with the data of the Ministry of Health in the middle three columns.
** Includes both Recurrent and Development Expenditures
Source: Dagdeviren 2005a based on MoH (2003), MoH (2004), WDI (1999)
Table 7.14  Selected indicators of health expenditure
Table 7.15. Contribution to total
health spending (%)
Table 7.16. Awareness of and participation in NHCs
Source: Dagdevirren 2005a, based on 
2002 data from MoH (2004) and 1990 data 
from Berman (1995).
* ZCCM accounted for over ninety-five percent 
of this contribution.
Source: Dagdeviren 2005a based on ZDHS, 2001
Table 7.17. Lack of access due to inability to pay for medical care (percent)
Source: Dagdeviren 2005a based on ZDHS, 2001
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1990 2002
Government
Parastatals*
Donors
Households
45
26
6
21
26.9
-
41.6
31.5
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MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
  Target 1     Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than one  dollar a day 
  Target 2  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
MDG 2: Achieve universal primary education
  Target 3     Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling
MDG 3: Promote gender equality  
  Target 4 Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 
and to all levels of education no later than 2015
MDG 4: Reduce child mortality
  Target 5 Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
MDG 5: Improve maternal health
   Target 6 Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
  Target 7 Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS
  Target 8 Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases
MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
  Target 9 Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
  Target 10  Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water
  Target 11 By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers
MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development
                 Target 12 Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and 
poverty reduction both nationally and internationally
  Target 13  Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Includes: tariff and 
quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC 
and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries 
committed to poverty reduction 
  Target 14  Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing 
states
  Target 15 Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through 
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term
  Target 16 In co-operation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for 
decent and productive work for youth
  Target 17  In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, 
essential drugs in developing countries
  Target 18  In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications
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